University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2019

The Political Economy Of Amazon Deforestation: Subnational
Development And The Uneven Reach Of The Colombian State
Javier Revelo-Rebolledo
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Latin American Languages and Societies Commons, Latin American Studies Commons,
Political Science Commons, and the Urban, Community and Regional Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Revelo-Rebolledo, Javier, "The Political Economy Of Amazon Deforestation: Subnational Development And
The Uneven Reach Of The Colombian State" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3511.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3511

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3511
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Political Economy Of Amazon Deforestation: Subnational Development And
The Uneven Reach Of The Colombian State
Abstract
The recent peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) has prompted radical changes in the country’s Amazon region. A decrease in violence
has been accompanied by an increase in deforestation, suggesting that good things do not always come
together. My dissertation studies the political economy of Amazon deforestation through a crossdisciplinary analysis linking studies of modern state formation with tropical deforestation. As such, it
offers an empirically grounded explanation for differential levels of deforestation in the Colombian
Amazon. Employing a mixed-methods research strategy, I reviewed historical archives on regional
development, interviewed more than ninety local leaders in the region, and produced an original
geodatabase on cumulative forest loss. This empirical strategy allowed me to measure Amazonian
deforestation since the 1970s and systematically compare Caquetá and Putumayo, which are the two
most similar departments with different levels of cumulative deforestation. Based on this research
design, this dissertation suggests that an explanation of different levels of cumulative deforestation
needs to seriously consider both the degree and the type of territorial integration. Cumulative
deforestation and territorial integration tend to be high in departments like Caquetá and Putumayo, which
transitioned from extractive economies to agrarian colonization in the first decades of the twentieth
century. Both cases were economically and politically similar until the mid-1950s, when their economic
and political incorporation trajectories and corresponding levels of deforestation began to diverge as a
result of the different integration strategies promoted by the Colombian state between 1948 and 1982
during the ‘developmental era’. Cumulative deforestation in Caquetá (compared to Putumayo) tends to be
higher because both the state and market forces succeeded in establishing an integration trajectory
based on the farming of livestock. This research has the potential to improve our understanding on the
geopolitical drivers of Amazon deforestation. Contemporary explanations that emphasize the withdrawal
of the FARC are incomplete insofar as they fail to recognize that the guerilla organization used to be very
influential in both departments and that deforestation in post-conflict Colombia has not increased equally.
My dissertation also illustrates the necessity of avoiding the geographical determinism characteristic of
much recent political science research and recognizing that geographical phenomena can sometimes be
endogenous to the discipline’s most important variables of interest. An increasing interest in
environmental issues has the potential to compel scholars and policy makers to better understand
exactly how geography matters, both socially and politically.
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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMAZON DEFORESTATION: SUBNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNEVEN REACH OF THE COLOMBIAN STATE

Javier Revelo-Rebolledo
Tulia Falleti

The recent peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has prompted radical changes in the country’s
Amazon region. A decrease in violence has been accompanied by an increase in
deforestation, suggesting that good things do not always come together. My dissertation
studies the political economy of Amazon deforestation through a cross-disciplinary
analysis linking studies of modern state formation with tropical deforestation. As such, it
offers an empirically grounded explanation for differential levels of deforestation in the
Colombian Amazon. Employing a mixed-methods research strategy, I reviewed historical
archives on regional development, interviewed more than ninety local leaders in the
region, and produced an original geodatabase on cumulative forest loss. This empirical
strategy allowed me to measure Amazonian deforestation since the 1970s and
systematically compare Caquetá and Putumayo, which are the two most similar
departments with different levels of cumulative deforestation. Based on this research
design, this dissertation suggests that an explanation of different levels of cumulative
deforestation needs to seriously consider both the degree and the type of territorial
integration. Cumulative deforestation and territorial integration tend to be high in
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departments like Caquetá and Putumayo, which transitioned from extractive economies
to agrarian colonization in the first decades of the twentieth century. Both cases were
economically and politically similar until the mid-1950s, when their economic and
political incorporation trajectories and corresponding levels of deforestation began to
diverge as a result of the different integration strategies promoted by the Colombian state
between 1948 and 1982 during the ‘developmental era’. Cumulative deforestation in
Caquetá (compared to Putumayo) tends to be higher because both the state and market
forces succeeded in establishing an integration trajectory based on the farming of
livestock. This research has the potential to improve our understanding on the
geopolitical drivers of Amazon deforestation. Contemporary explanations that emphasize
the withdrawal of the FARC are incomplete insofar as they fail to recognize that the
guerilla organization used to be very influential in both departments and that
deforestation in post-conflict Colombia has not increased equally. My dissertation also
illustrates the necessity of avoiding the geographical determinism characteristic of much
recent political science research and recognizing that geographical phenomena can
sometimes be endogenous to the discipline’s most important variables of interest. An
increasing interest in environmental issues has the potential to compel scholars and policy
makers to better understand exactly how geography matters, both socially and politically.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

“The state is a Janus about which it is impossible to state a positive
property without simultaneously stating a negative property… a
progressive property without a regressive and oppressive property.
This is troubling for those people who like to think that everything will
turn out rosy.” Pierre Bourdieu (2014, p. 98)

1.1. Peace vs Forests?
In September 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla movement
finally reached a peace agreement after a four-year peace process. When the agreement
was still under negotiation, the United Nations Development Program and Colombia’s
National Planning Office organized a public forum to debate “The Environmental
Dividends of Peace.” Former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos was invited to
this forum and, as expected, delivered a talk highlighting the benefits of peace. In
addition to promoting economic development and public safety, Santos (2016) argued,
peace “will give us the greatest environmental dividends.” The logic of his presentation
was simple: since violence was a cause of environmental degradation, peace would
restore the environment to health. The environment was presented as a casualty of
violence; one whose misery was about to end. Without violence, Santos added, peasants
would not clear land to cultivate coca, insurgents would become guardians of the forest,
the army would allocate additional resources to fighting environmental degradation, and
the government would eradicate coca crops, develop marginalized areas, and protect
additional lands. The Colombian Amazon, which is located in the northwestern corner of
region, would flourish (see Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1. The Colombian Amazon region in context
Data for the Amazon region from RAISG, for rivers from NASA, for political boundaries
from the Natural Earth (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).

Santos’ optimistic appraisal of the relationship between peace and the
environment is not unique. In fact, it reflects a common view according to which a
virtuous cycle links peace, development, and environmental protection. The 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development is perhaps the most prominent example of
this position. Warfare, the Declaration states, is “inherently destructive” of sustainable
development (Principles 15 and 24). Because “peace, development and environmental
protection are interdependent and indivisible,” environmental degradation is the result of
mismanaged or non-sustainable development (Principle 25). This common view presents
the development of the modern state—one capable of governing its territories—as a

3

crucial means to resolving most social problems, including environmental ones. The
modern state is conceived as a problem-solving organization, implying that
environmental problems are the direct result of impediments to state consolidation (e.g.,
violence, corruption, poverty, undefined property rights, etc.).

Figure 1.2. Annual deforestation by country in the Andean Amazon
Reprinted from Amazon Conservation – Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project MAPP
(2018, Dec 3). Data: Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA, UMD/GLAD, Global Forest
Watch, MINAM/PNCB, RAISG.

Soon after the FARC demobilized, however, Amazon deforestation began to
increase. The Colombian Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology, and Environmental
Studies (IDEAM) has repeatedly shown that deforestation in the Colombian Amazon, a
region where the FARC was once very influential, has accelerated since 2016 (e.g.,
Ramírez, 2011; Vásquez, Vargas, & Restrepo, 2011). Figure 1.2 clearly depicts these
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transformations, which pose difficult questions for the idea of environmental peace
dividends in the Colombian Amazon.
In light of these transformations, I argue that Colombia is a crucial case for
exploring the relationship between state strength and environmental degradation (Alcañiz
& Gutiérrez, 2018; Schwartz, 2003; Slough & Urpelainen, 2019). The primary objective
of my dissertation is to examine that relationship both theoretically and empirically by
linking political science research on the modern territorial state with environmentalist
knowledge about tropical deforestation.
The idea of a virtuous cycle linking the strength of the state with environmental
protection has limited purchase when it comes to explaining countries like Colombia,
where environmental degradation has increased following a relatively successful peace
process—one that both fortified the state’s monopoly on violence (Weber, 1968) and
enhanced its infrastructural power (Mann, 1984).1 If environmental problems are
problems of state weakness, as the common view assumes, then one would expect better
environmental outcomes in post-conflict Colombia, where the state has been historically
weak. Why, then, does Colombia defy this popular view? What can the Colombian case
tell us about the role of the modern territorial state in tropical deforestation? Is state
strength

or weakness

a driver of deforestation? How does the strength of the state

prevent or promote deforestation?

1

Colombia is usually considered a clear example of state weakness in Latin America and the developing
world. See for instance (Centeno 2002; Saylor, 2014; Soifer, 2015).
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This thesis suggests that the relationship between deforestation and the modern
state needs to consider two antecedent dimensions of state strength and the politics of
enforcement. These dimensions emphasize the importance of both the territorial reach of
the state and state functions. Based on basic claim, I propose that cumulative
deforestation results from a macro process of economic, political and cultural integration,
which in Colombia mostly occurred during the twentieth century. In this sense,
cumulative deforestation is highest in the Amazonian provinces that are highly integrated.
Furthermore, among the provinces that are highly integrated, my thesis suggest that
cumulative deforestation is highest where the state actively promoted the consolidation of
commercial farming vis-à-vis other economic sectors during the developmental era.
Therefore, cumulative deforestation results from different degrees and types of
integration, which in turn have left entrenched economic, political and cultural legacies
that strongly constrain the possibilities of advancing an environmental agenda in the
different regions of the Colombian Amazon.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The second section introduces the
object of study: the relationship between the modern state and Amazon deforestation. The
third section provides a general overview of Amazon deforestation and its drivers in
Colombia. The fourth section presents the basic characteristics of my research design and
methodological approach. The fifth section defends the importance of studying Amazon
deforestation, and establishes its relevance to political science debates. In the final two
sections, I summarize the dissertation’s core argument and provide an overview of
subsequent chapters.
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1.2. The Why and How of Amazon Deforestation Beyond the Enforcement Paradigm
Journalists, environmental activists, and researchers in Colombia have begun to
explore political and economic explanations for deforestation in Amazonia after the
FARC´s demobilization.2 A strong hypothesis has emerged according to which Amazon
deforestation has increased due to the absence of political authority in regions previously
controlled by the FARC. Post-conflict Amazonia, then, is characterized as a lawless
territory; the withdrawal of the FARC has created a “power vacuum”3 that explains not
only recent decline in violence but also spiking deforestation rates. According to Rodrigo
Botero, a former director of the Amazon division of the Colombian National Parks Unit,
“although deforestation is absolutely serious, there is a more complex issue underlying
deforestation, which is the loss of territorial sovereignty by the Colombian state... It is a
problem for the state as a whole” (interview 13).
Underpinning the connection between deforestation and post-conflict lawlessness
is a modified version of the abovementioned view of a virtuous cycle said to link
development, peace, and environmental protection. If peace is expected to yield
environmental dividends, then increasing deforestation following a peace agreement can
only be explained as the result of widespread illegality and crime. José Yunis Mebarak
(2018), the coordinator of a novel state program whose objective is to protect the
Amazon region (Visión Amazonía), provides a clear summary of this view. According to
Mebarak,

2

See, for example, Baena (2017), Cote (2017), López (2018), Reilly and Parra (2019) and Zarama (2019).
Some even claim that formerly FARC-controlled regions have witnessed a descent into “criminal
anarchy” (Ávila & Londoño, 2017).
3
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What is happening is illegal, immoral and irrational. It is illegal because they are
appropriating land that belongs to all Colombians with fires that are prohibited in
our country... It is immoral because they have no right or reason to burn every
animal, plant, and living species without differentiation... It is irrational because
they destroy the regulatory force of the climate.
Amazon deforestation is thus portrayed as a consequence of anarchy, negligence,
greed, and illegality. At first glance, the idea is appealing because, like many developing
countries, Colombia has passed numerous environmental laws over the past four decades
with the aim of regulating and punishing the misuse of natural resources (Amaya, 2002;
Maya-Aguirre, 2018). If, despite the introduction of comprehensive and ambitious
environmental laws and constitutional provisions, deforestation not only continues but
increases, practitioners and scholars have good reason to construe the problem as a lack
of law enforcement. And indeed, contemporary policy debates on Amazon deforestation
tend to accept that Santos’ environmental peace dividends have not reached Amazonia
due to insufficient enforcement—a view I refer to as the “enforcement paradigm.”4
The enforcement paradigm is much more than a theory, however. Given
increasing deforestation rates, the Colombian government is steadily enhancing and redirecting its enforcement capabilities to prosecute the ranchers, peasants, and coca
growers who are deforesting Amazonia. It is accepted that deforesters must incur
“exemplary sanctions.”5 For instance, in November 2018, the Office of the Attorney
General and the Police launched a massive operation

the first of its kind

to

confiscate cattle and expel cattle ranchers who were occupying the Picachos National
4

By conceiving Amazon deforestation as an enforcement issue, journalists, environmental activists, and
researchers end up debating whether the problem results from a lack of capacity or a lack of political will.
5
The Colombian Congress is currently considering a reform of the Criminal Code that would increase
penalties for deforestation.

8

Park in Caquetá department.6 The park is located in the highlands of San Vicente del
Caguán, a municipality where the FARC was influential until 2016. Police actions
quickly triggered protests and riots by locals who felt threatened by anti-deforestation
enforcement activity that, according to them, did not take their needs into consideration
(El Espectador, 2018). These events illustrate how, in the wake of the peace accords, the
Colombian Amazon region has witnessed an increase in deforestation, public attention,
law enforcement activity, and social conflict, all of which are quickly transforming the
region and the political economy of deforestation.
Naturally, the paradigm that associates tropical deforestation with a lack of law
enforcement is not unique to Colombia. The enforcement paradigm permeates political
and academic debates in other tropical countries and has become a commonplace among
scholars of state-led environmental strategies (Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, &
Sieber, 2012; Schwartz, 2003). A clear example of the enforcement paradigm is Mark
Ungar´s recent edited volume on state action in the Amazon region, whose subtitle is
Environmental Enforcement in the World’s Biggest Rainforest (2018). The book explores
environmental problems in each Amazonian country and emphasizes the persistence of
law enforcement limitations everywhere.
Similarly, recent studies of tropical deforestation in political science have focused
on the problem of enforcing anti-deforestation policies (Alcañiz & Gutiérrez, 2018;
Fernández & Garay, 2019; Slough & Urpelainen, 2019). These studies tend to accept the

6

As in many developing countries, in Colombia the occupation of a protected area is prohibited unless the
area overlaps with an indigenous territory (Decree 622/1977, art. 7).
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idea that deforestation results from a lack of enforcement, although the particular factors
that explain variation in enforcement dynamics differ. Slough and Urpelainen (2019, p. 3)
capture the way the phenomenon tends to be perceived: “the scale and visibility of
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon represents a direct consequence of the state´s
inability or unwillingness to enforce laws against deforestation.”
The enforcement paradigm benefits theoretically from the reasonable expectation
that state strength is essential for achieving most socially-valued outcomes (Centeno,
Kohli, Yashar, & Mistree, 2017). Common wisdom, based on comparative scholarship,
holds that the strength of the state is either a good in itself or an important factor in
promoting essential outcomes such as economic development, democratization, public
order, poverty and crime reduction, and so forth.7 The expectation is even stronger among
scholars who study developing countries, where the negative consequences of state
weakness are felt by people in their everyday lives (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; García
Villegas & Espinosa, 2013; Kohli, 2004). In light of the reality that political interest in
preventing deforestation has steadily risen since the late 1970s while successes remain
elusive, it is tempting to conclude that Amazon deforestation is principally a problem of
law enforcement and state weakness.
My dissertation takes issue with both the assumption of a positive relationship
between state strength, peace, and forest conservation and the view that reduces the role
of the modern territorial state to effective enforcement and implementation of
environmental policies (Alcañiz & Gutiérrez, 2018; Fernández & Garay, 2019; Schwartz,

7

See for example Evans (1995), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Kohli (2004) and Linz and Stepan (1996).
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2003; Slough & Urpelainen, 2019; Ungar, 2018). To be sure, I do not argue that the
enforcement paradigm is completely inaccurate. It not only has some explanatory value
after all deforestation tends to happen where the state is weakest and therefore law
enforcement is challenging

but also points in the right direction: deforestation

dynamics in Amazonia are closely related to first-order concerns about state territoriality.
My dissertation assumes a broader conception of the state that is not solely
focused on enforcement capacities. In addition, it focuses on the socio-political drivers of
Amazon deforestation, an environmental phenomenon that directly touches on two
defining features of the modern state: territory and violence (e.g., Foucault, 1991; Spruyt,
1994; M. Weber, 1968). It was Max Weber who famously defined the state as “the form
of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate
physical violence within a particular territory,” noting that “this idea of ‘territory’ is an
essential defining feature” of the state (2004, p. 33).8
On the basis of this broader conception, I maintain that enforcement paradigm is
insufficient to comprehend the complex relationship between the modern territorial state
and deforestation. Enforcement issues represent only the surface of the problem dynamics
associated with the region’s economic and political integration. Put differently, my
research takes issue with a narrative that treats tropical deforestation as if it were simply
another policy area subject to enforcement and relies on an ahistorical conception of state

8

Although territoriality and the legitimate monopoly on violence are defining characteristics of the modern
state, my conceptualization extends beyond those characteristics. As explained in Chapter 2 explain, I
explore a variety of historical models of state-initiated “social engineering” of forested hinterlands (Scott,
1998, p. 4).

11

strength that fails to consider the social and territorial determinants of state power (Mann,
1984). In what follows, I propose that we instead conceive state territorial reach (STR) as
an antecedent dimension of state strength, one that has traditionally been associated with
a particular set of social characteristics.9
Political science literature suggests that policy enforcement is dependent on a
minimum of state strength (Brinks, Levitsky, & Murillo, 2019; Holland, 2016). Although
such a minimum does not guarantee effective law enforcement, it is difficult to imagine
effective enforcement in its absence. An important dimension of state strength in that
literature is STR (Eaton, 2012; Giraudy, 2012). Many developing countries with vast
hinterlands face the serious challenge of exercising power over great distances (Herbst,
2000). For this reason, states that barely control their peripheries are often characterized
as weak (Soifer & Vom Hau, 2008). STR, then, is a first-order concern, and thus an
antecedent dimension of strength.
Given the strong link between enforcement and state strength, and between state
strength and STR, it stands to reason that high STR will contribute to the achievement of
most policy goals, including deforestation prevention. However, as I argue in this
dissertation, the enforcement paradigm as currently applied to deforestation rarely
considers the role of STR, which is linked to important economic and political integration

9

This type of argument is not uncommon in the discipline. The example that comes to mind is the debate
over the developmental state. Scholarship initially suggested that the type of state (e.g., predatory vs.
developmental) explains industrialization and economic growth (Bates, 1981; Evans, 1995). According to
Kohli (2004), however, there exists a “historically prior question” (p. 16) about the origins of different
types of states. Studies of the economic consequences of the state must therefore consider the decisive
influence of state formation patterns. Kohli claims, for example, that South Korea’s successful
developmental state cannot be explained without attention to the particular state-society relations that the
Japanese empire left in place.
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trajectories. By studying the social sources of STR, my dissertation reveals how the
enforcement paradigm fails to recognize the close association between the modern state
and the consolidation of internal territorial frontiers, a process in which closing the
Amazonian frontier has typically meant the “cleansing” of the forest. STR is much
reduced in forestlands due to the absence of basic economic and social conditions that
favor the state (Herbst, 2000; Mann, 1984; Scott, 2009). States rarely penetrate a region
without a prior transformation of the landscape. Although deforestation occurs where the
state is weakest, the clearance of land has historically accompanied the region’s
economic and political integration into the market and state project (LeGrand, 1986).
Put differently, although state weakness is a structural constraint that limits the
implementation of anti-deforestation policies, it is worth recognizing that the state is
weak in forested regions precisely because they are barely integrated. One implication of
this claim is that the modern territorial state is typically ill-equipped to prevent further
deforestation because STR

a dimension of state strength

is often preceded by forest

clearance. This is why contemporary dynamics of Amazon deforestation reveal the Janus
face of both the state and the relatively successful peace process in Amazonia.
In sum, the widely accepted link between state strength and better social outcomes
may not mechanically apply in the case of tropical deforestation because STR tends to be
linked to the very social conditions that favor deforestation. Social phenomena that favor
STR and the strength that facilitates it may also favor deforestation. The enforcement
paradigm is thus of limited value when it comes to explaining this particular policy area.
Analyzing the complex particularities of Amazonia’s territorial integration will better
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enable us to explain why the expected virtuous cycle between peace and forest protection
has not occurred since the onset of the peace agreement. In establishing the relevance of
enduring integration trajectories to questions of state strength, it is useful to consider
subnational differences in Amazon deforestation.

1.3. Amazon Deforestation in Colombia
While it is true that Amazon deforestation has markedly increased following the
demobilization of the FARC, the effect has not been uniform across the Amazon region.
The withdrawal of the FARC has not affected the same transformations everywhere,
despite the fact that the guerrilla organization was once active in most Amazonian
municipalities. If the FARC’s withdrawal was the main cause of increasing deforestation
one would expect similar transformations in all regions previously under their influence.
Arguments that emphasize the causal role of the FARC tend to assume a shortterm temporal horizon that compares landscape transformations before and after
demobilization (Armenteras, Schneider, & Dávalos, 2018; Baena, 2017; Cote, 2017;
López, 2018; Prem, Saavedra, & Vargas, 2019; Wade, 2018). These arguments are
implicitly premised on the idea that changes over time are more consequential than
changes over space. By contrast, my dissertation emphasizes regional differences when
studying the impact of the FARC’s demobilization on deforestation. I argue that the
FARC effect is mediated by the long-term economic and political integration trajectories
of different Amazonian territories. Put differently, it is necessary to consider historic
integration pathways if we are to fully comprehend the FARC’s role in explaining
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contemporary deforestation, and doing so requires attention to territorial differences as
well as temporal ones.
This invitation to consider enduring integration pathways better accords with
existing mainstream literature on tropical and Amazon deforestation, which tends to
emphasize economic and demographic explanations over purely political ones (e.g.,
Andrade, 1992; Armenteras, Rudas, Rodriguez, Sua, & Romero, 2006; Cabrera, Vargas,
Galindo, & Ordoñez, 2011). Generally speaking, political variables have not only been
understudied but marginalized from academic debates on the drivers of deforestation.
Although this specialized literature is useful in identifying the proximate drivers of
deforestation, it takes these drivers for granted. For this reason, the basic thrust of my
argument is that the immediate drivers of deforestation are themselves configured by
other, more primary forces, and that the role of politics becomes clearer when historical
processes are considered (Geist & Lambin, 2002).
In order to study the relationship between STR and Amazon deforestation, my
research investigates different levels of Amazon deforestation in Colombia at the
subnational level and explores the empirical and theoretical relationship between
deforestation and the modern territorial state. Colombian Amazonia has been less studied
by experts on tropical deforestation than other Amazonian regions. The civil war
prevented the study not only of the drivers of deforestation (Rudel, Flesher, Bates,
Baptista, & Holmgren, 2000) but also of biodiversity in the Colombian Amazon (Baptiste
et al., 2017; Wade, 2018).
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1.4.

Research Design and Methodological Approach
The methodological decisions in this dissertation were grounded in substantive

concerns and guided by two negative considerations. First, I hoped to avoid formulating a
research question on the basis of available data or simply in order to accommodate the
latest methodologies. Second, I wanted to avoid methodologies that oversimplified
complex phenomena. My privileging of substantive concerns over methodological
considerations is responsive to a recent invitation for political scientists to produce more
grounded studies of Latin American political economy that deal with real-world problems
and entail rigorous empirical research (Luna, Murillo, & Schrank, 2014). My approach
combines different methods and data sources in order to avoid the mismatch between
complex ontologies and over-simplifying methodologies (Hall, 2003). The following subsections provide a general outline of my research design and methodological approach.

1.4.1. The Study of Deforestation and Integration
I employ a mixed-method research strategy, which varies depending on whether I
am addressing degrees or types of political-economic integration. I begin by studying the
Colombian Amazon as a single case before executing my paired subnational comparison
between Caquetá and Putumayo, which are, as I will explain, the two most integrated
Amazonian departments exhibiting different levels of cumulative deforestation.
In relation to different degrees of integration, it is worth noting that the
Colombian Amazon region does not always overlap with internal political and
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administrative boundaries.10 As such, not every department in the region is completely
Amazonian. My research is largely focused on explaining variation in subnational
Amazon deforestation in the six departments that are entirely Amazonian: Caquetá,
Putumayo, Guaviare, Guainía, Vaupés, and Amazonas (see Figure 1.3).11 Although the
six entirely Amazonian departments belong to the same ecological region and share in
common most basic political and economic institutions, they exhibit very different levels
of cumulative deforestation. Figure 1.3 schematically illustrates how forest cover is high
and cumulative deforestation low in fact, practically nonexistent—in eastern Amazonia.
The figure divides the fully Amazonian departments into two groups corresponding to
high (Caquetá, Putumayo, Guaviare) and low (Guainía, Amazonas, Vaupés) levels of
cumulative deforestation. This initial difference is the baseline to the study the
contribution of different degrees of integration.
However, as mentioned previously, an important goal of my dissertation is to
propose an empirically-grounded theory to explain differential levels of cumulative
deforestation among regions with active deforesting frontiers. The methodological
challenge is to systematically compare at least two cases with similar degrees of
integration but different levels of cumulative deforestation. Caquetá, Putumayo, and
Guaviare are all part of the Colombian “arc of deforestation,” the region in which the

10
Amazonia is an ecological region comprising the basins of the Amazon and Orinoco rivers. Here, I use
the official delimitation of Amazonia, obtained from the Colombian SINCHI Institute, and based on the
ecological rather than the political characteristics of the region.
11
I thus exclude from the analysis the partially Amazonian departments Cauca, Meta, Nariño, and
Vichada because their developmental trajectories are mostly shaped by factors beyond the Amazon
region.
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agricultural frontier has expanded the most (Armenteras et al., 2006).12 Among the three
Amazonian departments in the “arc of deforestation,” Caquetá is clearly the department
with the highest cumulative deforestation: it represents half of all cumulative Amazon
deforestation in Colombia. Putumayo and Guaviare exhibit lower levels of deforestation
compared to Caquetá.13

Figure 1.3. Integration and cumulative deforestation in the Colombian Amazon
Data for primary and secondary roads from IGAC-SIGOT, for land cover from INDEAMSIAC, for international boundaries from Natural Earth, for the Colombian Amazon region
from SINCHI-SIATAC (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).

12
Compared to the departments of Eastern Amazonia, departments located in the “arc of deforestation” are
characterized by higher economic development and more elaborate population and infrastructure networks.
This division confirms the strong conclusions of the specialized literature on tropical deforestation.
13
Furthermore, as it was explained, both Putumayo and Guaviare are part of the “arc of deforestation” and
have higher levels of deforestation compared to Amazonas, Vaupes, and Guainía.
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In what follows, I present my case selection rationale and other inference
strategies. First, on the question of case selection, Caquetá and Putumayo are the best
Colombian provinces in which to explore my research question because they exhibit
similar values on most variables that existing scholarship has identified as the drivers of
deforestation. Historically, Caquetá and Putumayo are the most similar cases in the
Colombian Amazon, a fact that allows me to identify divergent types of integration above
and beyond their baseline similarities. In short, they are similar cases with starkly
different outcomes (Tarrow, 2010).
Neither Caquetá nor Putumayo have been crucial centers of government or
development in Colombia (Meisel, Bonilla, & Sánchez, 2013; Serje, 2011). They are part
of the historic peripheries of the Colombian state whose circumstances can be traced back
to pre-colonial times, when a centralized political order and economy were inchoate. The
peripheral character of these regions persisted through the colonial period and into the
post-colonial era. Only in the mid-twentieth century did their development paths diverge.
Furthermore, Caquetá and Putumayo are part of the same ecological region and share
most basic ecological and geographical characteristics.14 Both territories are located
partly in the eastern Andes, partly in the foothills of the Andean mountain range, and
partly in the vast plains of the Amazon region (see Figure 1.2). Their shape follows the
basic contours of most Andean-Amazonian rivers, which originate in the highlands and
flow towards the great Amazon river in Brazil. In sum, Caquetá and Putumayo are similar

14

Geographic and ecological variables are important because rainfall patterns, soil quality, lighting, and
temperature influence commercial agriculture and, therefore, deforestation.
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in terms of their pre-twentieth-century development trajectories and their ecological,
geological, and geographic characteristics.
These similarities are best appreciated when Caquetá and Putumayo are compared
with the other Amazonian regions that also exhibit relatively high degrees of integration:
Guaviare and Southern Meta (see Figure 1.2). Although Guaviare is also an active
agricultural frontier with a relatively high degree of integration, compared to Caquetá and
Putumayo it has distinct ecological and long-term developmental characteristics.
Guaviare is an Amazonian department, but not part of the Amazonian foothills (it is far
from the Andes and its terrain is uniformly flat); it does not belong to the Amazon river
basin;15 and most importantly, it has only recently experienced agrarian colonization
(Arcila, González, & Salazar, 1999). Southern Meta, meanwhile, is part of a department
that is not primarily Amazonian. Thus, given my research interests, Caquetá and
Putumayo are the most similar subnational cases in Colombia.
However, the similarities between the two departments raise the question of
possible interdependencies with the “potential for diffusion and borrowing among
subnational units” (Snyder, 2001, p. 97). Indeed, it is difficult to find completely
independent cases in a single country, particularly when subnational cases are
geographically contiguous. However, I suggest that interdependence between Caquetá
and Putumayo is not as much of a problem as one might at first suspect. The Caquetá
River area the natural border between the two departments
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was barely colonized until

The Amazon region in Colombia is formed by the Amazon and Orinoco River basins. Most of Guaviare
is part of the Orinoco basin, meaning that savannas are an important part of the department’s ecology.
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the mid-twentieth century (Brucher, 1974), and the two departments are not directly
connected by roads today.16 Until the early 1990s, one had to travel through three
departments

Nariño, Cauca, and Huila

in order to move between Putumayo and

Caquetá by road.17
As far as methods of inference are concerned, by systematically comparing the
integration trajectories of Caquetá and Putumayo, I am able to ascertain why departments
with similar degrees of integration nonetheless display different levels of cumulative
deforestation. The comparison benefits from the strengths of five general approaches:
paired comparisons, contextualized comparisons, subnational comparative method,
comparative historical analysis, and inductive process tracing.
I employ the logic of paired comparisons (Tarrow, 2010) and in particular Mill’s
method of difference the most-similar-system design to contrast divergent integration
paths in the Amazonian foothills. This comparison is not only paired but also
contextualized insofar as it carefully considers the “social ecology of diverse spatiotemporal contexts” (Sil, 2013). Given that I compare two cases within a single country,
the comparison also benefits from the advantages of the subnational comparative method
(Snyder, 2001). Deforestation is concentrated in particular regions and national averages

16

The Colombian government has not built a bridge over the Caquetá River. In the 1960s, Andean
countries committed to building La Marginal de la Selva, a regional road that was never finished in
Colombia. The lack of a bridge over the Caquetá River, which divides Caquetá from Putumayo, is one of
the aborted project’s most noteworthy consequences. However, it is worth noting that the Caquetá river has
historically allowed economic exchanges between the two provinces.
17
The connection improved during the 1990s when a road between Putumayo and Huila was finally built.
Thanks to the road’s completion, it became possible to move between the Amazonian foothills through
Huila. There is still no a direct route between Caquetá and Putumayo. However, travelers and merchants
can use rivers to move in the region.
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mask the most important sources of variation. Due mostly to data limitations, my main
unit of analysis is the department. While historical data on deforestation can be separated
from the state’s administrative boundaries, data on social, economic, and political
phenomena cannot. The problem of data availability beyond administrative divisions
tends to be acute when studying slow-moving historical transformations (Soifer, 2019).
This paired, contextualized, subnational comparison traces divergent paths over
time. I thus exploit both spatial and temporal variation. Comparative Historical Analysis,
an approach that is “oriented toward the explanation of substantively important
outcomes” (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003), provides a set of analytical tools for lay
out the temporal changes of theoretical relevance. Furthermore, I have implemented
inductive process tracing (Falleti & Mahoney, 2015) because sound, contextualized
induction, rather than universal deductive reasoning, is the most promising technique for
generating new hypotheses about the world. Both comparative historical analysis and
inductive process tracing facilitate the identification of the underlying drivers of
deforestation, a substantively important outcome that is rarely studied in political science.

1.4.2. Data
In May 2015, following my proposal defense, I began a course of research that
included extensive fieldwork in the Colombian Amazon, examining archival materials on
regional development, conducting in-depth interviews, and producing an original

22

geodatabase on cumulative deforestation.18 I decided to focus on the Amazonian foothills
because the literature had already identified that region as a site of deforestation, both
historically and presently.
During the course of my research, I developed a comprehensive understanding of
Amazon deforestation that foregrounds the role of history (Pierson, 2004) and integrates
the study of local dynamics and perceptions (a view from below) with large-scale
transformations (a view from above). Although my empirical chapters and appendices
will provide concrete information about my sources, it is worth mentioning here that the
“view from below” is based on materials from three historical archives on regional
development,19 90 in-depth interviews with local authorities and leaders,20 and a
systematic analysis of the relevant secondary sources. The “view from above,”
meanwhile, relies on the technical processing of at least 50 Landsat satellite images (see
Appendix A).
Although the use of satellite imagery in political science is still uncommon, the
number of research projects using remote sensing techniques has increased markedly in
recent years.21 As a qualitative researcher, I was at first tempted to discount the use of
satellite images. However, because land-use changes are typically measured with satellite
images and remote sensing techniques (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017), I decided to
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I defended my dissertation project before the FARC demobilized, at a time when the environmental
impact of the guerrillas’ withdrawal was unknown.
19
I reviewed the historical archives of the Corpoamazonia, of Caquetá governor’s office, and of the
National Department of Intendancies and Commissariats (DAINCO).
20
All interviews were conducted during trips to Putumayo, Caquetá, Bogotá, Pasto, and Neiva between
June 2015 and May 2018. Most fieldwork was conducted between mid-2015 and early 2017.
21
See for example Giraudy & Luna (2017), Harbers (2015), Hollenbach, Wibbels & Ward (2012),
Huntington & Wibbels (2014), Min (2015), Min, Gaba, Sarr & Agalassou (2013), Min & Golden (2014).
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invest the additional time and resources to understand them. I have consequently come to
believe that interdisciplinary collaboration is easier when researchers proactively utilize
contributions from multiple disciplines. The disciplinary division between the social and
natural sciences when it comes to studying the environment has a methodological
dimension, in which mutual mistrust of unfamiliar methodologies limits our ability to
properly understand complex environmental phenomena like tropical deforestation.
By taking advantage of the strengths of remote sensing techniques, my
dissertation attempts to mitigate some of the negative effects of sharp disciplinary
boundaries. While I build on remote sensing, I also recognize its limitations. This
moderate optimism explains my decision to combine views from above and below. While
satellite images can represent large-scale transformations, they cannot make sense of
social and political dynamics on the ground. Similarly, qualitative strategies of data
collection can shed light on the social complexities of Amazon deforestation, but they are
poorly suited to measure large-scale landscape transformations. In addition, satellite
images are neither produced by the Colombian government nor mediated by local
perceptions, which are important concerns for most data collection efforts (Herrera &
Kapur, 2007).22
To be sure, there is an emerging industry dedicated to measuring land-use changes
and deforestation with satellite technology.23 These data improvements facilitate state-

22
See Herrera & Kapur (2007) for an interesting analysis of the way politics affect both data collection and
substantive conclusions.
23
See, for example, Global Forest Watch’s impressive effort to measure annual deforestation globally since
2001: https://www.globalforestwatch.org/. In Colombia, it is important to recognize the contributions of the
IDEAM, which produces a deforestation report every three months since 2013.
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building in the Amazon because standard measurements are basic tools for controlling
territories and populations. Official representations like “maps, censuses, cadastral lists,
and standard units of measurement” constitute “techniques for grasping a large and
complex reality” (Scott, 1998, p. 77). Unfortunately, such efforts tend to assume very
limited time horizons and rarely take history into account. Available data on tropical
deforestation are typically produced by state authorities attempting to prevent
deforestation, or by environmental activists interested in measuring progress (or the lack
thereof). Unsurprisingly, these policy-oriented data-collection efforts are geared towards
“monitoring” and the issuing of “alerts.” Because academic research on deforestation is
largely dependent on this data, most existing literature on the drivers of Amazon
deforestation focuses on transformations occurring in the twenty-first century.
Given that a central contribution of this dissertation is to emphasize the
importance of history, and because available data is rarely historical, I decided to produce
a unique historical geodatabase on forest cover for my study area (see Figure 1.4). I have
processed and technically classified five sets of ten Landsat images (one set per decade)
beginning in the mid-1970s.24
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See Appendix A for technical details. To build this geodatabase, I first completed three specialized
courses on Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Digital Cartography, and Remote Sensing at the
Colombian Geographical Institute (IGAC). I subsequently benefited from the superb research assistance of
Nicolás Herrera and the constant advice of Osman Roa, an expert at the IGAC.
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Figure 1.4. Processed Landsat images
Data for the Amazon region from SINCHI, for altitude from INDEAM, for Landsat
Images from the U.S. Geological Survey (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).
This database allows me to measure cumulative Amazonian deforestation over
time since the mid-1970s. Historical and unprocessed satellite images are accessible on
the internet through the U.S. Geological Survey. With images dating back to 1972,
Landsat is the world’s oldest continuous data collection project to utilize remote sensing
techniques. By taking advantage of this freely-accessible raw historical data, my
dissertation presents original information on cumulative deforestation in the Amazonian

26

foothills of Colombia. To the best of my knowledge, my dissertation is the first effort to
measure cumulative deforestation in the area of study over such an extended period of
time.

1.5.

Why Study Amazon Deforestation and Why in Political Science?

1.5.1. A Key Component of the Contemporary Ecological Challenge
Deforestation, defined as the permanent clearance of forestland, is not a novel
phenomenon. Human beings have repurposed land and expanded agricultural frontiers for
centuries (Cronon, 1995; Michael Williams, 2003). Clearing the forest is a common,
historically accepted, and positively valued practice. As Lanly (2003) observes, “history
has shown that human beings have most often considered the forest as a space that must
be cleared in order to develop activities other than forestry (particularly farming).” The
practice intensified with the sustained development of commercial agriculture throughout
the world. In this sense, the real novelty is our contemporary awareness of the negative
environmental consequences of traditional economic activities (e.g., Agrawal, 2005).
Only in the twentieth century were the negative consequences of deforestation identified,
in accordance with the changing “spirit of the times.”
An important justification for my research project is the emerging concern with
the environmental problems resulting from Amazon deforestation. To be sure, the
primary objective of this dissertation is not to assess the environmental consequences of
Amazon deforestation but to identify its underlying socio-political determinants.
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However, in order to understand the significance of Amazon deforestation, it is necessary
to briefly review the important ecological role that tropical rainforests play in the global
environment.25 On the basis of mounting scientific evidence, I begin from the assumption
of a global ecological problem, in which the Amazon region plays a crucial role as both a
problem and possible solution. I thus accept that the ecological problem exists, that action
must be taken to remediate it, and that politics is an indispensable arena for the
development and implementation of meaningful solutions. Needless to say, my research
project is likely to hold little interest for those who deny the existence of a global
ecological problem that needs to be addressed.26
Climate change deniers aside, the scientific community tends to agree on the
existence of an anthropogenic environmental problem. Atmospheric chemist Paul
Crutzen (2002), winner of the 1995 Nobel Prize, has proposed that human-made
environmental transformations have become so important that a new geological epoch
has emerged: the Anthropocene. For better or worse, and despite many criticisms, the
idea has garnered substantial scientific and political attention and currently frames
environmental debates.27 In any event, we need not agree with the concept of a new

25
Some environmental activists and scholars conceive forest conservation as an end in itself. The idea of the
“rights of nature” is an interesting example. See Nash (1989)´s classic philosophical discussion of the
foundations and implications of recognizing the rights of nature.
26
Climate change denial began in the U.S. following the Kyoto Protocol and subsequently diffused to
countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Companies, think tanks, self-proclaimed
experts, conservative media, and conservative political leaders are the driving forces behind climate change
denial (see Dunlap & McCright, 2011), a position that in the U.S. tends to be espoused by conservative
white males (see McCright & Dunlap, 2011). See Dunlap and McCright (2011), Jacques (2012), and
Norgaard (2011) for an explanation of the emergence and strengthening of climate change denial.
27
See Lövbrand et al. (2015) for a critique of the widespread use of the Anthropocene for failing to
consider the social and economic characteristics of the problem. Some have attempted to re-signify the
term to mean something more than just the anthropogenic modification of the environment, which they
argue is not a novel phenomenon.

28

geological epoch to recognize the existence of a human-induced environmental problem
of global scale.
The international community tends to conceive climate change as the most
important environmental issue. The causes of climate change are diverse, with a range of
national and transnational actors and activities contributing to the problem. Both
developing and developed countries play a crucial role and share responsibility for
remediating its effects (Humphreys, 2013; Marc Williams, 2005). However, we cannot
ignore the existence of an international political economy of climate change in which
those who benefit from development tend to be different from those who suffer the
environmental consequences (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011). Despite this distributive
conflict, there is an emerging consensus on the idea that climate change is a global
problem requiring global solutions. The main contribution that developing countries like
Colombia have made to climate change is not so much air or water pollution as the
unsustainable depletion of natural resources. Developing countries face a serious
dilemma because they tend to be integrated into the global economy through the
exploitation of natural resources, which are assumed to comprise their comparative
advantage (Svampa, 2015). Contemporary deforestation mostly happens in tropical
countries that, unlike developed nations, still have large forests to clear or protect.
Although the drivers of environmental degradation are diverse, my research
focuses on only one environmental phenomenon that contributes to climate change:
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deforestation.28 By taking this focus, I do not deny the significance of other
environmental issues. I simply believe that academic research on the environment is more
promising when the idea of the environment is unpacked. The general view of a global
environmental problem obscures the fact that particular economic activities engender
particular environmental consequences that in turn give rise to distributive conflicts of a
particular kind. Unpacking the global environment allows us to better understand the
political economy of climate change, to more carefully assess the relative contributions of
particular environmental problems, and to more clearly envision effective political
solutions.
Most academic literature on Amazon deforestation is the work of natural and
environmental scientists and highlights the negative consequences of Amazon
deforestation on a global, regional, and local scale. At the global level, it is argued that
Amazon deforestation is an important driver of climate change. Deforestation not only
releases carbon into the atmosphere,29 it also reduces the capacity of the rainforest to act
as a carbon sink. One need not exaggerate the environmental role of the Amazon nor
reinforce the myth of the pristine rainforest, as many environmental activists strategically
do, in order to recognize the global significance of the region (Gash & Nobre, 1997;
Shukla, Nobre, & Sellers, 1990). Amazonia is the biggest tropical rainforest and the
largest agricultural frontier in the world. Despite the region’s economically and

28
If annual carbon emissions resulting from deforestation were tallied and treated as a country, that country
would be the third largest contributor to climate change after China and the U.S. (Gibbs, Harris, &
Seymour, 2018).
29
Deforestation releases greenhouse emissions that speed up global warming, an effect that is even more
problematic when burning is the most common technique used to transform the landscape.
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politically peripheral character, the literature on climate change has repeatedly
determined that preventing Amazon deforestation is essential to slowing climate change
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011). Unsurprisingly,
“Amazonia” is the word that appears most frequently in recent studies of the drivers of
deforestation (Aleixandre-Benavent, Aleixandre-Tudó, Castelló-Cogollos, & Aleixandre,
2018). As one scholar notes, the Amazon region contains “one-fifth of the planet’s
available fresh water, one-third of its evergreen broad-leaved forest resources, and onetenth of its living species” (Garfield, 2013).
In addition to its global impact, Amazon deforestation also has environmental
consequences at the regional level. Because forests perform critical natural functions,
deforestation affects soil quality, water nutrients, and rain patterns. It has been argued, for
example, that Amazon deforestation carries the potential to disrupt rainfall patterns and
impact climate cycles beyond South America, including in the United States.30 Finally, at
the local level, Amazon deforestation tends to reduce precipitation and biodiversity, to
lengthen dry seasons and droughts, and to erode the soil (Lean & Warrilow, 1989; Shukla
et al., 1990).
In sum, growing interest in remediating the environmental impacts of
deforestation has stimulated scientific inquiry into its drivers. The ecological importance
of the Amazon is the primary justification for research in this field. Mounting evidence
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For example, scientists found that Amazon deforestation would directly affect the U.S. because it results
in “10%-20% precipitation reductions for the coastal northwest United States and the Sierra Nevada”
(Medvigy, Walko, Otte, & Avissar, 2013, p. 9115).
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suggests that the negative consequences of Amazon deforestation have already become
visible, and that global climate change is one of them.

1.5.2. The Study of Amazon Deforestation in Political Science: Justification and
Contributions
Deforestation has gone largely unremarked in political science. To the best of my
knowledge, my dissertation represents one of the only book-length contributions by a
political scientist to address the political economy of Amazon deforestation. In addition,
Table 1.1 depicts the number of articles on deforestation published in political science
journals between 1945 and 2018—94 peer-reviewed articles in total. This number is
small given that 1) political science journals also publish work from other disciplines
(overestimated values); 2) the number of publications on core topics like democracy and
institutions is significantly higher,31 and 3) most existing political science articles on
deforestation did not appear in top journals (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 thus shows that political science has rarely made contributions in this
area, although two important articles are currently under review (Alcañiz & Gutiérrez,
2018; Slough & Urpelainen, 2019), and one was published in June 2019 (Fernández &
Garay, 2019), all focusing on the efficacy of contemporary anti-deforestation policies.
While my research deals with an uncommon object of inquiry in political science, one
should not thereby conclude that the discipline has nothing to offer the study of
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For example, the same database returns 18,251 results for the root “democra*” and 23,607 for the root
“institutio*.”
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deforestation. On the contrary, my project draws many theoretical and methodological
insights from political science.32 In the remainder of this section, I lay out five
justifications for the study of Amazon deforestation in political science.
Table 1.1.
Deforestation Articles in Political Science and International Relations

Journal
Total
International Environmental Agreements-Politics Law and
Economics
12
Global Environmental Politics
11
Environmental Politics
5
International Area Studies Review
4
Journal of Peace Research
4
Marine Policy
4
Social Science Quarterly
4
Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
3
Political Geography
3
Note.
World Economy
3
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science
2
Global Policy
2
International Studies Quarterly
2
Pacific Review
2
Review of Policy Research
2
Studies in Comparative International Development
2
Additional journals with one article
29
Articles on deforestation published in political science journals and included in the Web of
Science (2018).
First, politics is an essential arena in which both problems and solutions to those
problems play out, and environmental concerns like Amazon deforestation are no
exception. Although the study of tropical deforestation has been mainly advanced by the
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Politics is the primary object of study in political science, which focuses on, inter alia, political
institutions and behavior.
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natural and the environmental sciences, most practitioners and scholars tend to accept
that solutions are political. While environmentalists highlight both the existence of
ecological problems and the importance of remediating them, social scientists face the
challenge, in my opinion, the moral duty of understanding their mechanics. Although
problems like Amazon deforestation are problems of nature, they are produced by a
complex combination of social, economic, and political factors. Despite the fact that
social scientists are better equipped to understand those factors, the causes and
consequences of environmental degradation have not received much social scientific
attention.33 The one discipline solely devoted to the study of politics political
science has rarely examined the interests, incentives, and institutions associated with
Amazon deforestation and conservation.34 Without relatively clear theories about the
political economy of deforestation, it is difficult to explain why certain environmental
protection strategies fail or succeed.
My dissertation illustrates the type of contribution that political science can make
if interdisciplinary scholarship is promoted. Rather than ignoring or challenging the
natural and environmental sciences, I offer an interdisciplinary project that builds on their
contributions and at times utilizes their methodologies (see Appendix A). This orientation
is important because the study of the role of the state in Amazon deforestation has
become trapped amidst a disciplinary divide. Those who study the state

i.e., political

33
There are notable exceptions in each discipline, but they are usually confined to the margins of their
respective disciplines. Fortunately, the emerging field of Environmental Humanities has recently begun
promoting dialogue between scholars in the humanities and the social sciences whose work deals with
environmental issues.
34
There are naturally some exceptions to this general claim. See Chapter 2 for details.
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scientists

have paid little attention to the environment, and those who study the

environment

i.e., natural scientists

tend to understudy or oversimplify the role of

politics and the state. Contemporary debates over the role of the state in deforestation are
replete with reductionism, generalizations, and over-simplifications. For this reason, an
important goal of my dissertation is to reveal the complexity of the state-environment
relationship by building on political science contributions.
Second, the study of environmental problems like Amazon deforestation could
help the discipline avoid increasing public irrelevance. As political scientists fiercely
compete to fill smaller and smaller niches within the classical subfields through exercises
in deductive reasoning and increasing methodological sophistication, many substantive,
real-world problems remain largely understudied and undertheorized (e.g., Luna, Murillo,
& Schrank, 2014). An excessive emphasis on theory testing ends up obscuring the
importance of studying the real world and generating novel theories about it (T. G.
Falleti, 2016). Therefore, my dissertation’s objective is to provide an empiricallygrounded theory of Amazon deforestation that demonstrates the relevance of political
science to issues of pressing public concern. I believe this theory sheds needed light on
the political economy of Amazon deforestation.
Third, by studying the complex relationship between deforestation and STR, I am
sensitive to the “spirit of the times” that calls on us to strengthen the state, facilitate
economic development, and promote environmental protection. While it is true that
developed and developing countries alike have a shared responsibility to address climate
change, developing countries face unique challenges. In these countries not only is the
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exploitation of natural resources an important part of the economy, but state weakness is
common. STR is a concern in most developing countries, and Colombia the only South
American country still afflicted by a civil war is no exception. However, normative
expectations about the best way to strengthen states have steadily changed. Proponents of
state formation face the major challenge of figuring out how to project power over great
distances while simultaneously preventing the further depletion of natural resources. My
dissertation can help both theorists and practitioners understand one of the most
important contemporary dilemmas affecting state-building efforts in a historically
peripheral region that is quickly becoming central to the global economy and
environment (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011).
Fourth, the study of Amazon deforestation can facilitate a recognition that spaces
and territories are alive and that most political processes take place amidst concrete
ecosystems. Not all political science research is attentive to the important role of
territory, and those studies that are rarely take into consideration the ecological
characteristics of a particular region. For example, Miguel Centeno (2002)’s Blood and
Debt offers a theory of state formation in South America that highlights

as most state

formation theories do the enormous challenge of governing the hinterland.
Nevertheless, Centeno’s seminal work neither recognize that the Amazon region is the
largest hinterland in South America nor that this region spans more than 40% of South
America. In fact, Centeno’s book mentions the Amazon only five times. He barely
acknowledges that the Amazon is a resource-rich and biodiverse tropical rainforest
shared by most countries in South America (Hecht & Cockburn, 2010). Unlike other
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hinterlands (e.g., a desert), the Amazon region can be quickly transformed through the
introduction and promotion of technology, capital, and labor. My dissertation recognizes
that territories possess different ecological characteristics that condition their prospects
for economic and political development.
Finally, the study of Amazon deforestation helps problematize the way
mainstream political science has traditionally understood geographical variables.
Scholars in the discipline tend to treat geography as an independent variable with
important causal weight when it comes to explaining outcomes like development,
poverty, and violence. The idea of a “rough terrain” conducive to violent conflict or a
geography that stymies development are clear examples of it (e.g., Fearon & Laitin,
2003; Sachs, 2003). Far from disappearing, geographical determinism has simply
assumed a more sophisticated form. It has become commonplace to offer theoretical
models that incorporate geographical variables as part of a strategy to distinguish
causation from correlation. Geography is conceived as an “external” control variable
enabling researchers to isolate the causal effect of some independent variable of interest.
Treating geographic variables as exogenous sources of variation is a common strategy
among designers of natural experiments (e.g., Dunning, 2012). Contemporary political
science thus conceives geography as if it were a first cause akin to Aristotle’s unmoved
mover.
Few scholars in the discipline have pursued the opposite strategy, that is, studying
the way in which politics can influence geography. My dissertation exemplifies this
second approach based on the idea that the unmoved mover is also socially constructed
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and that it can sometimes be endogenous to the discipline’s most important variables of
interest. “Territory doesn’t just happen: it has to be worked” (Painter, 2010, p. 1105).
Rough terrain does not have to be rough: it can be perceived differently, or radically
softened. Thus, by studying the political economy of Amazon deforestation, my research
project illustrates the necessity of avoiding the geographical determinism characteristic of
much recent political science.
I believe that an ever-increasing interest in environmental issues will compel
political scientists to better understand exactly how geography matters, beyond the
simplistic contemporary approaches described above. If geographical variables were truly
exogenous or constant, we would not be grappling with environmental problems in the
first place. Forests are lost, rivers dissipate, sea levels rise, and topographies change. My
dissertation, therefore, emphasizes that territories are alive and that peripheries are
ecologically diverse. By studying human-nature transformations in the Amazon region
and considering the ecosystems at play, I expect to raise awareness in the discipline about
the changing nature of geography and the importance of avoiding simple determinisms.
In sum, Amazon deforestation is a real-world environmental problem that has
gone largely unexplored in political science. My dissertation makes an important
contribution to the discipline by encouraging researchers to 1) comprehend the role of
politics in promoting or preventing environmental degradation; 2) escape the current
tendency towards social irrelevance; 3) understand the pressing dilemmas of
contemporary state building; 4) recognize that territories are living organisms; and 5)
move beyond the limits of contemporary geographical determinism.
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1.6. Argument in Brief
The principal objective of this dissertation is to generate an empirically-grounded
and politically-oriented explanation for Amazon deforestation. Here, I offer a summary
of the basic argument with the aim of unpacking the complex relationship between STR
and deforestation. Thus, it is a two-step argument.

1.6.1. Cumulative Deforestation Results from Degree of Integration
I propose that cumulative Amazon deforestation results from different degrees of
integration of entirely Amazonian departments into the market and the Colombian state
project. Amazonia can be characterized as a “brown zone,” defined by Guillermo
O´Donnell (1993, p. 1359) as a region in which the state has little territorial or functional
presence. This general characterization is based on an implicit comparison between the
Amazon and the most integrated parts of the country, where both wealth and power are
concentrated.
However, important differences persist among Amazonian provinces, which
exhibit not only different levels of cumulative deforestation but also different degrees of
territorial integration. Forested areas in the Colombian Amazon, for instance, tend to be
less integrated than non-forested areas, which have undergone a process of massive
deforestation. High territorial integration thus spatially coincides with high cumulative
deforestation, and the opposite is also true. When the ecological characteristics and
internal differences of the Amazon in Colombia are considered, we observe that forested
areas

where cumulative deforestation has been low are “browner.” This spatial
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relationship raises questions about the ecology of the modern territorial state. In light of
this association and its drivers, my dissertation proposes that high cumulative
deforestation results from different degrees of integration.
Why are forested areas “brown zones”? Why are these areas less integrated? Why
is STR lower in forested areas? How can we make sense of this association? My
dissertation argues that the negative relationship between STR and forest cover is neither
random nor causal: the state is not the cause of deforestation, nor does deforestation
produce subnational variation in stateness. How, then, is the relationship best
characterized? I propose that deforestation and STR are closely related because they are
both driven by the same phenomenon: agrarian colonization. Inward migration, massive
landscape transformation, infrastructure development, and STR have all gone hand in
hand. Therefore, deforestation and STR should be conceived as part of an endogenous
process: the advance of agrarian colonization promotes deforestation in the short term,
and in so doing expands STR in the long term.
But the modern state is a complex political organization with different forms of
territorial reach that do not necessarily exhibit the same negative relationship with
forested areas. To capture this reality, my dissertation offers a conceptual map that
unpacks the varieties of STR. I suggest that states penetrate their peripheries in
accordance with the goals of different sectoral agendas and argue that state land-use
planning institutions like national parks and indigenous reservations coincide with
densely forested areas. In those forms, territorial integration is possible beyond and apart
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from agrarian colonization and deforestation. That is, certain varieties of STR can be
detached from the social conditions that favor both state strength and deforestation.
How does recognizing the varieties of STR affect the idea of a negative
association between forested areas and integration? I still suggest that the relationship
persists—that forested areas are “brown”—for the reason that these detached forms of
territorial reach tend to be merely formal, delegated, and/or concentrated on a single
function. On the basis of this conceptualization, I argue that forested areas can be
considered brown zones when direct rule and comprehensive forms of STR (that is, STR
as traditionally conceived) are taken into account.

1.6.2. Cumulative Deforestation Results from Type of Integration
The second part of my argument goes a step further to explore the causes of the
different levels of cumulative deforestation experienced by Caquetá and Putumayo, the
two most integrated Amazonian departments of Colombia that still have different levels
of cumulative deforestation. Although these two provinces were very similar until the
mid-twentieth century in terms of their ecological endowments, developmental legacies,
and demographic trends, cumulative deforestation is much higher in Caquetá than in
Putumayo. My dissertation presents the basic results of a paired contextualized
subnational comparison between these two Amazonian provinces.
By comparing Caquetá and Putumayo, I determine that differential levels of
cumulative deforestation are explained not only by different degrees of integration, as it
was mentioned, but also by different types of integration. Put differently, when the degree
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of integration is held constant, different types of integration help explain variation in
cumulative deforestation. Largely similar until the mid-1950s, Caquetá and Putumayo
began to diverge in both their integration trajectories and their corresponding levels of
deforestation as a result of the different strategies adopted by the Colombian state
between 1958 and 1978—that is, during the so-called developmental era.
More specifically, I suggest that cumulative deforestation in Caquetá is high due
to a particular trajectory of integration in which commercial farming was consolidated
and democratized as a consequence of state-led policies. By contrast, low cumulative
deforestation in Putumayo results from a markedly different state-led strategy of
economic and political integration. There is comparatively low cumulative deforestation
in Putumayo because the central government decided to promote extractive rather than
agricultural development during the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, state-made markets are
responsible for different levels of deforestation because they introduced concrete material
interests: while integration through commercial farming made dispersed and extensive
settlements profitable, integration through large-scale extraction benefited nucleated
settlements. By the end of the seventies, when coca crops reached the Amazonian
foothills, Caquetá and Putumayo were on two very different integration paths. While coca
cultivation reinforced the legal farming economy in Caquetá, it quickly became the only
rural product in Putumayo.
The third and final part of my argument represents a preliminary attempt to
understand the enduring legacies of these varied integration trajectories for environmental
action. I argue that the strength of environmental coalitions at the local level varies by
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historical integration trajectory. In other words, studying the enduring trajectories of
economic and political integration is essential if we are to understand not only cumulative
deforestation—the main outcome of interest in this dissertation—but also the concrete
possibilities of anti-deforestation policies at the local level.
I propose that different integration trajectories have bequeathed longstanding
cultural, and political legacies that could not be limited to purely economic factors.
Culturally, both trajectories promote a set of transcendent values not limited to utilitarian
economics. Although both provinces were born out of colonization, only in Caquetá are
prestige, pride, and social recognition strongly associated with cattle ranching. Politically,
different integration trajectories have shaped the dominant political economy in each
region, in turn constraining individual behavior. Regions where integration occurred
through commercial farming, I suggest, are not only reluctant to embrace antideforestation policies, but also tend to oppose contemporary efforts to introduce largescale extractive industries. By contrast, where integration occurred through extraction,
local populations are less unified and radicalized in opposing both anti-deforestation
policies and large-scale extractive industries. I argue that different dominant political
economies are dependent on the particular way in which costs and benefits are
distributed. In farming provinces, people benefit from commercial agriculture and the
environmental externalities of these economic activities are perceived as abstract. By
contrast, in large-scale extractive provinces, economic benefits are less widely distributed
and environmental problems—mostly those associated with water pollution—are seen as
“concrete” because they affect the farming economy.
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1.7. A Roadmap
In addition to the present introduction, this dissertation contains six chapters and
three methodological appendices. Chapter 2 lays out the complex relationship between
STR and Amazon deforestation. Combining existing knowledge of Amazon deforestation
and STR, it presents the basic concepts we will need to properly theorize the role of the
modern territorial state in an ecologically-strategic region like Amazonia. Colombia has
multiple brown zones, but some of them are easier to transform than others. Chapter 3
provides an empirically-grounded theory linking variation in cumulative deforestation
with different degrees and types of territorial integration. The main objective of this
chapter is to establish the reasons that forested areas tend to be brown zones in Colombia
and, arguably, in the other Amazonian countries. It also develops the argument that we
should consider both degree and type of integration when studying Amazon
deforestation.
Moving the empirical analysis forward, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on the
relationship between cumulative deforestation and diverse types of integration. These
three chapters present the results of my contextualized paired comparison between
Caquetá and Putumayo. They define and characterize the evolution of the different
integration trajectories undergone by Caquetá and Putumayo and establish their
relationship to Amazon deforestation. These chapters are chronologically organized in
order to facilitate the comparison between the two provinces. Chapter 4 focuses on
integration trajectories before the mid-twentieth century to understand the similarities
between Caquetá and Putumayo and lay out the critical antecedents that facilitated
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divergence. Chapter 5 studies state policies and private investments that were
implemented in these two provinces during the developmental era, which is conceived as
a critical juncture at which the basic features of each enduring integration trajectory were
defined. Chapter 6 describes the enduring legacies of these trajectories, which I suggest
constrain contemporary political efforts to protect the forest in the Amazon region.
Finally, Chapter 7 offers a conclusion that reflects on the contributions and limitations of
the argument and explores some of its practical implications.
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CHAPTER 2. DEFORESTATION, STATE UNEVENNESS,
AND THE ECOLOGY OF BROWN ZONES

“Let us imagine a map of each country in which the areas covered by
blue would designate those where there is a high degree of state
presence (in terms of a set of reasonably effective bureaucracies and of
the effectiveness of properly sanctioned legality), both functionally and
territorially; the green color indicates a high degree of territorial
penetration and a significantly lower presence in functional/class
terms; and the brown color a very low or nil level in both dimensions.”
Guillermo O´Donnell (1993, p. 1359)
“The state is the mountain that all political scientists sooner or later
must climb.” Joel Migdal (2001, p. 231)
2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter outlined my dissertation’s primary objectives, the most important of
which is to generate an empirically-grounded theory to explain the relationship between
state strength and Amazon deforestation in Colombia. To that end, the present chapter
lays out the dissertation’s conceptual foundations as a necessary prelude to constructing
its overarching theoretical argument (Chapter 3) and interpreting its empirical basis
(Chapters 4, 5, and 6). In this chapter, I conduct an interdisciplinary dialogue between
political science and the environmental sciences. The study of Amazon deforestation and
the complex role of the modern territorial state therein has become trapped between the
overly simplistic view of politics advanced by the environmental sciences and the general
disinterest in environmental issues exhibited by political scientists. The chapter is an
invitation, on the one hand, for environmentalists to reflect more carefully on the role of
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the state and, on the other hand, for political scientists to directly engage with pressing
environmental questions.
From the environmental sciences I borrow the concept of deforestation, a wealth
of research on the drivers of deforestation, and a general awareness of the ecological
characteristics of tropical rainforests. From political science I borrow the concept of the
state, research on the social origins of state strength, and the contributions of two
emerging research agendas: one that examines state strength at the subnational level, and
one that explores the politics of enforcement. As this chapter illustrates, both research
agendas are indispensable to understanding landscape transformations like Amazon
deforestation insofar as they consider the role of territorial unevenness and the existence
of different dimensions of state authority (e.g., state capacity, state autonomy, state
functions, state legitimacy, etc.).
While much comparative scholarship on the state aims to conceptualize and
measure these various dimensions of strength at the national level, an emerging research
agenda has begun to highlight the subnational dimension of state strength.21 However,
this new line of inquiry tends to conceive subnational stateness as a single dimension of
state strength, discounting the fact that subnational stateness itself has many dimensions.
I devote two sections of this chapter to thinking carefully, both deductively and
inductively, about the dimensions of subnational stateness and the possible relationships
between them. I propose that recognizing the state’s unevenness and the existence of

21

See for example Boone (2003); Enriquez, Sybblis and Centeno (2017); Giraudy and Luna (2017);
González et al (2002); Harbers (2015) and Luna and Soifer (2017).
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different dimensions of state authority at the subnational level is necessary to
understanding the role of the state in Amazon deforestation.
The present chapter consists of four parts, in addition to this introduction. The
first section offers an overview of scholarship on the drivers of deforestation with a focus
on the role of political variables. The second section draws on the political science
literature in defining the dissertation’s most important theoretical concepts. The third
section underscores the importance of the ecological characteristics of the state’s
peripheries in determining how and to what extent they can be socially constructed or
deconstructed. The final section concludes by highlighting the relevance of our core
theoretical concepts to the dissertation’s overall argument and empirical case studies.

2.2.

Literature on Amazon Deforestation and the Role of Politics

2.2.1. Defining Deforestation, Agrarian Colonization and the Study of Cumulative
Deforestation
My dissertation does not offer a novel concept of deforestation but rather relies on
existing definitions of deforestation, forest degradation, afforestation, and reforestation
present in the environmental sciences literature (Humphreys, 2013; Lund, 2018). While
the first two concepts (deforestation and forest degradation) describe a negative impact
on the forest, the latter two (afforestation and reforestation) designate the opposite. Since
forests are susceptible to both degradation and regeneration, they can be understood at a
strictly theoretical level as renewable resources. In reality, however, the deforestation of
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tropical rainforests exceeds its rate of renewal due to unsustainable practices
characterized by overexploitation (Hendee, Dawson, & Sharpe, 2012).22
By deforestation I mean “the comprehensive removal of forest cover and the
subsequent conversion of land to non-forest uses” (Castree, Kitchin, & Rogers, 2013).
The practice of clearing the forest is not new and has long occurred in most parts of the
world (Williams, 2003).23 Forest degradation differs from deforestation in that the latter
requires a land-use change: “there is no deforestation if there is a guarantee of continuity
in maintaining the forest cover” (Lanly, 2003, p. 15). While forest degradation does not
reduce forest cover, it negatively affects the forest’s ecological qualities. By contrast,
reforestation and afforestation both entail the planting of trees on treeless lands.
Reforestation occurs where forests were recently cut down, while afforestation happens
on treeless land that has not recently experienced deforestation.
Given the historical orientation of my research project, I focus on cumulative
deforestation rather than annual deforestation rates. The idea of cumulative deforestation,
however, may raise concerns about possible teleological or deterministic assumptions. As
mentioned above, net gains in forested territory are conceivable. Deforestation can be
reduced, and there are examples of developed and developing countries where significant
reductions have occurred (Angelsen & Rudel, 2013). But as this dissertation illustrates,
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For this reason, the characterization of tropical rainforests as renewable resources has always been a
matter of debate (Gomez-Pompa, Vazquez-Yanes, & Guevara, 1972).
23
For example, the name “Pennsylvania” honors the colony’s founder (William Penn) and the heavy forests
that characterized the region’s landscape at the time (the Latin sylva).
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gains in the Colombian Amazon region have in fact been low. Furthermore, I discount
recovered forest area in my measurements of cumulative deforestation (see Appendix A).
Lamentably, the literature on tropical deforestation and studies of agrarian
colonization have hardly spoken to one another.24 As a consequence, scholars of
deforestation are often unaware of the enduring social forces shaping their object of
inquiry, while scholars of agrarian colonization rarely explore the ecological implications
of colonizing forest areas. By agrarian colonization I mean the social process of
settlement that is strongly associated to the expansion of agricultural land. To be clear,
deforestation and colonization of forest land are not identical phenomena despite the fact
that they both refer to a land use change and because deforestation can occur without
colonization (e.g., extractive logging). Logically, deforestation is the broader
phenomenon that encompasses colonization. However, the colonization of forest land
almost by definition requires its deforestation (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999; Busch &
Ferretti-Gallon, 2017).25 There is usually high deforestation where agrarian colonization
has advanced.

2.2.2. The Main Drivers of Tropical Deforestation
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the literature on the drivers of
tropical deforestation, with a particular focus on the role of politics. Reviewing the
literature will help us gauge the complexity of the phenomenon, recognize the way
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See Rudel (2007) and Dávalos et al. (2016) for inspiring exceptions.
The relationship between colonization and deforestation is so strong that the Colombian state, when
interpreting satellite images, tends to conclude that a particular area is unoccupied by peasants if it is
covered by forests.
25
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political variables have been marginalized in mainstream studies, and identify a set of
expectations about the role of state institutions in deforestation.
A complex set of factors drive Amazon deforestation. One recent bibliometric
analysis determined that the study of deforestation has, for the most part, been dominated
by disciplines like plant science, environmental science, ecology, botany, and agronomy
(Aleixandre-Benavent, Aleixandre-Tudó, Castelló-Cogollos, & Aleixandre, 2018). The
analysis found that 2,051 peer-reviewed research articles on deforestation have been
published since 1954, and that the field is growing rapidly.26 Although academic interest
in the study of deforestation began to increase around 1980, at least 50% of the articles in
question have been published since 2008, and “Amazonia” is the word that appears most
frequently in this body of work. The best explanation for this increased academic output
is a heightened political commitment to stopping or slowing down tropical deforestation
(Chomitz, 2007; Humphreys, 2013). Most mainstream scholarship assumes that
consequential policy decisions depend on the production of relevant data about forest loss
and rigorous scientific knowledge of its drivers.
However, while existing scholarship on deforestation recognizes a distinction
between the phenomenon’s proximate and underlying drivers (Geist & Lambin, 2002;
United Nations, 1996), most mainstream research focuses on the former to the exclusion
of the latter. The proximate drivers of Amazon deforestation are typically defined as
localized human activities that “originate from intended land use and directly impact
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The actual universe of relevant articles is probably larger since the bibliometric study was limited to
peer-reviewed articles that included the word “deforest*” in their title.
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forest cover” (Geist & Lambin, 2002, p. 143)—in other words, the concrete and
immediate actions that impact the use of land and the fate of standing forests. According
to Geist and Lambin, “the extension of overland transport infrastructure, followed by
commercial wood extraction, permanent cultivation, and cattle ranching, are the leading
proximate causes of deforestation” (2002, p. 146).
By contrast, the underlying drivers of deforestation are defined as the
“fundamental social processes, such as human population dynamics or agricultural
policies that underpin the proximate cause” (Geist & Lambin, 2002, p. 143). Underlying
drivers are associated with economic and market distortions; policy distortions (e.g.,
incentives for unsustainable exploitation and land speculation); insecurity of tenure or
lack of clear property rights; an absence of economic opportunity; government failures in
intervention or enforcement; infrastructural, industrial, or communications developments;
new technologies; and population pressures (United Nations, 1996). Efforts to study these
underlying factors are relatively uncommon since causal inference and precise
measurement are more difficult to achieve. Given these difficulties, scholars tend to
concede the impossibility of developing “universal” theories of deforestation, instead
emphasizing diverse regional and temporal pathways generated by interactions among the
various proximate and underlying drivers listed above (Geist & Lambin, 2002; Rudel,
2007; Rudel, Defries, Asner, & Laurance, 2009).
In addition, social and political variables tend to be understudied or
oversimplified in the mainstream literature on deforestation. In fact, the absence of
serious engagement with the social, political, and economic factors underlying
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deforestation has become a source of complaint. After analyzing the most frequently-used
words in deforestation studies, the bibliometric study mentioned earlier concluded that
“the social component is almost non-existent in our research” (Aleixandre-Benavent et
al., 2018).27 Political variables thus play no vital role in a field of research that is by and
large concerned with the proximate drivers of deforestation.
If political variables are considered secondary, then what are the main drivers of
deforestation, according to existing scholarship? The answer, in short, is mostly focused
on economic variables. There is a debate in the literature over the relative contribution of
economic development activities, with three identifiable positions. The first suggests that
economic development leads to deforestation by increasing demand for natural resources
and food. A second, contradictory position holds that poverty
development

i.e., the absence of

is the primary cause of deforestation, with the implication that “growth

leading to poverty reduction will solve environmental problems” (Baland, Pranab,
Sanghammitra, Mookherjee, & Sarkar, 2007, p. 216). The third position argues for an
inverted U-shaped relationship in which deforestation will be low when economic
development is either low or high but high when development is on the rise.28 The
academic literature speaks of “forest transitions” in characterizing patterns of
deforestation as they relate to different levels of economic development (Mather, 1992;
Rudel, 1998). Interestingly, scholars have pointed out (though not sufficiently studied)
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Interdisciplinary research considering the role of social phenomena has been a serious concern of forestrelated research (Dobbertin & Nobis, 2010; Innes, 2005).
28
Scholars have applied the environmental Kuznets curve to the study of deforestation (Ehrhardt-Martinez,
Crenshaw, & Jenkins, 2002).
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the fact that forest transitions are not automatic but contingent on political interventions
(Barbier & Tesfaw, 2015; Rudel et al., 2005).
As this debate illustrates, the extent of economic development constitutes an
important baseline in explaining deforestation. Additionally, the literature highlights the
role of particular economic sectors like timber and agriculture, the relative weight of
which varies depending on the country. “Forests are cut down for one of two reasons:
because they are worth more as timber than they are standing, or because alternative land
uses are worth more than standing forests” (Humphreys, 2013, p. 81). In South America,
agriculture is the most significant driver of deforestation (Armenteras & Rodríguez,
2014; Fernández & Garay, 2019).29 The negative effects of agriculture are so extensive
that the standard concepts of deforestation were designed to capture them. Deforestation,
as noted above, is defined in terms of a permanent change in land-use, which typically
means conversion into cropland or pastures. Unsurprisingly, many economic models
conceptualize deforestation as the result of competition between the rents of farming and
the rents of the forest, with deforestation increasing whenever the former exceed the
latter. Competition is conceived as a zero-sum game in which standing forests are the
opportunity cost of agriculture and timber production (Barbier & Burgess, 2001).
Given the strong relationship between agriculture and deforestation, scholars have
determined that factors known to increase agricultural rents also tend to fuel

29

There is no consensus that timber extraction has a similar impact on deforestation. Its impact, however,
may be indirect: logging makes forests more accessible, which facilitates major transformations of the
landscape. However, there are also reasons to believe that regulated logging increases the rent of the forest
and, therefore, weakens incentives for land clearance (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999, p. 76).
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deforestation. For example, the literature strongly and consistently supports the finding
that built infrastructures promote deforestation.30 Tropical deforestation typically occurs
close to roads, urban centers, and previously cleared land (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999;
Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017; Chomitz, 2007; Geist & Lambin, 2002). Built
infrastructures promote deforestation by making forests accessible, reducing
transportation costs, and increasing the value of land (Pfaff, Amacher, & Sills, 2013).31
Understanding the vital role of agriculture as a driver of deforestation is also key
to comprehend the causal significance of certain biophysical attributes. Scholars have
found that good soil promotes deforestation, whereas high elevations and steep slopes
render it less likely (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999; Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017).32
These biophysical characteristics affect tropical deforestation by shaping the prospects of
agricultural development. My dissertation does not challenge these strong findings but
rather builds on them in considering the possible influence of factors like soil quality,
altitude, and slope.
Finally, mainstream academic studies of the drivers of tropical deforestation take
demographic variables like population size into account, with some suggesting that larger
populations promote deforestation. Although growing populations are indeed associated
with the unsustainable consumption of natural resources, it is not necessary to exaggerate
the role of demographic variables (Armenteras & Rodríguez, 2014; Geist & Lambin,

30
In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies on tropical deforestation that challenge the idea
that built infrastructures promote deforestation.
31
However, the academic literature suggests that although built infrastructures promote deforestation,
infrastructure building can occur after initial forest clearance.
32
Proximity to water and climate are not consistently significant in explaining deforestation (Busch &
Ferretti-Gallon, 2017).

55

2002). Neo-Malthusian arguments about the negative effects of population growth have
numerous limitations. For example, studies have found that deforestation tends to be low
where indigenous lands have been recognized, suggesting that population numbers alone
are insufficient to explain forest loss.33 The problem is not people but what they do.

2.2.3. An Emerging Field on The Politics of Deforestation
I have thus far suggested that politics is not usually conceived as one of the main
drivers of tropical deforestation. To be sure, from the fact that politics plays a secondary
role in most mainstream accounts of tropical deforestation, one should not conclude that
the topic is entirely absent from the literature. In fact, most peer-reviewed studies of
tropical deforestation offer some amount of policy discussion at the end. Scholars tend to
use the concluding sections of their articles to freely interpret the results, assert their
opinions, and even make explicit policy recommendations. While they are happy to
address politics in the form of post hoc speculation, however, far less frequently do
scholars incorporate political variables into their research designs. For this reason, my
dissertation attempts to expand the thematic horizons of the literature by bringing politics
back into the study of tropical deforestation as one of its underlying drivers.
The literature on the political economy of tropical deforestation can be divided
into two waves. The first examined the causes of environmental degradation, while the
second focused on environmental conservation (Barbier & Burgess, 2001; Rudel,
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Furthermore, studies of the role of demographic characteristics like age, gender, and education level are
less conclusive (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017).
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Roberts, & Carmin, 2011). The remainder of this section analyzes some of the central
conclusions of these two bodies of scholarship.
The first-wave scholarship examined the role of politics as a driver of tropical
deforestation. As one might expect, it emphasized that state policies aimed at promoting
the proximate drivers of deforestation—namely, agriculture, infrastructure, and timber
production—are the underlying drivers of deforestation (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999;
Geist & Lambin, 2002; Rudel, 2007). Beyond this connection, first-wave scholarship
explored the institutional constrains within which tropical deforestation occurs,
underscoring the importance of political development as well as economic development
(Barbier, 2019). For example, scholars conducted large-N, cross-national studies to
explore whether democratic regimes and capable states are good for the forest.34 While
democracies with capable states tend to deforest less than non-democratic regimes with
weak states, developing countries in the process of consolidating both democratic
regimes and capable states tend to exhibit high deforestation rates (Buitenzorgy & P J
Mol, 2011; Karsenty & Ongolo, 2012; McCarthy & Tacconi, 2011). The literature thus
concludes that democracies and capable states are good for the forest after a certain
threshold is passed. As with economic development, the scholarship finds that a Kuznets
curve best describes the relationship between deforestation and political development.

34

This literature has at least two limitations: first, economic development is strongly associated with
political development (democratization and state capacity) and, second, the underlying causal mechanisms
are rarely studied. One might hypothesize that democracies, unlike authoritarian regimes, provide
opportunities to mobilize both pro-deforestation and anti-deforestation demands (Barbier, 2019).
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The question of political development has also been studied with reference to
more specific phenomena like undefined property rights, insufficient law enforcement,
criminality, warfare, and corruption (e.g., Amacher, Ollikainen, & Koskela, 2012;
Dávalos et al., 2011; da Veiga Mendes, 2009; Fergusson, Romero, & Vargas, 2014;
Karsenty & Ongolo, 2012). Thus, it has become commonplace to claim that deforestation
occurs where the state is weak, fragile, or non-existent (Irland, 2008). However, an
important limitation of this scholarship is that it rarely acknowledges the strong link
between economic and political development. High levels of economic development
typically accompany the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of the state.
While the final product of state-building processes might produce low rates of
deforestation, the processes themselves do not.35 Most studies of the politics of
deforestation hold economic development constant and ignore the fact that areas already
cleared of forest cover tend to be the most politically and economically integrated.
Although contemporary deforestation occurs where state institutions are weak,
deforestation enables the institutionalization of state territories.
The second wave of scholarship examined the efficacy of state policies and social
projects aimed at preventing or slowing tropical deforestation (Rudel et al., 2011). Thus,
even if politics is not considered a primary driver of deforestation, it enjoys an important
place in academic discussions of environmental conservation. While mainstream studies
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It is worth differentiating private property from privatization, state capacity from state formation,
democracy from democratization, and institutional strength from institutionalization.
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of the causes of deforestation generally assume that politics is relatively unimportant, the
scholarship on potential solutions tends to place political variables up front.
It has been claimed, for example, that forest transitions (the threshold beyond
which economic and political development reduces deforestation) are the result of forest
scarcity, economic development, and efficacious public policies (Barbier & Tesfaw,
2015; Rudel et al., 2005). There are also fruitful debates about the real effects of
protected areas on forest cover. While some defend their efficacy (Armenteras, González,
& Retana, 2013; Armenteras, Rodríguez, & Retana, 2009), others suggest that, given
their location and biophysical characteristics, the effect is small (Joppa & Plaff, 2009).
Still other studies have analyzed the role of law enforcement (Alcañiz & Gutiérrez, 2018;
Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, & Sieber, 2012; Fernández & Garay, 2019), land
tenure (Robinson, Holland, & Naughton-Treves, 2014), and community forestry (Lemos
& Agrawal, 2006; Ostrom, 1992), even as their empirical conclusions are debatable
(Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017; L. Dávalos, Holmes, Rodríguez, & Armenteras, 2014).
There is also an emerging interest in the effects of policies aimed at introducing market
incentives (Jodoin, 2017).
The second-wave literature has at least two limitations that my dissertation seeks
to address. On the one hand, second-wave studies have mostly focused on the impact of
environmental policies on particular environmental outcomes without considering the
political process or development forces involved. One the other hand, given that most
environmental policies are of relatively recent origin, the literature tends to assume short-
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term horizons that discount the fact of deforestation as a historical process that occurred
in many parts of the world (Rudel & Roper, 1997; Williams, 2003).
An important contribution of this dissertation, therefore, is the historical
perspective it brings to the study of deforestation (Pierson, 2004). Past political strategies
have bequeathed profound legacies in the Amazon, legacies which in turn constrain
contemporary anti-deforestation efforts. One of the main challenges is confronting the
legacies of the past, and yet most quantitative research on tropical deforestation is limited
by the availability of data to the transformations of the twentieth-first century.

2.2.4. Amazon Deforestation
The scholarship on Amazon deforestation has overwhelmingly focused on the
case of Brazil, which is historically and currently the country with the largest area of
deforested land per year (Charity, Dudley, Oliveira, & Stolton, 2016). While Brazil long
served as the benchmark against which scholars analyzed the region as a whole, the last
two decades have seen a proliferation of studies on Amazon deforestation beyond the
Brazilian case (Kalamandeen et al., 2018). Even accounting for this trend, however,
studies of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon were rare until a decade ago, as
researchers tended to avoid forest-rich countries that “experienced rural violence during
the last three decades of the 20th century” (Rudel et al., 2009).
Over the last decade, scholars have begun to produce reliable data on
deforestation in Colombia. Although the literature on Colombia has certainly grown, it is
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worth remembering that most of it was produced in the twenty-first century;36 that natural
scientists have spearheaded the effort; that it largely focuses on the proximate drivers of
deforestation; that the role of political variables remains understudied; and that few
scholars have undertaken rigorous field research.37
Implicit comparisons between the Colombian and Brazilian Amazon tend to
accept that deforestation in Colombia is unplanned and chaotic (Armenteras, Rudas,
Rodriguez, Sua, & Romero, 2006) while deforestation in Brazil (and Ecuador) is the
consequence of state intervention and large-scale capital investments in agriculture
(Nepstad et al., 2006; Rudel et al., 2009).38 The different spatial patterns in Brazil and
Colombia can be interpreted as a sign of varying levels of state involvement (Mertens &
Lambin, 1997). State intervention in Brazil has promoted a fish-bone pattern in which
state-led infrastructure comprises the spine of multiple, branching private roads. The
scholarship interprets the absence of this spatial configuration in Colombia as a sign of
unplanned deforestation, which occurs in proximity to both roads and the most important
rivers (Armenteras et al., 2006, p. 353).39 An additional sign of unplanned deforestation
in Colombia is the presence of illicit crops: the literature finds that Colombian
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In fact, the first study to measure historical deforestation rates in Colombia was published in 1999 (Vina
& Cavelier, 1999, p. 31).
37
Most studies of Amazon deforestation in Colombia, all of them relatively recent, are based on
Geographical Information Systems (GIS).
38
Wealthy and influential ranchers and planters are, in turn, very effective at securing additional state
intervention. The synergy between high capital investments and active state intervention is one of the main
drivers of Amazon deforestation in Brazil (Rudel, 2007).
39
See also (Etter, McAlpine, Phinn, Pullar, & Possingham, 2006; Viña, Echavarria, & Rundquist, 2004, p.
24).
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deforestation is influenced not only by legal farming but also by coca cultivation (L. M.
Dávalos et al., 2011).
One of the contributions of my dissertation is to pose difficult questions for this
literature by highlighting the important influence exerted by Colombian state on Amazon
deforestation. A comparative study of cumulative deforestation at the subnational level
can help us understand how and why the state has historically intervened.40

2.3.

Beyond the Enforcement Paradigm: Dimensions of State Power
Although political scientists have rarely studied deforestation, a few ongoing

research projects address the topic in the context of the literature on enforcement and
subnational state strength. My dissertation benefits from these two literatures and
contributes to them by exploring the social origins of both phenomena (Falleti, 2019).
The current section recommends taking at least three steps back from intent-based
approaches to enforcement in order to better grasp the relationship between the modern
territorial state and deforestation. Figure 2.1 below depicts the conceptual logic of these
steps, illustrating the way research questions on the politics of enforcement are premised
on the existence of a minimum of state strength, which in turn is premised on state
territorial reach (STR) and state scope.

40

See Dávalos et al. (2016) for an interesting study on the enduring legacies of state-directed colonization.
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State Scope
State Reach
State Strength
Enforcement

Figure 2.1. The institutional antecedents of law enforcement research
2.3.1. Scratching the Surface: The Enforcement Paradigm
Recent studies in political science tend to conceive deforestation as a relatively
new policy area that requires the attention of both the state apparatus and local actors
(Alcañiz & Gutiérrez, 2018; Fernández & Garay, 2019; Slough & Urpelainen, 2019). By
focusing on the effectiveness of state policies and institutions aimed at stopping or
slowing deforestation, these studies attempt to determine if effective enforcement of
illegal clearing is ultimately consequential in reducing deforestation. Despite many
differences, they all tend to accept the assumption that curbing tropical deforestation
requires “understanding why illegal extraction is often sanctioned or facilitated” (Burgess
et al., 2012, p. 1708). Such studies thus limit the role of the state to effective enforcement
of anti-deforestation laws. On this reductionist view, when deforestation is declared
illegal, the problem then becomes a lack of enforcement.
The focus on enforcement benefits from a fruitful research agenda in political
science on the politics of enforcement and coincides with the expectation that Amazon
deforestation has increased in Colombia as a result of anarchy (see Chapter 1). The
“enforcement paradigm” applied to deforestation dynamics involves the study of
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environmental laws (as juridical claims), environmental outcomes (as social practices)
and the subnational variation of the mismatch between what should happen and what
actually happens (Brinks, Levitsky, & Murillo, 2019).
By contrast, my dissertation argues that research focused on the enforcement of
environmental laws only scratches the surface of a complex phenomenon linked to
configurations of state power at the subnational level. “While a focus on implementation
capacities remains important, an emphasis on such issues effectively ‘puts the cart before
the horse’ if equal attention is not paid to capacity issues associated with the ‘upstream’
aspects of policy-making agenda setting, framing, analysis, and policy development and
design” (Sagar & VanDeveer, 2005, p. 16). In our case, deforestation dynamics are
influenced by enduring historical trajectories (Pierson, 2004) related to economic
development and population dynamics (Geist & Lambin, 2002; Rudel et al., 2009).
Comparative scholarship on the politics of enforcement highlights the fact that
enforcing the law depends not only on the overall strength of the state but also on the
willingness to act (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, 2013). It openly questions capacity-based
approaches that tend to ignore the political processes shaping enforcement dynamics,
even positing variation in state strength as a null hypothesis to be rejected (Bozçağa &
Holland, 2018). An important example from this research is Holland’s idea of
forbearance, which she defines as “intentional and revocable government leniency
toward violations of the law” (2016, p. 233). Despite her emphasis on voluntary nonenforcement, Holland is aware that the politics of enforcement do not play out in a
vacuum. She thus recognizes the importance of a minimum of state strength and
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conceives forbearance in terms of a combination of capacity, intention, and revocability.
“It is nonsensical to talk about forbearance in parts of Sierra Leone or Haiti where the
state apparatus barely penetrates society” (Holland, 2016, p. 233).
One implication of adopting this minimal threshold as a criterion is that studies of
the politics of enforcement tend to focus on urban areas, capital cities, or industrialized
environments in which a minimum of state strength is taken for granted (Amengual,
2016; Bozçağa & Holland, 2018). Justified by pervasive institutional weakness in Latin
America (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009), the enforcement literature has focused on the most
developed parts of the region, where the mismatch between norms and reality is already
small. Instead of conceiving state strength as a structural constraint on enforcement
(Amengual, 2016), my dissertation conceives it as a condition of possibility. While state
strength alone cannot explain compliance, a minimum of strength is necessary before we
can even approach the political puzzles associated with enforcement (Brinks et al., 2019,
p. 22).
A major challenge for the enforcement scholarship is overcoming the limitations
of both capacity-based approaches that ignore elite interests and intent-based approaches
that overlook the role of state strength.41 I propose that the relative importance of
willingness and capacity depends on the territorial manifestations of state strength. In
places where wealth and power are concentrated, intent-based approaches can provide

41

See Bozçağa and Holland (2018) on Enforcement Process Tracing as a possible method for carefully
adjudicating between competing claims of state strength and political willingness. “We suggested a series
of causal process observations to strengthen arguments that politicians, rather than weak states, contribute
to limited enforcement” (p. 317).
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more leverage than capacity-based approaches. By contrast, in the peripheries of the
state, the question of willingness tends to be less important. The academic literature on
the politics of enforcement stands to benefit enormously from a serious reckoning with
the uneven strength of the state, which is the first of the three steps required to understand
the relationship between Amazon deforestation and the state.

2.3.2. First Step Back: The Infrastructural Power of the State and the Concept of
Territorial Integration
To make the argument that a minimum of state strength is an antecedent
dimension of enforcement and its political puzzles, we must first clarify what state
strength is and what its various dimensions consist of. Fortunately, scholarship on the
infrastructural power of the state has witnessed a revival in tandem with the growth of
scholarship on the politics of enforcement. In studying Amazon deforestation, I
contribute to this literature by probing the ecological implications of the origins and
development of the state.
Given that public interest in reducing deforestation is relatively recent (Williams,
2003), a historical analysis of cumulative deforestation cannot limit itself to the narrow
question of anti-deforestation law enforcement. I thus adopt a different approach, one that
moves away from an “enforcement paradigm” emphasizing environmental policies and
the sectoral capacities to implement them. Instead, my dissertation builds on classic
literature about the origins and development of state power (e.g., Centeno, 2002; Mann,
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1984; Tilly, 1992) in order to explore the underlying relationship between deforestation
and the modern state.
The study of the modern state—its characteristics, causes, and consequences—is
certainly a foundational topic in political science. Conceptualizations of the state are
manifold. Drawing on Weber’s classical definition, I conceive the state as a “form of
human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical
violence within a particular territory – and this idea of ‘territory’ is an essential defining
feature” (M. Weber, 2004, p. 33). Hence, I define the state by its means rather than its
ends, implying that states are political organizations capable of pursuing a wide variety of
goals depending on historical context. Hitler’s Germany and Mandela’s South Africa are
both modern states despite their obvious differences. Weber provides a useful, minimal,
and procedural definition of the modern state, one based on the exercise of authority over
a particular territory through a monopoly on legitimate (institutionalized) violence.42 I
thus conceive the state as a territorialized form of political domination in which
authoritative power and territorial closure are both defining attributes.
Political science scholarship notes that states can be “strong” or “weak”
depending on their ability to exercise power and “get things done” (Mansbridge, 2012),
that is, to achieve their intended objectives. But this concept is still too general to be
empirically useful. What exactly is meant by state capacity? To answer this question, I

42
Despite the utility of Weber’s concept, many critiques have been lodged against it. Some claim that
Weber’s conception of the state discounts the importance of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2014), ignores
fuzzy state-society relations, and neglects the everyday practices of the state in favor of an imagined
coherence (Migdal, 2001; Mitchell, 1991). However, some of these critiques depend on a misinterpretation
that turns Weber’s sociological ideal types into normative goals (Migdal, 2001). See Fukuyama (2013) for
an influential misinterpretation.

67

build on Michael Mann’s distinction between despotic and infrastructural state power.
Despotic power refers to the negotiation of state actions with civil society groups, while
infrastructural power is “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to
implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann, 1984, p. 113).
Mann’s different forms of power mirror Huntington (1968)’s distinction between
government types and degrees.43 On the basis of Mann’s conceptual apparatus, I employ
the idea of state strength to indicate high degrees of infrastructural power (Soifer & Vom
Hau, 2008).
I already mentioned that the defining characteristic of the state—and, therefore, of
state strength—is the territorially-bounded exercise of power. Few other concepts in
political science include territoriality as an essential feature (see for example Herbst,
2000; Scott, 2009; Spruyt, 1994; Tilly, 1992).44 Mann himself pays particular attention to
the role of territory in characterizing state power:
Only the state is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has
authoritative power. Unlike economic, ideological or military groups in civil
society, the state elite’s resources radiate authoritatively outwards from a center
but stop at defined territorial boundaries. The state is, indeed, a place – both a
central place and a unified territorial reach (1984, p. 123).
Mann’s focus on territory has led some scholars to argue that the idea of
infrastructural state power has both “social” and “spatial” dimensions (Eaton, 2012, p.
648; Soifer & Vom Hau, 2008, p. 226). However, Mann has clarified that the division

43
Despotic power resembles concepts like regime type, government type or even state autonomy.
Infrastructural power, by contrast, approximate concepts like state capacity, state strength, and government
degree (Mann, 2008).
44
One might argue that theories of the modern territorial state that fail to consider the complex role of
geography are incomplete at best (Lustick, 1999, p. 92).
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between society and territory is a false one. Both are aspects of the same phenomenon:
“For me, the world ‘society’ is fairly empty. Instead, I mean control over people (and by
people) insofar as they are located within the state’s territories” (Mann, 2008, p. 358).
Hence, the infrastructural power of the state is relational, but its exercise is territorialized.
The concept of the infrastructural power of the state is useful to understand the
idea of “territorial integration,” which is a vital concept of the theoretical proposal of this
dissertation (see Chapter 3). Thus, the infrastructural power of the state is a form of
authoritative power that radiates outwards. There is typically a center, characterized by “a
high concentration of the main elements of authority and power in the social system”
(Shue, 1988, p. 40), and a set of peripheries, which lack those elements for the reason that
they have not been fully integrated into the state. In this context, integration is the process
by which the center of authority and wealth expands into the peripheries and forms a
single entity of multiple parts.45 Integration is a multifaceted phenomenon with at least
three dimensions: political/administrative, economic, and normative/cultural (Shue, 1988,
p. 40). Territorial integration increases the infrastructural power of the state and is a vital
aspect of the macro-sociological process through which power is universalized and
centralized (Bourdieu, 2014).
Although the infrastructural power of the state radiates outwards from a
hierarchical center of authority, two important clarifications are in order. First, territorial
integration is not always linear, and states can contract as well as expand (Lustick, 1993).

45

Although I prefer the term territorial integration to describe this process, I am aware of the existence of
more radical alternatives. The concepts of internal colonialism (Hechter, 2017) and uneven development
(Smith, 1990) are perhaps the most relevant.
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Second, although territorial integration is traditionally conceived as a top-down process,
the periphery is not simply a passive recipient of decisions emanating from the center.
“How power is distributed between center and periphery, and how these imbalances are
institutionalized, are partly artifacts of the organization of power within agrarian society
itself” (Boone, 2003, p. 2). We can therefore hypothesize that the way in which power is
organized at the subnational level shapes the state’s institution-building strategies.
The state accumulates infrastructural power through the integration of territory.
However, state strength is not evenly distributed. Comparative political scientists are
indebted to the work of Guillermo O’Donnell (1993), who offered a simple but powerful
conceptual scheme for theorizing state unevenness and its implications for the
consolidation of democratic regimes. O’Donnell argued that countries in the developing
world tend to contain many extensive “brown zones,” where the presence of the state and
its territoriality are weak. Unlike Norway, for instance, Peru and Brazil were mostly
“brown.” Focusing on the processes involved in state-building, we can understand
territorial integration as the process through which “brown zones” cease to be brown.
Despite wide recognition of the importance of territory and internal territorial
unevenness, few scholars had seriously engaged O’Donnell’s powerful insights until
recently. The subnational turn in comparative politics (Snyder, 2001) has been slow on
this front. Comparativists have begun to question the “whole-nation bias” with its focus
on national averages and the “best known places” (Gibson, 2012). But the subnational
turn has mostly studied political regimes i.e., despotic rather than infrastructural
power and the design and implementation of social policies (Eaton, 2017; Gibson,
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2012; McMann, 2006; Niedzwiecki, 2018). Nevertheless, the situation is steadily
changing as new scholars advance theories, methodologies, and empirical studies
oriented towards understanding the uneven infrastructural power of the state at the
subnational level. An enriching but still incipient research agenda on subnational state
capacity has finally built upon O´Donnell´s insights.46 One of the main challenges of this
emerging literature is to conceptualize and measure what state unevenness means.
“Seeking more precise descriptions of relational state capacity at the local level is thus a
crucial pending task for this research agenda” (Dargent, Feldmann, & Luna, 2017, p. 27).
Existing scholarship has underscored the importance of studying the relationship
between state strength and state territorial reach (STR). STR is a dimension of state
strength, one that I relate to what Mann calls the “logistics of political control” (1984, p.
116). Similarly, Giraudy (2012) argues that territorial reach is one of three core
dimensions of state strength.47 For a state to be strong, on this view, it must have
penetrating forms of territorial reach, sufficient autonomy from non-state actors, and
bureaucratic capacity.
Although STR is a dimension of state strength, I argue that is an antecedent
dimension. State strength is preceded by STR, which is a first-order concern of state
authority. While STR without strength is a logical possibility, state strength without STR

46

(Boone, 2003, 2012; Enriquez et al., 2017; García Villegas, García Sánchez, Rodríguez Raga, Revelo
Rebolledo, & Espinosa Restrepo, 2011; Giraudy & Luna, 2017; González et al., 2002; Harbers, 2015; H.
Huntington & Wibbels, 2014; Luna & Soifer, 2017; Steinberg, 2018).
47
Given that states must reach a region before they can advance a state goal, the infrastructural power of
the state is “partially conditioned” by state reach (Centeno, Kohli, Yashar, & Mistree, 2017, p. 10). State
reach is an important aspect of the infrastructural power of the state, but it would be inaccurate to measure
state capacity by counting the state officials present in a territory (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, & Robinson,
2015, p. 2365).
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is not. The vital role of STR is easier to understand on a less abstract level. Scholars have
measured variation in stateness on the basis of survey data—for instance, considering the
time it would take police to arrive after a call is placed (Luna & Soifer, 2017, p.8). Many
parts of the developing world lack this minimal reach (Centeno, Kohli, Yashar, &
Mistree, 2017; Herbst, 2000), and Colombia is no exception.48 Although survey-based
measurements are designed to capture the whole country, they rarely consider that many
people in the developing world live entirely beyond the sphere of influence of the police.
Some regions lack telephone service, road networks, administrative means of
transportation, and even police stations.
In conclusion, comparative scholarship on state infrastructural power recognizes
the importance of the uneven exercise of state authority over territory. The rigorous study
of this heterogeneous reality, I suggest, is necessary for understanding both state strength
and the concrete institutional contexts in which intent-based approaches to law
enforcement are meaningful.

2.3.3. Second Step Back: State Territorial Reach
Comparative scholarship has questioned the dichotomous classification of states
as either “strong” or “weak.” However, the academic literature on STR tends to utilize
equivalent dichotomous classifications of presence and absence. Given the historical
expansion of states, pure “non-state spaces” have become rare (Scott, 2009). Few

48

A minimum of STR can be taken for granted in developed countries, though we cannot assume that STR
is evenly distributed (Steinberg, 2018).

72

populations today are truly “out of reach.” Nonetheless, one can hardly conclude from
this fact that STR is homogeneous. The state “does not spread evenly over entire
territories. It remains concentrated in pockets and along communication routes” (Mann,
1984, p. 124). States reach most territories and populations, but they do so in different
ways. Fernán González (2014) and his research team in Colombia aptly describe this
phenomenon as the “differentiated presence of the state.”
Although it is important to recognize state unevenness, mere recognition does not
clarify what the relevant differences are. A contribution of my dissertation is thus to
provide a typology of the different varieties of STR. Scholars have developed similar
proposals before (e.g., Boone, 2003; Giraudy & Luna, 2017; González, Bolívar, &
Vásquez, 2002; Mann, 2005; Naseemullah & Staniland, 2016), which I briefly present
here in order to clarify the novelty of my own contribution. One set of proposals
underscores socio-historical dynamics. Michael Mann (1986) offers a typology of
different forms of organizational reach distinguished by level of cooperation (extensive
or intensive) and the presence or absence of an explicit command (authoritative or
diffused).49 Similarly, González (2014) classifies different forms of state presence
according to the way regions were populated, organized, and articulated to the center.
Despite their important contributions, a major problem with these proposals is their
underspeficiation of agents, power balances, and institutions.

49

Mann’s typology is not limited to the domain of the state: economic, ideological, and military power can
also be understood through these lenses.
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A second set of proposals focuses on the balance of power between the center and
the regional elites. Boone (2003)’s classificatory scheme is based on levels of
concentration of state agencies within the territory and the distribution of authority
among rural elites and state agents. Where state agencies are created at the local level,
authority can devolve to rural elites (powersharing) or be centralized in the hands of state
agents (usurpation). By contrast, where local state agencies are not created, state agents
can centralize authority (administrative occupation) or cede it to rural elites (nonincorporation).50 Relatedly, Giraudy and Luna (2017) propose a typology of STR that
considers the incentives and resources of state agents and “territorial challengers.” STR is
“contested” when both state agents and territorial challengers possess high incentives and
resources, while it is “unprojected” when incentives and resources are low. Intermediate
forms of reach occur when only state agents (“unrestricted” STR) or only territorial
challengers (“restricted” STR) possess high incentives and resources to control the
territory. While this set of proposals recognizes the existence of a power relation between
state agents and elites, it barely considers the role of state institutions.
The final typology of STR was developed by Naseemullah and Staniland (2016),
who propose three types of indirect rule that can result from different legal frameworks
and forms of implementation. They theorize that suzerain governance occurs when
private rulers possess autonomous authority; hybrid governance occurs when private
rulers share power with the state; and de jure governance occurs when “the state
maintains de jure direct rule over a territory, but in reality coercion is enforced locally by

50

Chapter 3 further explains Boone’s idea of “non-incorporation.”
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intermediate political elites” (Naseemullah & Staniland, 2016, p. 17). Though this
proposal considers both actors and institutions, it leaves aside different types of direct
rule.
Certainly, these five proposals take us a step further in understanding the varieties
of STR, but they minimize the role of institutions and often assume simple ontologies
focused solely on the physical world and (consequently) the deployment of state
organizations or agents.51 Drawing on the insights of these proposals, and considering the
importance of both institutions and complex ontologies, I offer a typology of STR based
on the creation of state organizations at the local level (Boone, 2003), the type of rule
(Tilly, 1992) and the breadth of state action (Mann, 1984) (see Figure 2.2).
The first element of my typology is inspired by Douglass North’s distinction
between the players and the rules, that is, between organizations and institutions (North,
1990, p. 3). On the basis of this distinction, we can differentiate formal from
organizational forms of STR. State reach is formal when institutional presence exists
without the actual deployment of state organizations. Formal institutions state
rules are capable of penetrating a region before state organizations do. Institutions and
ideas travel fast because they are relatively unencumbered by physical obstacles, budget
constraints, or travel allowances. Formal state reach is meant to capture the symbolic and
ideational aspects of the state, which might be interpreted as part of the state’s “image”

51

Most types of STR reviewed here center on the physical world and leave aside ideational and
institutional forms. My proposal, by contrast, is based on a complex yet limited conception of reality that
builds on Popper (1994)’s three domains: physical objects, mental experiences, and products of the human
mind. See also Hall (2003) on the methodological challenges of adopting complex ontologies.
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(Migdal, 2001). Formal state reach is an idea without matter, which means that the state
is present as its own specter. In light of this form of STR, “non-state” spaces or regions
that remain “out of reach” are extremely rare (Scott, 2009).

State Organizations
Absent

Present
Type of Rule
Indirect

Direct
Breadth

Formal

Delegated

Institutional reach

Narrow

Wide

Focalized

Promiscuous

Organizational reach

Figure 2.2. Varieties of STR

On my conceptualization, then, STR is first and foremost defined by the legal
status of its authority. The existence of formal institutions is among the most important
characteristic of the modern state (O’Donnell, 1993; Soifer, 2016; M. Weber, 1968): “the
essence of the state’s functions is a monopoly of binding rule-making” (Mann, 1984, p.
112).52 The first variety of STR, therefore, captures the attempt the claim to rule both
territories and populations through formal institutions (Nugent & Krupa, 2015). “Legal
frameworks represent the clearest signals of state’s intentions of intervention and the selfdefined extent of its authority” (Naseemullah & Staniland, 2016, p. 16). This is not to
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This dissertation uses the terms “formal institutions” and “state law” synonymously.
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neglect the existence of powerful non-state actors that exercise authority (Arjona, 2016;
Naseemullah, 2014; Staniland, 2012), or to deny the latter’s sociological similarities to
state authority.53 However, despite these characteristics, I assume that not every form of
social authority embodies stateness. It is conceptually problematic to consider non-state
actors, their order and authority, as part of STR.54
Purely formal state reach can also be consequential. Scholars have recognized the
vital role of de jure statehood in shaping enduring state-building trajectories in the
developing world. The international respect for formal territorial borders regardless of de
facto state power to defend them is a clear example of this (Centeno, 2002; Herbst, 2000;
Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).55 And within a given territory, the winning of hearts and
minds can prove even more consequential than fear of direct enforcement, as scholars of
sociological institutionalism have observed (Falleti, 2019). So long as local actors have
internalized formal institutions, they can exert state power even in the absence of state
organizations.
The state, however, is not only an institution but also as Michael Mann (1984)
points out

an organization that promotes compliance with the law and implements

diverse policies. When state agencies are deployed, the state becomes both an
institutional and organizational project. Once both forms of STR are present, we can then
identify additional types of rule. The scholarship on state formation and colonialism tends

53
Charles Tilly famously proposed an analogy linking war making, state making, and organized crime
(1985, p. 181).
54
STR does not exist when non-state actors alone rule a particular region, as armed actors do in may
Colombian municipalities (Arjona, 2016).
55
There is typically a complex international political process associated with the international recognition
of sovereign states (Coggins, 2014).
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to accept the distinction between direct and indirect rule (see for example Tilly 1992),
which hinges on whether state agencies monopolize authority or delegate it to local
leaders (Boone, 2003, p. 37). When state bureaucracies do not govern a particular region
by themselves, I characterize STR as delegated: that is, institutional, organizational, and
indirect.56
By contrast, when state agencies retain power, STR is institutional,
organizational, and direct. In these cases, a final distinction comes into play, namely the
breadth of state functions, which can be narrow that is, focalized or wide that is,
promiscuous

depending on the number of discrete objectives that state authorities

pursue in a particular region. The army is a typical example of focalized STR because it
rarely intervenes in local affairs unless a security threat is perceived (Slater 2010). By
contrast, municipalities are a clear example of promiscuous reach, in which local
bureaucrats are responsible for performing a variety state functions.57
In sum, this section has shown that states exercise different forms of reach, which
in turn constitutes an antecedent dimension of state strength and the political puzzles of
enforcement. Drawing on existing literature, I offered a typology of state reach that
distinguishes different forms by considering state organizational presence, type of rule,
and breadth of action.

56
For example, in the Colombian Amazon, until the mid-twentieth century, the government delegated statelike functions to the Catholic Church. Chapter 4 illustrates how the Catholic Church was once tasked with
conflict resolution, land titling, education, and infrastructure building (Bonilla, 2006; Kuan, 2015; Uribe,
2017).
57
Mann (1986, p. 26) emphasizes that states are functionally “promiscuous:” they are neither coherent nor
monolithic, and have many functions.
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2.3.4. Third and Final Step Back: The Scope of the State
Acknowledging diverse forms of STR tells us little about the particular goals that
states pursue in the Amazon. In historical terms, the phenomena are related insofar as the
objectives of the state tend to promote particular types of state organization. The scope of
the state typically precedes its territorial reach because policy goals are what drive the
construction of STR. Charles Tilly (1985) argues, for example, that in Europe “each of
the major uses of violence—war making, state making, protection and extraction—
produced characteristic forms of organization” (p. 181). While armies and navies resulted
from war making activities, tax collection agencies were largely the consequence of
financial necessities. The state’s objectives are thus closely associated with
organizational developments on the ground: “the goals for which infrastructural power is
used may affect how it is deployed and the actual outcomes it generates” (Soifer & Vom
Hau, 2008, p. 228).
Thus far, I have offered conceptualizations of state strength and state reach
centered on means rather than ends (Mann, 1986; M. Weber, 1968). Comparative
scholarship assumes procedural definitions, but empirical studies tend to focus on
particular state goals and functions (Berwick & Christia, 2018) such as information
(Scott, 1998; Soifer, 2013), war making (Centeno, 2002; Thies, 2005; Tilly, 1992), and
tax collection (Levi, 1989; Lieberman, 2002). In this context, I propose that the
theoretical and empirical study of the state stands to benefit from acknowledging both the
existence of less traditional state goals and the fact that the scope of the state has
expanded over time (Kurtz, 2013; Soifer, 2016). For example, the liberal state of the
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nineteenth century was barely involved in the provision of social welfare. During the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, due to the heightened significance of the socalled “social question,” the scope of the state markedly expanded. New state
infrastructures were developed as new demands for state involvement were articulated
(Kurtz, 2013).58
How can we best characterize the goals of the Colombian state in the Amazon?
Table 2.1 below represents a preliminary mapping that emerged inductively from my
fieldwork in the Amazonia foothills and is intended to reduce the complexity of the
state’s diverse and often contradictory objectives (Migdal, 2001). The scope of the state
in the Amazon is influenced by at least by four sectoral agendas—agrarian, extractive,
environmental, and ethnic—which each have characteristic land-use planning institutions
and particular orientations towards the active promotion of economic development.
Table 2.1
State Agendas, Institutions, and Orientations Towards Development
Sectoral agenda
Agrarian
Extractive
Environmental
Ethnic

Characteristic Land-Use Planning
Institution
Individual land property
Individual property and concessions
Forest Reserve / National Parks
Indigenous reservations

Orientation (Development
Promotion)
Developmental
Non-developmental

Since different regions have been integrated according to different agendas, I will
describe each in sequence. The agrarian agenda is characterized by the interest of the

58

See Kurtz (2013) for an interesting discussion of the ways the social question shaped state-building
trajectories in Latin America. The author argues that in countries where mass mobilization began prior to
the Great Depression, state building became difficult as conflict quickly escalated and locked in.
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state in promoting the development of commercial agriculture. Thus, landowners,
peasants, ranchers, and rural employees tend to be the beneficiaries of this sectoral
agenda. The extractive agenda promotes the development of extractive industries like oil
or mining.59 The beneficiaries of this agenda are the companies, employees, merchants,
and other local contractors that directly or indirectly profit from extractive activities. The
environmental agenda aims to protect the environment by either prohibiting or
regulating certain economic activities. The main beneficiaries of this agenda are those
who are affected by the negative externalities of damaging economic activities.60 Finally,
the ethnic agenda promotes the recognition of indigenous rights and the incorporation of
indigenous peoples as non-subordinated citizens. In the Amazon, indigenous peoples tend
to be the direct beneficiaries of the ethnic agenda and have received additional attention
from the state as compensation for centuries of exclusion and violence.61
The four sectoral agendas are instantiated through concrete planning institutions
that regulate both the use and acquisition of land. These institutions determine what can
be done with land, where, and under what conditions. Land use has traditionally been
linked to ownership, which means that institutions regulating land ownership also tend to
affect how land is used (Unruh, Cligget, & Hay, 2005). Land-use planning institutions

59

The extractive agenda of the state can benefit large or small-scale projects, and those projects can be led
either by private actors or state-owned companies.
60
Environmental harms are characterized as “negative externalities” when they are caused by production or
consumption activities but affect people other than the beneficiaries of those activities (Black, Hashimzade,
& Myles, 2017). However, the beneficiaries of the environmental agenda are not limited to those who
directly suffer the negative externalities of a particular activity. Theoretically, the environmental agenda
stands to benefit future generations, humanity at large, and other living beings (Dobson & Eckersley, 2006;
Nash, 1989). Furthermore, it carries potential benefits for those implementing the policies and projects
aimed at protecting the environment (Jodoin, 2017; Robinson, Holland, & Naughton-Treves, 2014).
61
The ethnic agenda is not limited to indigenous groups. However, as Chapter 3 explains, indigenous
groups are, at least numerically, the most important participants in the ethnic agenda in the Amazon.
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can be understood as claims to the ownership and governance of territory, typically
pursued by a diverse set of social actors.
The recognition of individual property rights tends to be the most important and
characteristic land-use planning institution of the state’s agrarian and extractive agendas
(Besley & Persson, 2009; Blomley, 2015; De Soto, 2000). In addition to the institution of
private property, the extractive agenda also depends on mining concessions
exclusionary rights of exploitation

that do not require the recognition of land

ownership (Rodríguez, 2017). When it comes to the environmental agenda, reserve
forests and protected areas for conservation are the two most important land-use planning
institutions (Leal, 2017; Nepstad et al., 2006). Finally, indigenous reservations, a unique
form of collective property, constitute the characteristic land-use planning institution of
the state’s ethnic agenda in the Amazon.62
These four sectoral agendas and their associated land-use institutions can be
classified into two additional categories on the basis their overall orientation towards
developmental activities. Considering the role of the state in relation to economic
development, it becomes clear that the state has at least two distinct faces (Bourdieu,
2014). One face—associated with the agrarian and extractive agendas—is essentially
committed to promoting economic development, while the other—associated with the
environmental and ethnic agendas—is not.
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Afro-Colombian communities also have land rights in Colombia. However, given different historical and
spatial patterns of internal migration and displacement, the collective land of Afro-Colombian communities
tends to be concentrated on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts (Asher, 2009).
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Given that political scientists and economists have long used the terms
“developmental” and “non-developmental” to describe the state, a clarification is
necessary (see for example Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004). Scholarship on the developmental
state described the way states play an essential role in promoting economic development
by providing not only basic public goods (Huber, 1995) but also the infrastructure and
institutions that facilitate economic cooperation (e.g., Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005). My
dissertation uses the same terms but in a slightly different way.
My goal is not to designate the state “developmental” but rather to classify the
state’s four sectoral agendas into two categories. I assume that states are diverse and
often internally incoherent forms of political domination that pursue a range of
potentially conflicting goals (Migdal, 2001) and commitments with respect to the
promotion of economic development. By classifying the state’s four sectoral agendas as
either “developmental” or “non-developmental” (see Table 2.1), I recognize the way the
state pursues both developmental and non-developmental goals simultaneously and often
in the same space.
Furthermore, I use the term “non-developmental” with neither a negative nor a
positive connotation. Scholarship on the developmental state tends to classify as nondevelopmental states those that “do not perform nearly as well in terms of developmental
criteria” (Leftwich, 1998, p. 53). On that usage, a non-developmental state impedes
development rather than promoting it, thus depriving citizens of a presumptive good. A
non-developmental state is thus a failed developmental state, or a “predatory” state
(Evans, 1995). In my dissertation, by contrast, the idea of non-development does not
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convey this negative meaning: it simply indicates the absence of a fundamental
commitment to the active promotion of economic development.
In addition, the idea of non-development should not be taken to imply active or
radical opposition to economic development. Here, a distinction between nondevelopment and post-development is instructive. Post-development indicates ideas or
actions in active opposition to, or somehow residing beyond the frontiers of, economic
development (Escobar, 1994, 2017). By contrast, the idea of “non-development” allows
us to distinguish a lack of a fundamental commitment to the advancement of
development from post-developmental antagonism to it.63 The distinction is particularly
important given the difficulty of identifying clear sectoral agendas of the state that
strongly oppose development. The state rarely embraces such agendas, but rather exhibits
a strong commitment to the active promotion of capitalism (M. Weber, 1968) and
modernity (Scott, 1998).
In sum, the four sectoral agendas of the state, their characteristic land-use
planning institutions, and the two development-oriented faces of the state are naturally
abstract constructs. Reality is more complex and dynamic than Table 2.1 suggests. My
goal here is simply to provide a parsimonious conceptual map through which to
understand the scope of the state in the Amazon. State scope, in turn, is an antecedent
dimension of STR, state strength, and the politics of enforcement.

63

Since non-development does not always oppose development, the concept covers more but says less
about the phenomenon of interest (Sartori, 1970).
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2.4. Green is the New Brown
The previous section provided a conceptual apparatus for understanding the
institutional antecedents of both subnational state strength and the politics of law
enforcement. I posited a distinction between STR and state scope because states not only
pursue different and non-always-coherent goals (scope) but also exhibit different types of
presence (reach). This section goes one step further to analyze the relationship between
uneven stateness and the ecological characteristics of territories that have traditionally
been depicted as “brown.”

2.4.1. States Have Many Brown Zones
States in the developing world are rarely able to govern their peripheries evenly,
and Guillermo O’Donnell (1993, p. 140)’s classical characterization of ungoverned areas
as “brown zones” is a simple and useful way to think about them. How can brown zones
be identified? Does the literature provide tools with which to identify them? Comparative
scholarship emphasizes at least three aspects of brown zones, all of which pertain to the
underlying mismatch between people and territory. First, the literature stresses the
difference between urban and rural areas,64 suggesting that state reach in developing
countries often has an “urban bias.”65 The state is “relatively ineffective at penetrating
peasant agriculture” (Mann, 1984, p. 124). Second, the literature suggests that internal
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Comparative scholars have noted that, historically, controlling the countryside was one of the major
challenges of state building (Spruyt, 1994; Tilly, 1992).
65
Economists and political scientists have long recognized that state decisions and investments tend to
favor urban areas to the detriment of rural populations, which already perform poorly on most development
indicators. See Lipton (1977), Bates (1981) and Bezemer & Derek (2008) on the economic and political
dynamics of the urban bias. See, e.g., Weber’s classic Peasants into Frenchmen (1976) on the difficulties
of asserting state control over the countryside.
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frontiers tend to be difficult to govern and that public goods provision and access to basic
infrastructure is often low in frontier zones (Foa & Nemirovskaya, 2016; LeGrand,
1986). Finally, scholars note the importance of commercial agriculture in explaining why
and where particular institution-building strategies are implemented (Boone, 2003).
The existing scholarship thus takes stock of subnational geographic differences in
the infrastructural power of the state, and offers a set of analytical tools for identifying
likely brown zones. State strength tends to decrease in rural areas and, even more, in both
frontier zones or areas without commercial agriculture. These three factors alone help
explain why the Amazon has low levels of state strength: it is a mostly rural frontier
region in which the vast majority of the territory has not undergone commercial
agricultural development.

2.4.2. Brown Zones Resulting from Varied Ecologies
Despite its important contributions, the literature on subnational stateness tends to assume
that the countryside, peripheries, and frontier regions are homogeneous. Classic studies of
the state rarely take into consideration the variable ecological characteristics of the
territory. Brown zones like the Amazon, which accounts for roughly 40% of South
America, are barely mentioned in the scholarship on state formation in Latin America
(Centeno, 2002; Kurtz, 2013; López-Alves, 2000; Soifer, 2015).
There are some noteworthy exceptions to the general trend of neglecting
ecological characteristics, however. Scholars have recognized that certain territories are
difficult to reach, making the “logistics of political control” difficult to implement. In this
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sense, there may be territories that, given their ecological characteristics, are naturally
resistant to state action. What makes these territories so resistant? Do their ecological or
topographical characteristics really explain such difficulties? How much can we infer
about the state from the ecosystems in question?
Comparative scholarship identifies certain ecological characteristics thought to
make political control difficult. Studies on the causes of violence tend to converge on the
idea that a “rough” terrain helps explain both the onset and the continuity of conflict.
Rough terrain heightens the risk of violence because it aids “rebels in hiding from
superior government forces” (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 76). It is no coincidence that
many classic theorists of guerrilla warfare recognize the strategic value of particular
territories. For example, Che Guevara (1998, p. 29) argued that guerrillas perform better
“in zones difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable
deserts or marshes”. Similarly, Mao Tse-tung (2015) observed that a successful guerrilla
“travels light and travels fast. He turns the hazards of terrain to his advantage and makes
an ally of tropical rains, heavy snow, intense heat and freezing cold” (p. 26).66 These
writers tend to be aware of the existence of geographic obstacles that limit state power
(Tollefsen & Buhaug, 2015, p.11). Rough terrain, in other words, helps create brown
zones.

66

Tse-tung was convinced that guerrilla camps should be located in the mountains, where they could
successfully hide from the regular army.
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Additionally, the academic literature tends to agree that mountainous terrain,
deserts, and forests are difficult to control (e.g., Giraudy & Luna, 2017, p. 105).67 For
example, the proportion of a country that is mountainous has been used as a crossnational measurement for rough terrain (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p.81).68 Similarly, Herbst
(2000)’s States and Power in Africa emphasizes the difficulties of governing the forested
or desertic hinterlands of many African countries. Finally, Eartman’s Birth of the
Leviathan explains that, historically, in Poland “vast areas of thick forest and marshland
… prevented the construction of large-scale forms of social and political organization”
(1997, p. 278). Mountains, deserts, and forests have thus all been represented as
environments that tend to resist the effective exercise of state authority.
What do these landscapes have in common that makes them resistant to state
authority? Comparative scholarship suggests the answer may have something to do with
the way mountains, deserts, and forests restrict population settlement and economic
development. Put differently: the effect of different ecosystems on state power is
mediated by population dynamics. For example, in Africa, vast territories remain beyond
the reach of the state due to low population density, which makes state building both
costly and unrewarding for political elites (Herbst, 2000). James Scott’s conclusions in
The Art of Not Being Governed (2009) do not radically differ from what Herbst argues:

67
Tollefsen and Buhaug (2015, p. 17) found that the number of battles increases with distance from the
capital city, the prevalence of mountains and forests, and the size of excluded populations.
68
This crude measurement is, surprisingly, not very different from Scott (2009)´s qualitative study on the
highlands of Southeast Asia. Scott studies the Southeast Asian mountain region “on the marches of
mainland Southeast Asia, China, India and Bangladesh” (2009, p. 14), which, according to him, may be one
of the largest “non-state spaces” on Earth.
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namely, that state authority tends to vanish in certain territories because state power is
“man power.” 69
All of the above suggests that the densely forested green zones of the Amazon are,
in fact, what O’Donnell (1993) calls brown zones: green is the new brown. Since
O’Donnell did not consider the interaction between the state and nature, the colors of his
maps are very different from mine. Many of the brown zones of Peru and Brazil, the
Latin American countries that O’Donnell studied, are green, ecologically speaking, since
they are mostly covered by natural forests. STR is low in the dense forests of the
Amazon, but high in lands that have been cleared. Amazonia is a continental brown zone
spanning several peripheral states (Ungar, 2018)70 that face the not-insignificant
challenge of exerting power over a region that has become crucial for the world economy
and environment.
Figure 2.3 provides a simple but powerful image to illustrate this point. It depicts
contemporary forest cover in Colombia and its spatial association with the most
important system of indirect rule that the Colombian state implemented until the end of
the twentieth century. The Catholic church was in charge of performing most state
functions in many parts of the country, and the Amazon was one of them. Therefore, the
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Mountains do not always resist state action, which depends on particular historical configurations. While
state power diminishes with altitude in Southeast Asia (Scott, 2009), power and wealth are concentrated in
the Andean mountain range in countries like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. States were built where
manpower was present, thus reinforcing spatial patterns that existed from pre-colonial times (Mahoney
2010). The capital of the Inca Empire was located in Cusco rather than Lima and the suyos (regional
territorial power structures) were designed to connect Andean towns. Thus, state strength diminishes in the
lowlands of most Andean countries, a fact that the Amazon exemplifies.
70
This region is, so to speak, a doubly peripheral region because it comprises the periphery of a group of
peripheral states (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979).
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map is useful to highlight that forest areas tend to be brown, which in this case is
represented by state delegation to the Catholic Church.

Figure 2.3. Forest cover and indirect rule in Colombia
Data for indirect rule from Bonilla (1968) and for forest cover in 2012 from IGACSIGOT (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).
In conclusion, the existing scholarship provides useful theoretical tools for
identifying the places where state strength decreases: peripheries, rural areas, internal
frontiers, and areas without commercial agriculture. The literature also concludes that
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mountains, deserts, and dense forests tend to be brown zones due to the mismatch
between population and territory. The Amazon should be understood as a brown zone
because it meets all of these expectations.

2.4.3. Amazonia: A Brown Zone that Could Be Modified
Political science literature on the state’s territorial unevenness tends to assume
some sort of geographical determinism: the Amazon is a brown zone because it is green.
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, my dissertation adopts a different perspective, one
that investigates how landscapes are socially constructed and, in so doing, critiques
contemporary forms of geographical determinism with a view towards the particular
ecological characteristics of different brown zones.
Taking account of the differences between ecosystems reveals that tropical
rainforests

unlike ecosystems like deserts and steep mountains can be configured,

unmade, and remade. Dense forests like the Amazon are susceptible to transformation by
different combinations of technology, capital, and labor. Given the changing nature of
tropical rainforests, they should not be treated as constants or independent variables. This
idea may strike environmental studies scholars as self-evident, but political scientists
have yet to reckon with it (see Chapter 1).
It is certainly true that dense forests, deserts, and steep mountains are all
peripheries of the state, and as such can be classified as brown zones. It is also true that
population density tends to be low, capitalist development limited, and state control
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contested in these regions.71 However, unlike deserts and steep mountains, demographic
change and economic development is more dynamic in the Amazon because the ecology
of the forest is less resistant to human settlement. Within certain constrains, settlement in
the Amazon is not only possible but positively incentivized by the region’s wealth of
natural resources. The costs of transforming forests are comparatively low, and forests
provide crucial inputs that other ecosystems do not (Peluso, 1994; United Nations, 1996).
Given its natural bounty and soil quality, the Amazon can be rendered suitable for food
production and farming under the right conditions.
In other words, the Amazon’s status as a resource-rich brown zone partially
explains its relative dynamism. Demographic variables in the Amazon cannot not be
treated as constants in the same way that, e.g., Herbst (2000) regards geographic and
demographic patterns in the hinterlands of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger as quasipermanent features. In those countries, “greater urbanization only will enhance the
importance of the capital city because it is unlikely that people will migrate anywhere
else” (Herbst, 2000, p. 154). Herbst’s conclusion is grounded in the reality that the
peripheries in question are comprised of the Sahara Desert, a resource-poor terrain that
significantly constrains the development of animal and human life. Unlike the Sahara, the
Amazon is a resource-rich region that supplies settlers with water, food (fish, mammals,
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Naturally, the logistics of political control depends on the interaction between the ecological
characteristics of the terrain and available technologies. For example, the impact of tropical diseases such
as malaria or dengue can now be controlled thanks to modern medicine (which was less developed when
European colonialism first arrived) (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001); road construction has become
easier (Little, 2014); and helicopters can quickly reach previously isolated regions (Rojas, 2015; Scott,
2009). Furthermore, increased state control through the direct transformation of the landscape is always a
possibility. The use of Agent Orange by the U.S. military is perhaps the clearest example. The powerful
herbicide and defoliant was sprayed over forests and the countryside during the Vietnam war in order to
remove both the hiding places and food crops that sustained rural populations and guerrilla groups.
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birds), building materials, and firewood (Brucher, 1974). Furthermore, the commercial
value of the Amazon’s resources (for example, rubber, timber, and skins) incentivized
previous migration waves. Therefore, when the ecological characteristics of different
brown zones are compared, it quickly becomes evident that the bio-diverse Amazonian
terrain is not as hostile as one might initially surmise (Dominguez Ossa & Gómez,
1990).72
Furthermore, while the Amazon’s soil quality does not prevent migration, it does
constrain it. James Scott (2009) notes that soil quality is a crucial factor constraining or
incentivizing the development of commercial agriculture. Amazon soils are acidic and
lack many of the nutrients that commercial agriculture requires. Compared to the desert,
however, Amazonian soil is both higher quality and more proximate to water. Diamond
(1999)’s theory of food production as the driving force behind civilizational expansion
usefully illustrates this point. Agriculture, he explains, is extremely difficult in deserts
and the Artic, whereas Amazonian soils are at least to some degree amenable to food
production (Diamond, 1999, p. 250). Albeit costly to develop, farming in the Amazon is
possible.73 The arid soil of the desert, by contrast, imposes qualitatively different
constraints on food production.74

72

The rapid urbanization of some Amazonian cities is the clearest example of this dynamism (Little, 2014,
p. 62).
73
Although food production techniques have gradually evolved in the Amazon, many areas remain beyond
the reach of agricultural development and are naturally protected. Hunter-gatherers have been able to
persist in their traditional economic activities “only where especially potent geographic or ecological
barriers made immigration of food producers or diffusion of locally appropriate food-producing techniques
very difficult” (Diamond, 1999, p. 250).
74
To be clear, I am not suggesting that agriculture is completely impossible in desert regions. There are
many examples of desert farming in countries like Israel, Australia, and the United States (Fedoroff et al.,
2010). My point is simply that, when we compare deserts with tropical rainforests, food production appears
far less complicated in the latter.
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In conclusion, Amazonia, the biggest tropical rainforest in the world, can be
characterized as a transnational brown zone where both state reach and strength tend to
be relatively low. Taking account of the basic ecological characteristics of different
peripheral territories, I argue that the Amazon is comparatively more amenable to human
transformation than other brown zones. Like mountains and deserts, dense forests tend to
resist state control. The latter, however, can be modified with some effort. It is for this
reason that the study of Amazon deforestation has the potential to disrupt political
science’s geographical determinism (see Chapter 1).

2.5.

Conclusion
The relationship between Amazon deforestation and STR is complex, and the

purpose of this chapter was to lay out the conceptual foundations of my dissertation.
Advancing an interdisciplinary dialogue, I clarified what tropical deforestation is and
identified its underlying causes, with a particular focus on the role of politics. Existing
academic literature on tropical deforestation, I argue, is largely preoccupied with
proximate drivers to the detriment of underlying socio-political explanations. I then
unpacked the subnational dimensions of stateness with the aim of highlighting the
limitations of the “enforcement paradigm” (that is, research focused on the effective
implementation of anti-deforestation laws). I defended the importance of taking several
steps back—from enforcement to strength; from strength to reach; and from reach to
scope—in order to bring into view historically prior research questions about subnational
stateness and deforestation.
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Finally, I argued that it is necessary to consider the basic ecological characteristics
of a state’s peripheries in order to determine how amenable they are to human
transformation. The academic literature on the subnational strength of the state already
maintains that forest lands tend to resist state action—i.e., that green is the new brown.
However, this chapter suggests that geography is not destiny. Forest lands can be
transformed, unmade, and remade. The next chapter employs the concepts we have
developed here to further explore the mechanics of deforestation and the role of the state
therein.
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CHAPTER 3. A THEORETICAL PROPOSAL ON THE STATE
AND AMAZON DEFORESTATION
“Human transformation of the environment at one historical moment
thus establishes limits to the subsequent uses which man can make of
his environment.” Stephen Bunker (1985, p. 14)
3.1.

Introduction

Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on the drivers of tropical deforestation, with particular
attention to the role of politics at the subnational level. It also described the institutional
and ecological context of State Territorial Reach (STR) and argued that the Amazon, as
the world’s largest tropical rainforest, can be characterized as what Guillermo O´Donnell
(1993) called a “brown zone.” Because the logistics of political control are difficult to
implement in densely forested areas, the Amazon can be characterized as state resistant
(Scott, 2009). However, unlike certain other ecosystems, rainforests lend themselves to
transformation through human effort and capital investment. Despite the relatively poor
quality of Amazonian soil, tropical rainforests possess an abundance of natural resources
that deserts and mountains do not (Peluso, 1994; United Nations, 1996).
Building on these concepts, the current chapter goes a step further and proposes
an empirically-grounded and politically-oriented explanation for varying levels of
cumulative deforestation in the Colombian Amazon. By studying the factors that make
Amazonia a “brown zone,” I theorize the relationship between territorial integration and
deforestation. This chapter presents the core theoretical contributions of the dissertation
and generates a relatively parsimonious set of hypotheses through a combination of
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deductive and inductive reasoning. My overarching claim is that different levels of
cumulative Amazon deforestation in Colombia are the product of enduring trajectories of
economic and political integration. In particular, I argue that any explanation of
cumulative deforestation must consider both the degree and type of territorial integration.
Below, I provide a brief overview of my theory of deforestation, characterize the various
degrees and types of integration, and conclude by discussing my research design and
methodological approach.

3.2. An Overview: Deforestation and Integration
Despite the difficulty of unpacking the relationship between territorial integration
and deforestation, I propose that a comprehensive explanation of cumulative deforestation
in the Colombian Amazon needs to seriously consider both the degree and type of
integration. Figure 3.1 is a schematic representation of the argument I develop in
subsequent sections of this chapter, and in the remainder of the dissertation. Briefly, while
the level of agrarian colonization determines the degree of territorial integration, the
different sectoral agendas of the state (see Chapter 2) determine the type of integration. The
combination of degree and type, in turn, determines the ultimate level of cumulative
deforestation.
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Figure 3.1. Amazon deforestation resulting from degree and type of integration

Economic and political integration tends to increase with the spatial advancement
of agrarian colonization, which promotes deforestation in the short run. The expansion of
agriculture is one of the main proximate drivers of tropical deforestation in South
America (Armenteras & Rodríguez, 2014). Densely forested areas tend to be “brown”
because they have not yet been subject to agrarian colonization, which has traditionally
driven both deforestation and the expansion of STR. Once we establish the degree of
integration (via colonization), however, we must then consider the various social
engineering strategies through which forest peripheries were integrated into the state
(Scott, 1998, p. 4). Variation in the rate of cumulative deforestation between regions with
active agricultural frontiers, I argue, is a product of the particular type of territorial
integration. In other words, the distinctive, state-led development strategies applied to
different Amazonian provinces during the development era shaped their overall
integration and, thus, their present levels of cumulative deforestation.
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This combination of degree and type of territorial integration determines the
ultimate level of cumulative deforestation, which I classify as either high, medium, or
low. Cumulative deforestation tends to be low in regions where agrarian colonization is
uncommon and the frontier is relatively inactive. By contrast, deforestation is highest
where agrarian colonization is most advanced and where the developmental-era state
promoted an integration pathway geared towards commercial farming. The combination
of agrarian colonization and heavy state intervention enabled these regions to transition
from subsistence to commercial agriculture, and thereby to promote rapid cumulative
deforestation. Finally, between these two extremes, cumulative deforestation is moderate
where agrarian colonization occurred but the state did not promote a developmental-era
integration trajectory based on commercial agriculture.
Historically, I propose that cumulative deforestation and territorial integration
tend to be high in provinces like Caquetá and Putumayo, which transitioned from
extractive economies quinine and rubber to agrarian colonization after the 1932
Colombian-Peruvian war. Among these active agricultural frontiers, cumulative
deforestation in Caquetá (compared to Putumayo) tends to be much higher because,
during the developmental era, the state first and then the market succeeded in establishing
an integration trajectory that is based on livestock farming (see Figure 1.2). The next two
sections of this chapter provide some of the additional analytical tools we need to make
better sense of these categories and the broader relationship between Amazon
deforestation and territorial integration.
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3.3. Integration as an Underlying Driver of Amazon Deforestation

3.3.1. Understanding the Amazon’s Brownness
This section develops the idea that cumulative deforestation in the Amazon is, in
the first place, the result of different degrees of territorial integration. I have argued thus
far that dense forests like the Amazon tend to be “brown zones,” and that, unlike other
ecosystems, tropical rainforests can be transformed by introducing capital, labor, and
technology (see Chapter 2). Just as highly integrated parts of the Amazon tend to have
already been stripped of heavy forest cover, new deforestation tends to occur in regions
the state has barely penetrated. If forests tend to be “brown” and cultivated areas “blue”
or “green,” to use O´Donnell (1993)’s terminology, one might suggest the hypothesis that
territorial integration is an underlying driver of deforestation. In other words, integrating
forested brown zones into the state may contribute to their deforestation.
However, the apparent positive relationship between territorial integration and
deforestation could be a spurious one so long as we are unable to identify the
mechanisms by which political and economic integration are linked to the clearance of
land, and vice versa. Hence, a vital task of this dissertation is to study the precise
relationship between territorial integration and Amazon deforestation. While I do not
present a complete literature review on the political ecology of the modern state (Blaikie,
1987; Forsyth, 2003), I do offer some theoretical insights that may enhance our
understanding of the relationship between STR and deforestation.
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In Chapter 2, I reviewed the scholarly consensus that cumulative deforestation
tends to result from, inter alia, infrastructure extension, agriculture expansion, wood
extraction, economic development, and population changes (Armenteras, Rudas,
Rodriguez, Sua, & Romero, 2006; Geist & Lambin, 2002; Rudel, Defries, Asner, &
Laurance, 2009). Interestingly, the classic literature on the social origins of the modern
state contends that most of these variables also contribute to state development. If road
building (Guldi, 2012; Herbst, 2000), commercial agriculture (Boone, 2003), population
density (Scott, 2009), and taxation (Levi, 1981; North, 1990) are critical variables
influencing both STR and deforestation, then we have good theoretical reason to posit a
close relationship between the two phenomena.
How is this relationship best characterized? For an answer that is both
parsimonious and appropriately nuanced, we must examine the social origins of the
modern state. I suggest that deforestation and STR are closely related because both
phenomena are caused by agrarian colonization. The co-occurrence of STR and Amazon
deforestation is explained by the sustained advancement of agrarian colonization in the
twentieth century, which promoted deforestation in the short run and territorial
integration in the long run. Conversely, dense forests tend to be brown because they
remain beyond the reach of agrarian colonization. Figure 3.2 summarizes the argument,
which I will explore step by step.
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Figure 3.2. Understanding the linkage between deforestation and degree of integration

3.3.2. The Short-term Effect: Agrarian Colonization as Creative Destruction
The first element in Figure 3.2 depicts the environmental consequences of
agrarian colonization. The massive incorporation of new land by small, medium, and
large farmers has historically been the main driver of deforestation in the Amazon region
and South America writ large (Armenteras & Rodríguez, 2014; Busch & Ferretti-Gallon,
2017; Etter, McAlpine, Phinn, Pullar, & Possingham, 2006; Geist & Lambin, 2002). On
this basis, I propose that agrarian colonization be conceived as part of a larger process of
“creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 2008) in which forests are destroyed and both
agriculture and territorial integration are created.
I begin with a discussion of the meanings of relevant terms. “The etymological
origins of Latin words colonia (agricultural settlement), colonnus (farmer) and colere
(cultivation) show how foundational agrarian labour is to the word colony” (Arneil, 2017,
p. 20). Colonos (in Spanish), then, are defined by their economic activities, which in the
Amazon are characterized by the opening and incorporation of new forestlands along the
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agricultural frontier. The large-scale entrance of colonos and investors into forested areas
has traditionally been accompanied by a radical change in the use of land.
Chapter 2 showed that many economic models of tropical deforestation conceive
the relationship between forests and agricultural lands as a zero-sum game: areas that are
covered by forests are not cultivated, and cultivated areas are not covered by forests
(Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999), implying that the opportunity cost of maintaining the
forest is restricting the advance of agriculture.73 Until very recently, official records
classified forest lands as uncultivated (incultas), uncivilized (incivilizadas), or simply “to
be colonized” (colonizable).
The relationship between colonos and the forest is mediated by two types of labor:
hunter-gathering and farming (Cronon, 1995). Forestlands tend to be perceived at the
local level as economically worthless in and of themselves. It is only as a result of the
colono’s labor—an arduous labor in humid tropical conditions, I might add—that
economic value is created.74 Farms are born out of labor; land is improved by clearing. In
fact, during my fieldwork in the Amazonian piedmont, I learned that the word
deforestation is not commonly employed by colonos, who prefer the idea of “mountain
toppling” (tumbar monte). While contemporary environmentalists emphasize destruction
over creation, colonos tend to highlight creation over destruction.

73

There is an interesting debate about the environmental impact of peasant agriculture. Some argue that
peasants have the capacity to engage in sustainable practices and that references to their destructive role
only reinforce a discourse that discriminates against and stigmatizes them (Ojeda & González, 2018).
Although the risk of discriminatory policies exists, based on my own fieldwork, it appears indisputable that
colonos are the primary driving force behind the transformation of the landscape that we call deforestation.
74
The clearance of new land was even more difficult and time consuming when modern chainsaws were
not available. Hence, technological improvements can impact cumulative deforestation (Geist & Lambin,
2002).
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Both positive and negative aspects, however, are part of the same process of
creative destruction that characterizes agrarian colonization. Colonization is not a
uniform phenomenon, of course. Colombian scholarship posits the existence of numerous
types of colonization depending on whether the process is led by peasants (colonización
campesina), ranchers (colonización ganadera), coca growers (colonización cocalera),
indigenous peoples (colonización indígena), corporations (colonización empresarial), the
army (colonización militar) or guerrillas (colonización armada).75
Until the 1980s, just decades ago, few people in the Amazon conceived agrarian
colonization as anything other than a righteous war on nature, valiantly waged by the
colonos with their axes and bodies. As such, thousands of farms have been established in
the course of colonization, accompanied by the construction of agricultural settlements
and basic infrastructures. That same infrastructure, incidentally, supports the logistics of
state control (Mann, 1984; Scott, 2009). Some agricultural settlements have even become
towns and proper cities over time. Unsurprisingly, land prices tend to increase the closer
a farm is to agricultural settlements and roads, as well as when farmers possess a formal
land title and have cleared the forest. This explains why lands closest to sources of wealth
and authority tend to be deforested.
If agrarian colonization had occurred only once, deforestation would have ceased
long ago. The problem, however, is that colonization tends to recur indefinitely due to
factors like land accumulation, the sustained advancement of commercial agriculture,
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See Molano (1980), Jaramillo et al (1989) and Salgado (2012) on the differences between these types of
colonization.
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demographic increase, and the concrete economic and political difficulties that colonos
face in attempting to remain in their original places of settlement.76 As Colonos sell the
fruits of their labor, the land market, which is initially informal (De Soto, 2000), slowly
consolidates.
Because some colonos move away in order to repeat the process, colonization
tends to exhibit particular spatial patterns (Bunker, 1985; Mertens & Lambin, 1997).
What others have done in the past tends to influence the location and the economic
decisions of newcomers. Since colonos and investors already control the best lands,
newcomers have strong incentives to move further away from the agricultural frontier,
where land is still “free” or cheap (Serje, 2011). When that happens, newcomers must
confront nature anew, as they (or others) did when they were younger.77
Conceived as a form of creative destruction, agrarian colonization (or the absence
thereof) is thus the first factor we must account for in understanding why densely forested
areas like the Amazon tend to be “brown.” In the short term, colonos and investors clear
the land, establish a farm, and transform the landscape. By introducing the social
conditions that promote deforestation, agrarian colonization facilitates the integration of
forest peripheries.78

76

A local politician I interviewed described the process as a modern version of the Myth of Sisyphus: a
punishment that colonos suffer and which they must eternally repeat (interview 6).
77
Agrarian colonization can also understood with reference to established and outsider actors (Elias, 2008).
Established colonos and investors acquire cleared land. Some of the established were once outsiders and
most outsiders aspire to be part of the establishment. However, while the colonization process tends to
repeat itself, the same people are not usually involved.
78
Recognizing the vital role of agrarian colonization does not mean that colonos are the only relevant actor
in the transformation of the landscape, which is also influenced by investors, coca growers, hunters,
loggers, miners, merchants, companies, and indigenous peoples.
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3.3.3. The Long-term Effect: State Embeddedness in Agrarian Colonization
A second key to understanding why forests are brown zones is recognizing that
states usually embed themselves in agrarian colonization, that is, in territories that have
been previously colonized (see Figure 3.2 above). Comparative scholarship finds that
states are typically enmeshed in concrete social relations and networks of power (Mann,
1986; Migdal, 2001).79 Embeddedness is the concept that political economists have used
to characterize these strong connections. Karl Polanyi (2001), for example, suggested that
markets in capitalist societies tends to be socially “embedded,” despite sustained efforts
to disembed them. A similar concept informed Peter Evans (1995)’s classic notion of
“embedded autonomy,” which holds that economic development is the product of an
autonomous state that is nonetheless closely embedded with civil society.
Due to the state’s embeddedness in agrarian colonization, the territorial
integration of forested areas is strongly associated with deforestation. By studying the
way in which the agricultural frontier advances, we can understand the particular
characteristics of territorial integration that explain cumulative deforestation in the
Amazon. Major landscape transformations are the hallmark of an advancing agricultural
frontier, which in turn constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition for the long-term
extension of STR (Boone, 2003). James Scott (1998, p. 11) described that the study of
forests and their transformation as a “metaphor” for the “manipulation characteristic of
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For example, it has been claimed that state development is conditioned by social processes like economic
development (Polanyi, 2001; M. Weber, 1968) or modernization (S. Huntington, 1968; Migdal, 1988;
Scott, 1998).
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powerful institutions with sharply defined interests, of which state bureaucracies and
large commercial firms are perhaps the outstanding examples.”
The positive relationship between territorial integration and deforestation is so
strong that we can invoke the logic of necessary but insufficient conditions (Braumoeller
& Goertz, 2000): deforestation in the Amazon has been a necessary but insufficient
condition of STR. How do we know when a condition is truly necessary? According to
Braumoeller and Goertz, deforestation is only a necessary condition of STR if two
premises are satisfied: (1) territorial integration is limited where massive deforestation
has not happened, and (2) massive deforestation is always present where there is high
territorial integration. I leave it to the reader to judge if Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide
enough evidence to support this claim.80
At this point, however, I would like to provide some introductory evidence to
illustrate how agrarian colonization has promoted deforestation in the short run and
territorial integration in the long run during the twentieth century. Figure 3.3 illustrates
that road networks, access to electricity and centers of population in the Amazon, all of
favor the state´s logistics of control, are concentrated where forests were previously
cleared. Similarly, most of the same factors are absent in densely forested areas. The
figure also illustrates a similar relationship between deforestation and political
integration, which is here represented by the difference between areas that have been

80

It is important to recognize that not every deforested area has penetrating forms of STR (see Chapter 2).
This fact does not present a logical problem for the argument, as deforestation may be a necessary but not
sufficient condition of territorial integration.
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formally recognized as municipalities and areas that have not.81 The figure provides a
visual image of the fact that forests cover, on average, 50% of municipalities, while the
94% of non-municipalized areas are covered by forests.

Figure 3.3. Cumulative deforestation and economic and political integration in the
Colombian Amazon.
Data for centers of population and political-administrative boundaries from the DANE
(2017), for roads and rivers from the IGAC (2017), for Nighttime Lights from MODIS
(2018), for forest cover from the IDEAM (2016), and for the Amazon region from the
SINCHI (2017) (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).
But this aggregate and general picture is the outcome of a complex historical
process. Figure 3.4 presents the relationship between cumulative deforestation and the
formal recognition of a municipality. This figure focuses on the Amazon piedmont,
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In theory, every part of the Colombian territory should be part of a municipality. However, there are several
territories in the Amazon region that are not part of a municipality and have not been recognized as such.
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where most deforestation has occurred and most municipalities have been recognized.
Not a single municipality had been recognized and the region was mostly covered by
forests when the twentieth century begun (A. Ciro, 2008). However, after one century, 29
municipalities had been recognized and slightly less than 3 million hectares of forest had
been lost. To illustrate this process, Figure 3.4 presents cumulative deforestation and
classifies the recognition of new municipalities by decade since the early 1970s.

Figure 3.4. Cumulative deforestation and political integration over time in the Amazonian piedmont
Data for political-administrative boundaries and its timing from the DANE (2018) and for forest cover my
own data (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).
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My emphasis on state embeddedness carries an important implication: the state,
which is usually defined by its means rather than its ends, may not always be neutral with
respect to environmental outcomes like Amazon deforestation. The “enforcement
paradigm” as applied to deforestation not only tends to assume a virtuous cycle between
state strength and environmental protection but also frequently relies on a procedural
conception of the state that imagines it as fully disembedded.82 State strength tends to be
defined in terms of the ability to achieve policy objectives, and the enforcement paradigm
assumes that environmental objectives are no different. Yet, when state embeddedness is
taken seriously, we are forced to conclude that the modern state is not always neutral with
respect to deforestation since state reach has historically been associated with the very
drivers of deforestation (e.g., population, infrastructure, commercial agriculture, and
private property).
Agrarian colonization is thus part of the social origins of STR and helps us
understand the relationship between deforestation and the state. Population settlement and
agriculture tend to precede the economic and political integration of territory. Less
populated areas have relatively low STR, and even less if commercial agriculture is absent
(Boone, 2003; Herbst, 2000; Scott, 2009). The idea that states follow population movement
and capital development is not new (Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005; Scott, 1998). The main
theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to conceptualize the particular relationship
between the state and the forest in the Colombian Amazon by being explicit about these
linkages.

82

Chapters 1 and 2 summarized what I mean by the “enforcement paradigm.”
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Agrarian colonization can be seen as part of the “organic process of state
development,” an idea proposed by Miguel Centeno (2002) to differentiate the European
process of state development from the same process elsewhere. On this view, European
states underwent an organic developmental trajectory that allowed them to “grow into”
their frontiers. Because Latin American states like Colombia did not face strong external
threats, their state-building strategies mostly focused on places where the population was
settled. “The sheer amassing and control of territory was not as central for Latin America
as it was for Europe” (Centeno, 2002, p. 270). As a result, juridical sovereignty and state
territoriality does not always coincide with the de facto exercise of power in developing
countries like Colombia (e.g., Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Herbst, 2000).
The existence of brown zones like the Amazon is partly the result of this
mismatch between population and territory.83 The literature suggests that sparsely
populated regions tend to be difficult to govern because state leaders lack the incentives
to broadcast power (Herbst, 2000). State power is basically man-power, which means that
states are usually anchored in places where population is settled (Scott, 2009).84 It is thus
vital to consider population numbers when studying STR.
Although theories that emphasize the relationship between state power and
population are useful in explaining the state’s limited reach in tropical rainforests like the
Amazon, they tend to assume that demography remains the same over time. By contrast, I

83
Border disputes in the Colombian Amazon were settled by the mid-1930s as a result of the ColombianPeruvian war (see Chapter 4).
84
The territorial state has historically been an anthropocentric political form. Unsurprisingly, it has many
weaknesses when it comes to addressing the so-called “ecological challenge” of our times (Dobson &
Eckersley, 2006).
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propose that, instead of reproducing the well-known methodological practice of holding
population constant in the study of political phenomena like STR (Giraudy & Luna,
2017; Steinberg, 2018, p. 238), any research project on the enduring connection between
territorial integration and deforestation needs to seriously consider demographic change.
By controlling for population dynamics, studies risk losing sight of the fact that state
power is man-power (Herbst, 2000; Scott, 2009). Contemporary studies on the politics of
territorial unevenness (Boone, 2012; Giraudy & Luna, 2017; Steinberg, 2018) stand to
benefit enormously from considering not only how territories are populated over time
(González, Bolívar, & Vásquez, 2002) but also how particular regions gain in strategic
importance as population dynamics change.
The significance of population is more complex than numbers alone. In addition,
the literature notes that state control becomes easier when populations are settled, that is,
when they are not mobile (Scott, 2009). Unsurprisingly, states with open internal
frontiers like the Amazon tend to have serious problems of consolidation because people
can easily evade state control. Ernest Gellner famously wrote:
Pastoral societies, especially (but not exclusively) when nomadic, provide a
milieu within which centralization of power, though not unknown, tends, when it
does occur, to be short-lived, ephemeral, and to lead, after a fairly short time, to a
return to the initial, uncentralized situation. The explanation is not far to seek:
though pastoral societies possess storable wealth, it is mobile wealth, and those
who own it may escape the dilemma of the pre-emptive conflict… Something
similar is true of peasant societies in difficult terrain. Generally speaking, peasants
are tied to their fields and therefore eminently exploitable: they cannot run away.
Nevertheless, if their fields are located in terrain that is difficult of access, then the
imposition of domination may be too arduous to be worthwhile (1988, p. 149).
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State territorial reach, then, is closely associated with populations that are already
established and that live in areas that are not difficult to access. The modern state is thus a
form of political organization that mainly exercises power over settled territory (Lustick,
1993), and the Amazon region is no exception.85 This linkage is so clear that, historically,
authorities in the Colombian Amazon have consciously attempted to settle nomadic
groups and have introduced incentives to facilitate the internal migration of populations
amenable to proper agricultural settlement (Bonilla, 1968; Uribe, 2017). Since native
indigenous groups in the Amazon have historically been nomadic while newcomers have
been sedentary, state embeddedness clearly has a cultural angle.
The sustained arrival of colonos and investors who were socialized in settled
societies as well as the steady cultural assimilation and displacement of native and
nomadic populations is thus crucial to comprehending how the Amazon was integrated in
the twentieth century. Since the late nineteenth century, and particularly from the middle
of the twentieth century, the region has witnessed the rapid influx of newcomers from the
most integrated parts of Colombia. Their basic economic and social practices were
substantively different from those of the native populations. Colonos replicated in the
Amazon region the economic practices of the most integrated parts of Colombia (CNMH,
2017). Agriculture was accordingly transformed from subsistence to commercial farming.
The twentieth century was the period when both subsistence agriculture (initially) and
commercial agriculture (subsequently) became widespread in the Amazonian foothills.
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In fact, Scott’s initial insight (2009), as he recognized, was inspired by the longstanding indigenous
practice of running away from predators in the Amazon.
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Catherine Boone´s Political Topographies of the African State nicely underscores
the connection between institution-building strategies and commercial agriculture. Boone
contends that regions without commercial agriculture tend to remain politically
unincorporated because state elites lack incentives to build institutions or challenge the
power of rural elites. Non-incorporation, then, “is really a catch-all for rural societies that
are not engaged in commercial agriculture” (2003, p. 323). Where commercial agriculture
is underdeveloped, local elites exercise power and the regime abdicates authority.
Although Boone’s theory relies on three explanatory variables, the existence of
commercial agriculture is her baseline.86 Despite this powerful insight, I argue that Boone
neglects the dynamism of state-society relations. Rulers’ strategies can change, and
unincorporated regions can undergo different incorporation trajectories. Commercial
agriculture does not simply exist: it is constantly in the making and, in the Amazon,
leaves a footprint.
In conclusion, the state’s embeddedness in agrarian colonization is the second
factor explaining why deforestation and territorial integration are closely related.
Agrarian colonization promotes deforestation in the short run (creative destruction) and
extends the territorial reach of the state in the long run (state embeddedness).
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Boone proposes that, in the presence of commercial agriculture, institution-building strategies depend on
the bargaining power and economic autonomy of rural elites. Administrative occupation is likely when
rural elites lack bargaining power, whereas usurpation is likely when rural elites have substantial
bargaining power but are not economically dependent on the state (powerful and highly autonomous rural
elites need to be controlled). Finally, powersharing occurs when rural elites have substantial bargaining
power and are economically dependent on the state. Dependent rural elites can be allies of the state even if
they are powerful.
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3.3.4. State Reach and Agrarian Colonization
In order to understand how agrarian colonization contributes to the extension of
STR, it is first necessary to understand the role that state institutions play in colonization.
The purpose of this section is to clarify how agrarian colonization is linked to political
integration as well as economic integration. The literature has long addressed the role of
the state in colonization and proposed different types of colonization: for example, stateled colonization, in which state agencies are responsible for the transplantation and
welfare of colonos; induced colonization, in which state agencies do not directly support
colonos but introduce strategic incentives for migration; and spontaneous colonization, in
which colonos move without the active intervention of a state agency regardless of the
posterior state support that they may receive.87
These three ideal types illustrate the range of possible relationships between the
state and colonization. The relationship that actually obtains, I hypothesize, will affect the
magnitude and pace of colonization and corresponding deforestation. Given that states
possess capacities and resources that colonos rarely have access to (Torres, 2011), and
which enable them to promote cooperation for development (Lange & Rueschemeyer,
2005), I predict extensive and rapid agrarian colonization when state involvement is high.
Scholars agree that, historically, induced and spontaneous colonization were more
important in the Colombian Amazon than state-led colonization. Furthermore, state
involvement was highest during the developmental era (1948-1982), a period when state-
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See Salgado (2012) for a critical assessment of these types of colonization.
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led colonization projects were implemented and spontaneous colonization was not led but
supported by the state.88
The belief that colonization in Colombia is largely spontaneous has been
reinforced by the idea that Amazon deforestation is mostly unplanned (Armenteras et al.,
2006). By contrast, my dissertation provides several tools for analyzing the role of the
state in spontaneous colonization and deforestation. I propose that the Colombian sate has
always played a central role in colonization, and that my typology of STR (see Chapter 2)
is useful for understanding how the state is never completely absent from unsettled lands.
In short, the state provides the institutional framework and the imaginaries by virtue of
which colonization occurs in the first place (Serje, 2011).
We can observe the role of agrarian colonization in promoting both economic and
political integration by examining the relationship between land ownership and state
territoriality. Legal geographer Nicholas Blomley (2017, p. 2) notes that “the tendency of
geographers to tie territory to the state, combined with the resistance of most property
scholars to engage with territory, means that there is little scholarship that focus on the
territorial dimensions of property in land.” Blomley argues that property is territorialized
and that such territorialization is one of the bases of state territory: the recognition of land
ownership, in other words, decisively contributes to the institutionalization of state
territory (Besley & Persson, 2009; De Soto, 2000).
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The next section of this chapter describes the importance of this period in the Colombian Amazon.
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As in many other countries, most forest areas in the Colombian Amazon were
officially public lands (baldíos) until the early 1980s.89 Institutions and ideas associated
with land acquisition, then, reached the region early and produced important effects even
if they were not directly enforced by a state agency (Falleti, 2019). Formal institutions
became consequential when colonos, who have historically been the vanguard of the state
in the Amazon, began to occupy public forestlands. Colonos’ aspirations vis-à-vis baldíos
are profoundly shaped by their own experiences as subjects of the state in their regions of
origin. Colonos plant the seeds of the state and know what needs to be done in order to
claim public land and increase the likelihood of obtaining a legal land title from the state
(CNMH, 2017).90 One of those conditions is land clearance: the well-known mechanism
of “clearing to claim” has long been at work in the Amazon, both formally and informally
(Unruh, Cligget, & Hay, 2005). Figure 3.5 illustrates the amount of land titles that the
Colombian state granted during the twentieth century in the Colombian Amazon by
department.

89

Utilitarian property theorists would probably classify baldíos as commons because these areas belong to
everyone and yet to no one. See Alexander & Peñalver (2012) for an introduction to Utilitarian Property
Theory. It is important to highlight that, historically, baldíos were the most important formal institution in
the Amazon region until the early 1980s. Designation as baldíos did not mean that territories were empty:
indigenous people lived in the Amazonian foothills before the onset of agrarian colonization (A. Ciro, 2008;
Serje, 2011).
90
The acquisition of baldíos is becoming increasingly difficult as a result of the recent recognition of
national parks and indigenous reservations (see Chapter 6).
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Figure 3.5. Allocated public land to private hands in the Colombian Amazon by department
Data from INCODER (2012).
Historically, most deforestation has occurred in baldíos, which can be seen as
reaffirming the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). After all, baldíos have been
colonized by self-interested individuals who know that acquiring property depends on its
use and occupation. This sustained appropriation of baldíos can also be conceived as a
form of “enclosure” (Polanyi, 2001) or a tragedy of the commons led by the aspirants to
private owners.91 The expansion of the land market as the result of agrarian colonization
is a clear sign that territory is being institutionalized by the state. Furthermore, with the
formal recognition of land property, colonos usually gain access to additional state
services (De Soto, 2000).

91

Colonos’ aspirations are only sometimes fulfilled by state agencies as part of a slow-moving process that
is neither peaceful nor mechanistic.
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A summary of the argument thus far is the following: colonos move to forested
areas, clear the land, establish a farm, finance a town, and facilitate both the economic
and political integration of the territory. Densely forested areas tend to be brown zones
because one rarely finds (1) penetrating forms of state reach without agrarian
colonization or (2) agrarian colonization without deforestation.

3.3.5. Territorial Integration through Non-Developmental Agendas
Above I argued that the degree of territorial integration accounts for differences in
cumulative deforestation. Until this point, I have focused on forms of STR that are
associated with the developmental agendas of the state in order to highlight the fact that
the state tends to be embedded in the establishment of agricultural settlements. The idea
of state embeddedness in agrarian colonization helps us understand why there is usually a
strong connection between territorial integration and cleared land. The transformation of
the landscape known as deforestation is the end result of agrarian colonization, which is
typically induced by the promise of ceding public lands (baldíos) to investors and
landless peasants. Densely forested areas like the Amazon tend to be brown zones
because the social conditions that favor both STR and deforestation are not present. The
economic and political integration of the Amazon began in the late nineteenth century
with the rubber boom (Uribe, 2017) and markedly accelerated during the developmental
era of the mid-twentieth century (Marsh, 1983) when the state became deeply invested in
promoting agrarian colonization and configuring a proper internal market (Boone, 2012).
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Thus, political integration via developmental strategies is the primary explanation for the
negative relationship between STR and forest cover.
This picture was fairly simple until the early 1980s. Once the developmental era
came to a close, however, not only did the relationship between state and market shift in
favor of fuller marketization (Harvey, 2007), but Colombia also witnessed a
strengthening of the non-developmental

i.e., ethnic and environmental

agendas of the

state (see Chapter 2). The empowerment of these disembedded agendas emerged in
tandem with the implementation of neoliberal reforms. Put differently, two simultaneous
transitions occurred at roughly the same time in the Amazon: the market gained a degree
of autonomy from society (Polanyi, 2001) while the state began to broadcast power
beyond the boundaries set by agrarian colonization. The transition from the
developmental to the neoliberal era, and the corresponding retrenchment of the state form
the market, coincided with a diversification of state goals beyond pure developmentalism
in the Amazon (Orihuela, 2019).
As Chapter 2 explained, the scope of state functions gradually changed as
Colombia began to pursue non-developmental goals. Consequently, following the
developmental era, new land-use planning institutions

reserve forests, national parks,

and indigenous reservations were recognized in the Amazon and have come to
complement the classic institutions of private property and mining concessions (see
Figure 3.6).92

92

Although the institution of indigenous reservations is not new, the recognition of indigenous titles in the
Amazon was uncommon prior to the mid-1970s.
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Figure 3.6. Land-use planning institutions in the Colombian Amazon
Data for reserve forest, subtractions of reserve forest, natural parks and hydrocarbons
from SIAC (2018), for Indian Reservation from the Ministry of Interior (2016)
(coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).
As a result of these new agendas and land-use planning institutions, STR has
become more diverse (Table 3.1). Since the early 1980s, densely forested areas of the
Amazon have been undergoing an active process of territorial integration despite the fact
that they have not undergone massive agrarian colonization.
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Table 3.1
Sectoral Agendas of the State and State Reach in the Amazon over Time
Sectoral agenda
Agrarian
Extractive
Ethnic
Environmental

Developmental era
(1950s-1970s)
Promiscuous
Promiscuous
Formal
Formal

Neoliberal era
(1980s-)
Promiscuous
Promiscuous
Delegated
Focalized

In light of this transition and the diversification of state goals, the idea that
deforestation results from different degrees of territorial integration and that densely
forested areas tend to be brown zones should be further clarified. Despite the fact that
new forms of territorial integration have now emerged as a result of the strengthening of
the state’s non-developmental agendas, I nonetheless defend the idea that forested areas
in the Colombian Amazon should be characterized as brown zones. When my typology of
STR is taken into account (see Chapter 2), we see that non-developmental agendas tend
to promote types of STR that are largely formal, delegated, or focalized. Penetrating
forms of reach, which Mann (1986) described as “promiscuous,” tend to be embedded in
the integration dynamics that favor deforestation. Drawing on traditional concepts and
theories of the modern state, I argue that dense forests in the Amazon are brown zones
because penetrating forms of state reach rarely occur in forested areas.
Chapter 2 characterized the different sectoral agendas of the state and their
associated forms of STR. This chapter, by contrast, analyzes the theoretical association
between those forms of reach and cumulative deforestation in the Colombian Amazon.
Together, these two chapters enable us to understand why deforestation continued after
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the 1980s, even as the amount of land that has been incorporated as a national park or an
indigenous reservation has likewise increased.
In conclusion, I hypothesize that cumulative Amazon deforestation is the result of
different degrees of territorial integration into the market economy and state project.
Deforestation can be seen as a sign of territorial integration in the making. The dense
forests of the Amazon tend to be brown zones because the very social conditions that
favor both deforestation (in the short term) and STR (in the long term) are largely absent.
At the same time, STR has diversified due to the empowerment of non-developmental
agendas, which tend to be detached from agrarian colonization. The post-1980s
Colombian state reaches territories beyond the agricultural frontier, but these new forms
of reach are less penetrating and tend to be formal, delegated, or focalized.

3.4.

Types of Integration: Cumulative Deforestation Among Integrated Areas

3.4.1. From Degrees to Types of Integration
I have argued thus far that the relationship between STR and cumulative
deforestation is explained by the state’s embeddedness in agrarian colonization. I have
proposed that different levels of cumulative deforestation first result from different
degrees of territorial integration. This is the primary reason that STR increased
throughout the twentieth century in tandem with forest depletion in the Amazonian
foothills. However, even Amazonian provinces with a relatively high degree of
integration exhibit different levels of cumulative deforestation, suggesting that our
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explanation is incomplete. We must now account for different levels of cumulative
deforestation among regions with both active agrarian frontiers and relatively similar
degrees of integration.
By systematically comparing deforestation levels among the most integrated
provinces of the Colombian Amazon, I am able to capture the enduring effects of state
policies whose objective was the promotion of regional development. Although Caquetá
and Putumayo are the two most integrated provinces of the Colombian Amazon, the
former has much higher levels of cumulative deforestation than the latter (see Chapter 1).
Why has Caquetá historically experienced much higher levels of deforestation
than Putumayo? The literature on Amazon deforestation provides interesting clues to this
puzzle in its identification of cattle ranching as the main proximate driver of deforestation
in the Colombian Amazon (Etter et al., 2006).93 Nevertheless, studies of tropical
deforestation in Colombia typically limit their inquiry to the proximate drivers of
deforestation and rarely assume a historical and social perspective. As a result, they tend
to naturalize economic development pathways.
By contrast, the historical perspective adopted in this dissertation sheds light on
the reasons livestock farming became the dominant sector in Caquetá and not in
Putumayo. It then becomes necessary to examine the way different types of integration
account for additional subnational variation in deforestation among provinces with
similar degrees of integration. In particular, I suggest that cumulative deforestation
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Chapter 2 provided a brief explanation of the drivers of deforestation and the difference between direct
and underlying drivers. See also Gest and Lambin (2002).
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among regions with active agrarian frontiers is conditioned by the longstanding
integration trajectories first configured by the Colombian state during the developmental
era and subsequently reinforced by private actors.
Table 3.2 summarizes this paired comparison and suggests that different levels of
cumulative deforestation among regions with active agricultural frontiers are the result of
the different types of integration put in motion during the developmental era.94 The table
begins with historical pre-conditions, that is, the prior transformations that facilitated the
adoption of different integration pathways during the developmental era (Slater &
Simmons, 2010). The two rows comprising the pre-conditional part of the table capture
the state’s strategic interests in the Amazonian foothills during the first half of the
twentieth century and the specific dynamics of early agrarian colonization. The second
segment of the table describes state intervention and its consequences during the
developmental era (1958-1982), a critical juncture at which different integration
pathways were configured (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). These pathways are in turn
responsible for different levels of cumulative deforestation. The final segment of the table
captures the subsequent fate of developmental-era integration trajectories as their effects
were amplified during the neoliberal era.

94

See Section 3.5 on research design and methodological approach.
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Table 3.2
Two Integration Trajectories in the Amazonian Foothills Through the Developmental
Agendas of the State

Period

Domain

Integration through the
agrarian agenda
(Caquetá)

Integration through the
extractive agenda
(Putumayo)

Strategic interests

From low to high importance
(internal threat)

From high to low importance
(external threat)

Types of colonization

Peasant and corporate
colonization (colonización
campesina y empresarial)

Peasant colonization
(colonización campesina)

State-led agenda

Agrarian

Extractive

Oil extraction
promotion

Low

High

Commercial farming
consolidation and
democratization

High

Low

Private capital
investments

Constant, stable, and
unlimited demand for
farming products

Interrupted, unstable, and
limited local demand for
farming products

Coca cultivation

Complemented and
facilitated transition to legal
farming. Medium influence

Became dominant. High
influence

High

Medium

Pre-conditions

Developmental
Era (19581982)

Neoliberal Era
(1982-

Cumulative deforestation

3.4.2. Pre-conditions: Changing Strategic Interests and Initial Agrarian Colonization
The integration trajectory of the Amazonian foothills, where Caquetá and
Putumayo are located, was relatively uniform until the developmental era (1958-1982),
when the two provinces began to diverge. However, two important aspects of the earlier
period are worth noting: the strategic interests of the state and the particular type of
colonization.
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What I call the pre-conditional period lasted from the conclusion of the 1932 war
between Colombia and Peru over Amazonian territories until the beginning of the
developmental period at the end of the 1950s. The quinine and rubber booms of the latenineteenth century triggered the earliest integration of the Amazonian foothills (A. Ciro,
2008; Zárate, 2008). Although both Caquetá and Putumayo were influenced by these
extractive booms, the strategic interests of the Colombian state ended up focusing on
Putumayo, which was a border province. A proper understanding of the integration
trajectories of peripheral territories thus demands serious consideration of the evolving
strategic logic of the state. The sustained advance of Peruvian rubber tappers, merchants,
and companies threatened the interests of the Colombian state, which at the time
delegated most state functions to the Catholic Church. Between the late nineteenth
century and 1932, when the Colombian-Peruvian war ended, Colombia’s fear of losing its
Amazonian territories critically shaped state-led development strategies (Uribe, 2017).
Prior to the war, Caquetá was strategically less important than Putumayo: it was
located in the north and did not share a border with Peru. As classical bellicist theories of
state formation would predict (Downing, 1992; Thies, 2005; Tilly, 1992), the necessity of
combatting an external threat promoted heavy state-led investments in Putumayo, which
lies along the Peruvian border. By the war’s end, the economies of both Caquetá and
Putumayo were mostly extractive, though agrarian colonization was already underway.
Additionally, the Peruvian-Colombian war left two important legacies that
influenced the dynamics of agrarian colonization and the strategic interests of the state in
the post-war period (Vásquez, 2015). On the one hand, during the war, the army built two
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roads to connect Caquetá and Putumayo with their neighbors Huila and Nariño. In a
national context of demographic growth and land inequality, the new roads induced
heavy migration to the Amazonian foothills. Agrarian colonization increased after the
war in both regions, but Caquetá, in contrast to Putumayo, received not only peasants but
also investors (Serrano, 1994). On the other hand, and more importantly, the strategic
interests of the state in the Amazonian foothills changed with the resolution of the border
conflict between Colombia and Peru following an exchange of territories. As classic
bellicist theories would predict, this de jure recognition of international boundaries
diminished the necessity of exercising de facto state power in the border region of
Putumayo (Herbst, 2000).
In the post-war period, the strategic interests of the state changed focus from
external to internal threat, and from Putumayo to Caquetá. State intervention in the
Amazonian foothills after the war can only be understood in relation to these changing
strategic priorities. Internal turmoil in the most integrated parts of Colombia increased
following the war (Pecaut, 1978), which meant that the necessity of defending territorial
sovereignty from the Peruvian threat was replaced by the imperative of ordering power
domestically (Slater, 2010). Putumayo declined in importance relative to Caquetá, the
province that quickly became associated with the effects and dynamics of internal
violence (Molano, 1989).
Although social turmoil increased throughout the post-war period, historians of
Colombia tend to highlight one particular period known as La Violencia (1946-1966).
The two traditional parties and their constituencies clashed when the Conservative Party
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gained power in 1946 and populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was assassinated in 1948.
The Amazonian foothills were not directly afflicted by La Violencia, which mostly took
place in the most integrated parts of the country where the hegemony of the Conservative
Party was challenged (Ramírez, 2011). La Violencia thus had a political geography that
enables us, for analytic purposes, to conceptualize it as an “exogenous shock” facilitating
the metamorphosis of the state’s strategic interests in the Amazonian foothills (Slater &
Simmons, 2010).
I argue that the vital role of La Violencia in the Amazon can only be understood
by examining the dynamics of forced displacement and migration. Although population
increased in both Caquetá and Putumayo, its timing, magnitude, and political
characteristics differed. Partisan violence was pervasive in Huila and Tolima, which
prompted an exodus of colonos to neighboring Caquetá. By contrast, for political reasons,
Nariño did not expel as many people to Putumayo (Ramírez, 2011). The possibility that
partisan violence would spill over into the Amazonian foothills, I suggest, shaped the
uneven interest of the Colombian state in Caquetá and Putumayo during the
developmental era.
In conclusion, just prior to the developmental era, the strategic interests of the
Colombian state in the Amazon foothills shifted dramatically. Putumayo was no longer a
priority following the Colombian-Peruvian war. By contrast, Caquetá became a strategic
region that received mass migration and capital investment and also risked reproducing
civil violence in the early stages of the Cold War.
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3.4.3. A Critical Juncture: Integration During the Developmental Era (1958-1982)
The developmental era was a path-breaking period, or a critical juncture, during
which the integration trajectories of Caquetá and Putumayo began to diverge. The public
policies implemented between 1958 and 1982 had long-lasting consequences. The
Colombian state acted as a vital force reshaping nature-society relations in the
Amazonian foothills, defining distinctive integration pathways for the two departments in
question (e.g., Polanyi, 2001; Scott, 1998; E. Weber, 1976). More specifically, territorial
integration was promoted through the agrarian agenda in Caquetá and the extractive
agenda in Putumayo during this period.
Why, from a theoretical standpoint, do I view the state as a decisive force in
Amazonia? There are at least two complementary reasons we might expect the state to
play an important role in peripheral regions like the Amazon. First, the literature on
economic development suggests that late developers tend to rely on heavy state
intervention.95 Second, capital investments tend to be risky and costly in regions where
labor is scarce, property rights poorly defined (De Soto, 2000), state institutions contested
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), tropical illness common (Acemoglu, Johnson, &
Robinson, 2001) and infrastructure lacking (Herbst, 2000). Positing a central role for the
state in the developmental era does not imply that it was the only relevant actor in the
region, only that its intervention was more decisive than that of colonos and small-scale
investors.

95

The connection between late development and state intervention was true for European late developers
(Gerschenkron, 1965) and “doubly true” for the global peripheries (Kohli, 2004, p. 8).
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Chapter 2 observed that integration occurs through at least four distinct sectoral
agendas: agrarian, extractive, environmental, and ethnic.96 Among these sectoral agendas,
the agrarian one is most wide-ranging, having the greatest effect on the largest number of
people. Unsurprisingly, public policies that promote this agenda in forested areas tend to
be expensive, since basic infrastructure is lacking and needs to be built (Peluso, 1994).
The extractive agenda of the state, by contrast, tends to be less extensive: its impact is
focalized (Saylor, 2014) and does not benefit as many families as the agrarian agenda
does. The agrarian agenda has the potential to promote broad social development.97
Given that economic resources tend to be scarce in developing countries like Colombia,
the allocation of agrarian investments is rarely uniform across regions. Among peripheral
regions like the Amazon, state authorities decided where to allocate scarce resources.
I argue that, during the developmental era, the agrarian agenda was advanced
mostly in regions where the strategic interests of the state were compromised (Albertus &
Kaplan, 2013). With the aim of ordering power and preventing violence in regions of
recent agrarian colonization, the Colombian government actively promoted a nonredistributive land reform in which colonization of public land
“empty”

usually presented as

was the most important strategy (Jimeno, 1989; Marsh, 1983). Instead of

distributing land, state authorities decided to expand the agrarian frontier, which required
them to lead, induce, and support agrarian colonization. Social development was
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See Chapter 2 for a conceptualization on these four agendas of the state.
When economic exchange between the center and periphery is considered, the agrarian agenda involves
high capital inflows to the region, while the extractive agenda mainly involves capital outflows.
97
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promoted by expanding the agrarian frontier without threatening the interests of landed
elites from the center (Fajardo, 1981).
However, agrarian colonization was not promoted evenly. Caquetá, unlike
Putumayo, became a priority after the war with Peru. State authorities reacted differently
to the effects of La Violencia, which transformed the strategic thinking of the Colombian
state. State agencies like the Caja Agraria and the INCORA facilitated the transition
from subsistence agriculture to livestock farming and incentivized additional migration to
Caquetá. As a result, livestock farming consolidated and democratized in Caquetá, where
integration through farming was promoted (Jimeno, 1989). Although there are some
examples of state-led colonization (colonización dirigida) in Caquetá, the dominant role
of the state was to support spontaneous colonization (colonización espontánea) and to
incentivize further colonization (colonización inducida). Although oil was present in
Caquetá, it was not exploited, apparently for technical reasons (E. Ciro, Barbosa, & Ciro,
2016).98
State intervention in Putumayo was very different: its integration during the
developmental era was advanced through the state’s extractive agenda. The once strategic
border region was left behind following the Colombian-Peruvian war. In Putumayo, the
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This emphasis on the important role of the state in Caquetá would probably sound peculiar to scholars
who study the economic and political development of the region. The literature regularly emphasizes the
peripheral condition of the region and the absence of state-led comprehensive efforts to support
colonization there (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2017; Ferro & Uribe, 2002; Salgado, 2012).
While not necessarily contradicting those findings, my dissertation reaches a different conclusion based on
a different type of comparison. Instead of contrasting Caquetá with the Andean core or an ambitious ideal
of state-led development, I compare Caquetá’s economic success with the most similar department in the
Amazon: Putumayo. Although state investments have not satisfied the local populations, among the
multiple regions where colonization has occurred, Caquetá has received the most attention and resources
(Jimeno, 1989).
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effects of La Violencia were less significant than in Caquetá. When the strategic interests
of the state shifted from external to internal threats, Putumayo was no longer a priority.
Put differently, state-led agrarian investments in Putumayo were minimal because its
frontier status was no longer an important asset in the post-war period. Instead, state
intervention focused on constructing the infrastructure necessary for oil extraction, a
process that was delegated to the Texas Petroleum Company (CNMH, 2015). Since the
extractive agenda is less wide-ranging than the agrarian one, one can argue that
Putumayo gave more to the center than it received in return.
These different state-led strategies put in motion two distinct integration
trajectories that in turn explain varying levels of cumulative deforestation. In Caquetá, the
province that integrated through the agrarian agenda, state investments created a
trajectory in which livestock farming was consolidated and to some extent democratized.
During this critical juncture, Caquetá was able to speed up the transition from subsistence
agriculture livestock farming, thus establishing the basic parameters that explain high
cumulative deforestation. The opposite happened in Putumayo, where the state’s strategy
focused on extractive activities. In Putumayo, the state promoted integration through the
extraction of oil, a path that left the farming sector unconsolidated and explains the
province’s medium levels of cumulative deforestation.
In conclusion, the developmental era was a critical juncture at which the
Colombian state initiated two very different integration paths in the Amazonian foothills.
At the close of this vital period, the once-similar departments of Caquetá and Putumayo
were on divergent trajectories. The different levels of cumulative deforestation they
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subsequently experienced, I argue, resulted from the different types of economic and
political integration set in motion by the state during the developmental era. While
agrarian development was promoted in Caquetá, leading to high levels of deforestation,
extractive development was promoted in Putumayo, resulting in less intense
deforestation.

3.4.4. Integration Trajectories during the Neoliberal Era (1982-Present)
The legacies of the developmental era continued to reverberate into the neoliberal
period that began in the early 1980s, when major economic reforms were initiated in
Colombia. By then, Caquetá and Putumayo were on two starkly different paths. In the
years since, two important market-led developments—private capital investment and
“coca colonization”—have affected the Amazonian foothills. But instead of radically
altering the two regions’ integration paths, these developments reinforced them. To put it
in theoretical terms, while the developmental era decisively shaped the integration
pathways of Caquetá and Putumayo, since the early 1980s a resilient path dependency
has set in.
At the close of the developmental era, the Colombian state began to retreat from
the market. Neoliberal reforms impacted Caquetá and Putumayo at roughly the same
time, but the substance and effects were markedly different. In Caquetá, a self-regulated
farming market was already in place. The retreat of the state went hand in hand with the
entrance and establishment of large private investors who introduced a stable, constant,
and virtually unlimited demand for milk. The entrance of Nestlé played a crucial role not

135

only because it stabilized demand for milk but also because the company provided credits
that facilitated both the conversion of colonos into cattle ranchers and the configuration
of a proper dairy district (Serrano, 1994).99
The situation in Putumayo was different. At the end of the 1970s, the province’s
farming sector was barely consolidated. The retreat of the state was thus less
consequential: state influence was already minimal and large-scale private investment did
not introduce a comparable demand for the region’s most important agricultural
commodities. As if this were not enough, the oil industry experienced a significant
downturn at the beginning of the 1980s, further reducing local demand for farming
products (CNMH, 2015). Comparing the role of large private investors in the two
regions, one can conclude that presence (in Caquetá) and absence (in Putumayo) of stable
and constant demand for farming products was the decisive factor reinforcing and
amplifying preexisting integration trajectories, which in turn explain the regions’
different levels of cumulative deforestation.
The second major impact of the neoliberal era was the entrance and proliferation
of coca crops in Caquetá and Putumayo, a phenomenon that affected the two departments
at roughly the same time. Coca cultivation produced a demographic boom in the
Amazonian foothills that was not directly promoted by the state. This phenomenon is
typically referred to as “coca colonization” (colonización cocalera) (Ramírez, 2011).
Certainly, coca cultivation and cocaine production are important in explaining how
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Since the late 1980s, Nestlé has ceased to monopolize the demand for milk. However, it remains the single
most important buyer in the region. See Chapter 5.
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integration trajectories evolved and subsequently affected cumulative deforestation in the
post-developmental period (Dávalos, Sánchez, & Armenteras, 2016; Torres, 2011).
Nevertheless, since both Caquetá and Putumayo have produced coca for almost four
decades and their deforestation levels are very different, the effect of the illegal economy
on deforestation demands further study.
To this end, and on the basis of our paired comparison between Caquetá and
Putumayo, I offer a hypothesis to explain the effect of coca cultivation on deforestation.
The distinction between proximate and underlying drivers of deforestation (Geist &
Lambin, 2002) is useful in understanding the contribution of coca crops, which influence
deforestation in both ways simultaneously. As a proximate driver, coca cultivation
impacts deforestation by requiring the clearance of land. As an underlying driver, the
production of coca influences deforestation by changing the regional economy. Despite
the fact that coca crops often require new land clearance, I suggest that, as a proximate
driver of deforestation, land clearance alone cannot explain the differential levels of
cumulative deforestation in the Amazonian foothills.100 After all, coca cultivation rapidly
accelerated in Putumayo during the 1980s and 1990s.
For this reason, my intuition is that the underlying effect of coca crops on the
regional economy has been more consequential than their proximate effect. The paired
comparison between Caquetá and Putumayo helps illustrate this difference. When coca
crops reached the Amazon, Caquetá and Putumayo were already on different integration
paths. Unlike in Putumayo, Caquetá’s commercial farming economy had been
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Large coca plantations, uncommon in the past, are practically nonexistent today (Salgado, 2012).
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consolidated and to some degree democratized. These different starting points in turn
shaped the effects of coca crops on the regional economy: while coca cultivation
reinforced the legal farming economy in Caquetá (E. Ciro, 2016), it quickly became the
only rural product in Putumayo (Ramírez, 2011).
My dissertation provides evidence to support the idea that the underlying effect of
coca crops on cumulative deforestation was (1) more important than the proximate effect,
and (2) conditioned by the different characteristics of the two departments’ integration
paths. Put simply: coca crops in Caquetá contributed to the consolidation and
democratization of the livestock economy, which was not an option in Putumayo. In
Caquetá the relationship between the illegal and the legal economy is very fluid. There is
no sharp division of labor between coca growers and cattle ranchers (E. Ciro, 2016). The
former could invest in cattle and pastures, while the latter could cultivate coca in order to
sustain or invest in a legal farm.101 In Putumayo, by contrast, coca colonos lacked a
viable legal farming alternative through which to supplement or replace their existing
crops.
In sum, high cumulative deforestation in the Amazonian foothills largely results
from integration successes rather than failures. Deforestation is thus the environmental
consequence of a consolidated and relatively democratized commercial farming economy
that state agencies inaugurated during the developmental era, and which the market
expanded in the subsequent neoliberal period. Regions that were not integrated through
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Where a division of labor exists and individuals produce for only one market, ranchers and coca growers
may coordinate in order to promote rural development.
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the agrarian agenda, by contrast, tend to have relatively low levels of cumulative
deforestation.

3.4.5. The Legacies for Advancing Environmental Policies
The two distinct integration pathways described above have bequeathed at least
three entrenched legacies that transcend the economic arena and limit the concrete
possibilities for advancing environmental policies in the Amazonian foothills. I propose
that two very different moral and political economies were configured in Caquetá and
Putumayo during the second half of the twentieth century. Table 3.3 below summarizes
these three legacies and gestures at the dearth of cultural and political incentives to adopt
anti-deforestation policies in Caquetá, where deforestation is most advanced.
Table 3.3
The Legacies of Different Types of Integration
Domain

Agrarian Integration
(Caquetá)

Moral economy

Honors agrarian colonization,
land clearance, and cattle
ranching

Honors agrarian colonization
and land clearance, but also
diverse economic sectors

Strong opposition and few
local allies

Weak opposition and many local
allies

Unified opposition

Fragmented opposition

Politics of antideforestation
policies
Politics of extractive
mega-projects

Extractive Integration
(Putumayo)

First, our two integration paths have configured two distinct moral economies.
Thus far my dissertation has assumed that social action is mostly guided by instrumental-
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rational considerations (M. Weber, 1968). However, because Amazon deforestation is a
complex phenomenon that transcends utilitarian motivations, I take up Weber’s invitation
to recognize the importance of value-based considerations. Indeed, the idea of a regional
moral economy helps shed light on the transcendent values associated with land
clearance.102 Among classic works of political science, James Scott (1976)’s The Moral
Economy of the Peasant is worth mentioning. Scott argues that resistance to economic
innovation depended on certain moral arrangements in peasant societies that took into
consideration the peasantry’s subsistence problem.103
Residents of the Amazonian foothills tends to value agrarian colonization because
doing so bestows recognition on colonos’ efforts. However, beyond this bottom line of
recognition, important differences have emerged between Caquetá and Putumayo. The
region that managed to consolidate commercial farming, Caquetá, has developed a proper
cattle culture, which valorizes the transition from subsistence agriculture to cattle
ranching. Indeed, livestock farming is perceived at the local level as the highest economic
“vocation.” By contrast, in Putumayo, the province that was not integrated through the
agrarian agenda, a wider variety of economic sectors are valued. The dominant moral
economies of the two regions represent enduring legacies of the developmental era,
legacies that constrain contemporary possibilities of “going green.”104
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I adopt a descriptive rather than a normative definition of moral economy. In other words, I study the
way transcendent values influence agrarian colonization but do not myself assume that particular actions
are better than others (Carrier, 2017). For a history of the concept see: (Götz, 2015).
103
There is an interesting debate among political scientists about the utility and scope of the moral
economy paradigm. See, for example, Arnold (2001), Booth (1994), and Farmer and Bates (1996).
104
Although culture certainly matters, one can hardly conclude that the lack of “environmental
consciousness” is the main driver of Amazon deforestation.
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Second, when it comes to the politics of anti-deforestation policies, our two
integration trajectories establish different sets of political (dis)incentives for
environmental protection. Deforestation is rarely a salient political concern in the
Amazonian foothills because farming the main driver of land clearance

is the

economic activity that directly or indirectly sustains most of the local population.
Therefore, anti-deforestation policies tend to come from outside and above.
Unsurprisingly, critiques of anti-deforestation policies for neglecting development
concerns are common in regions like Caquetá, where integration took place through the
agrarian agenda. In Putumayo, by contrast, where oil extraction is the primary economic
sector, the situation is very different and opposition is mild. Put simply: anti-deforestation
policies have few local allies in places where cumulative deforestation is high.
Finally, in relation to the politics of extractive mega-projects, I hypothesize that
regions like Caquetá, which were integrated through the agrarian agenda, will tend to
oppose the advancement of contemporary extractive mega-projects. Oil extraction has not
featured in their longstanding integration trajectories, and the conflict with extractive
mega-projects resembles a conflict among economic sectors. By contrast, I predict that
opposition to oil extraction will be weak and fragmented in regions like Putumayo that
were integrated trough the state’s extractive agenda. Since extractive activities were
introduced decades ago, the oil industry has supporters at the local level, with the result
that opposition is divided.
In conclusion, this section generated hypotheses to explain different levels of
cumulative deforestation among Amazonian departments characterized by similar
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degrees of integration. I argued that variation in cumulative deforestation results from the
different types of integration promoted by the state during the developmental era. When
neoliberal reforms and non-developmental types of STR began to emerge in the early
1980s, Caquetá and Putumayo were already on two different integration paths. I also
considered how the moral and political legacies of these integration paths constrain
contemporary efforts to protect the forest. Not only is Caquetá the Colombian department
that has experienced the most deforestation, but compared to Putumayo it faces
economic, cultural, and political obstacles that make environmental protection extremely
difficult.
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CHAPTER 4. BEFORE DIVERGENCE: INCREASING
DEGREES OF INTEGRATION ON SIMILAR PATHS

“To appreciate this change properly, it is necessary to remember that
not long ago the natives did not have a single horse or a dairy cow;
they did not use pastures, nor take advantage of the grass of their
fields, nor defend, nor enclose the fields; in a word, they were in the
saddest abandonment, because, apart from corn... they did not know
another industry, nor did they have progress.” Fray Fidel de Montclar
(1927, p. 274)

4.1.

Introduction

The previous chapters laid out the dissertation’s theoretical framework. Specifically,
those chapters offered a parsimonious set of hypotheses describing the relationship
between STR and cumulative deforestation in the Colombian Amazon. I argued that
cumulative deforestation is the result of different degrees and types of integration. The
objective of this chapter is to provide some empirical evidence in support of these
hypotheses. Caquetá and Putumayo are the two most populated and economically
developed departments in the Colombian Amazon (Meisel, Bonilla, & Sánchez, 2013),
which explains why cumulative deforestation is higher in these departments as compared
to less populated and developed provinces like Amazonas, Vaupés, or Guainía (see
Figure 1.3). Caquetá and Putumayo are part of the historic and contemporary “arc of
deforestation,” because they both have active and expanding agricultural frontiers.
This is the first of three historical chapters devoted to my paired, contextualized
comparison between Caquetá and Putumayo, the two most similar Amazonian
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departments that nonetheless exhibit different levels of cumulative deforestation levels.
The main goal of this comparison, as I explained in Chapter 3, is to determine why
Caquetá´s agricultural frontier has expanded faster than Putumayo´s. This chapter focuses
on the “critical antecedents” that made substantial divergence between the cases possible
during the developmental era (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 887). I describe the most
important transformations that occurred before the critical juncture of the developmental
era, not only to avoid temporal truncation but also to highlight the factors that facilitated
and constrained integration strategies in that period. While this chapter examines
deforestation that resulted from increased degrees of integration in the two departments,
the next chapter focuses on the role of different types of integration.
My emphasis on critical antecedents reveals the scope and variation of the stateled strategies that were implemented in the Amazon piedmont during the developmental
era. I show that countering the external threat from Peru was the core interest of the
Colombian state in the Amazon before the 1932 Colombian-Peruvian war. During the
second half of the nineteenth century, the quinine and rubber booms stimulated the
encroachment of Peruvian rubber tappers and merchants, whose territorial demands were
supported by the Peruvian government. The Colombian state, in turn, promoted the
economic and political integration of the region by delegating important state functions to
the Catholic Church. Before the international war, the Colombian state spatially
concentrated its efforts on the Putumayo region because, unlike Caquetá, it is located
along Colombia’s border with Peru.
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When the war with Peru broke out, the Colombian state built the basic
infrastructure to defend its territories along the Putumayo river. The war was resolved by
the League of Nations and the two parties complied with the decision despite mutual
mistrust. The wartime infrastructure projects facilitated additional migration to the
Amazon, which was actively supported by the army. The rubber economy began to
decline in favor of agrarian colonization. However, when the external threat abated, the
strategic objectives of the state shifted to consolidating domestic public order. Internal
turmoil impacted the Amazon by stimulating additional migration. Compared to
Putumayo, in the post-war period, Caquetá received more migrants from neighboring
departments and faced a greater risk from the spread of internal violence.
The present chapter has five sections in addition to this introduction. The second
section provides a general overview of Caquetá and Putumayo’s similarities when it
comes to both biophysical characteristics and pre-nineteenth century developmental
paths. The third section describes the basic features of economic and political integration
in Caquetá and Putumayo between the late nineteenth century and the 1932 PeruvianColombian war. The fourth section explores the increase in degrees of integration
between the international war and the mid-twentieth century, just before the integration
paths of Caquetá and Putumayo began to diverge. I then summarize my findings in a brief
conclusion.
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4.2.

Geographic and Early Developmental Similarities Between Caquetá and

Putumayo

4.2.1. Biophysical Characteristics
This section examines the most important biophysical characteristics of Caquetá
and Putumayo. Controlling for biophysical characteristics is important because the
deforestation scholarship has emphasized that factors like soil quality, climate, altitude,
precipitation, and solar radiation affect, positively or negatively, commercial farming and
its corresponding deforestation dynamics (see Chapter 2). Because Caquetá and
Putumayo are so similar in these respects, I argue that differences in cumulative
deforestation could not have resulted from biophysical differences.
Caquetá and Putumayo are not only part of the same ecological region but also
share most relevant ecological and geographical attributes. These two territories are
located on the eastern Andes, in the foothills of the Andean mountain range and on the
large plains of the Amazon region (see Figure 1.3 above). Unsurprisingly, scholarship has
found that soil quality in Caquetá and Putumayo is similar (SIAT-AC, n.d.). Furthermore,
the altitude of the two provinces is similar: the vast majority of the land in both Caquetá
and Putumayo is under 1,000 m.a.s.l,1 which is an important factor because it affects
climate in the tropics and because scholarship has determined that a sloping terrain
impedes deforestation (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017).

1

Despite this similarity, we should acknowledge a key difference: one of the three regions of Putumayo
(upper Putumayo) has an average altitude of 2,000 m.a.s.l. This region’s soil is fertile and it is relatively
more integrated and closer to the Andean region (Ramírez, 2011).
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In addition, the contours of Caquetá and Putumayo follow the course of most
Andean-Amazonian rivers, which originate from the highlands and flow to the great
Amazon river in Brazil. In fact, “Caquetá” and “Putumayo” are also the names of the two
most important tributaries of the Amazon river in Colombia (see Figure 1.1 above).
These two rivers are navigable the entire year, even though their volume decreases in the
summer (December-February). However, it is worth noting that the Caquetá river, the
natural border between the two departments, is not entirely navigable (E. Ciro, 2018): it
is interrupted by the Araracuara torrents (eastern Caquetá), a fact that limits international
trade between Colombia and Brazil via the Caquetá river. By contrast, the Putumayo
river, which delimits Colombian territory, is completely navigable. However, it appears
that access to Brazilian markets is not consequential in explaining cumulative
deforestation because twentieth-century markets in the two provinces gravitated
westward—that is, towards the Andean region.
Finally, climate, rainfall patterns, and solar radiation tend to be similar in Caquetá
and Putumayo. Average annual precipitation in the two provinces fluctuates between
4500 and 5000 mm. Solar radiation is also similar, though it tends to be slightly lower in
the southern part of the Amazon piedmont. Despite these minor differences, there are
strong reasons to believe that Caquetá and Putumayo have generally similar soil quality,
altitude, climate, rainfall patterns, and solar radiation. Thus, divergences in farming
development and cumulative deforestation cannot be explained by biophysical factors.
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4.2.2. Integration Trajectories Before the Late Nineteenth Century
A long-term comparative analysis of cumulative deforestation in Caquetá and
Putumayo must begin from the expansion of the Spanish empire in the sixteenth century.
In this period, merchants and missionaries entered the region looking for gold, Indian
labor, and souls to redeem with the aim of advancing civilization. Their initial plan was
to replicate in the Amazon what they were doing in the Andean region, that is,
establishing new settlements on top of indigenous towns (Balcalzar, 1995). However, the
challenge in the Amazon was qualitatively different. Not only were the region’s native
populations rarely settled but Europeans also tended to view the tropical rainforest as a
particularly harsh environment. Historians and archeologists have shown that indigenous
peoples in the Amazon had an extensive relationship with the forest formed through
constant movement and shifting cultivation (Pineda & Llanos, 1982).
For this reason, one of the main challenges for the colonial and later Colombian
state in the Amazon from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century was “reducing” the
indigenous population—that is, limiting, controlling, and re-patterning both their
movements and their most fundamental cultural habits (e.g., language, religion,
subsistence, clothing, etc.) with the aim of creating European-like societies.2 To be clear,
reductions were part of a civilizing process in which constant contact between natives
and missionaries facilitated the cultural assimilation and displacement of the former

2

Chapter 2 explained the difficulties of state control in non-settled societies. See James Scott (2009)’s The
Art of Not Being Governed for an interesting theoretical argument about the inverse relationship between
state power and unsettled people. See Simón Uribe (2017) for an interesting critique to Scott’s argument
and a historical narrative about the role of the Catholic Church in the Amazon.
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(Bonilla, 1968). Reductions were also the first step towards securing indigenous labor
and taxation (Gómez, 2015). Spatially, initial efforts were focused on the Putumayo
region. Historians have found that indigenous population size was relatively high in the
Putumayo region (Pineda, 1987).
Assimilation efforts were not always pacific. Missionaries and merchants were
willing to enforce reductions and some indigenous groups resisted. This dynamic can be
fully appreciated when considering the political history of Mocoa, the capital of
contemporary Putumayo and the main colonial city in the Colombian Amazon. Mocoa
was apparently founded in 1557 to promote and guarantee the extraction of gold
(Castellvi, 1944).3 It later became an important center of administration in the Spanish
government circuit formed by Quito, Timaná, Pasto, and Popayán. The establishment of
Mocoa encountered violent resistance from the native populations mostly Mocoas and
Andakis who constantly attacked and set fire to the town (Friede, 1953). As a result of
this conflict between colonizers and natives, Mocoa was relocated at least four times
through a cycle of “foundation-destruction-transfer-(re)foundation” (Sánchez, 2015, p.
74).
Early developments, nonetheless, were less consequential than one might think
because they followed typical boom-bust cycles. When Colombia gained its
independence from the Spanish empire, most missionaries left the Amazon region, which
led to the decline or disappearance of most colonial towns, including Mocoa (Gómez,

3

See Sánchez (2015, pp. 58–63) for an enlightening discussion about the possible dates of Mocoa’s
foundation.
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2015). For that reason, I maintain that Caquetá and Putumayo were similar by the midnineteenth century because early differences between the regions of the Amazon
piedmont did not leave long-lasting legacies and most early activity focused on
Putumayo, which is not the region with the highest level of cumulative deforestation.

4.3.

Increasing Degrees of Economic and Political Integration (1850s-1932)
This section describes the basic characteristics of territorial integration dynamics

from the late nineteenth century to the 1932 Colombian-Peruvian war. I do not offer a
complete historical narrative. My objective is to illustrate how Caquetá and Putumayo
were integrated in a similar manner during the initial stages of agrarian colonization,
following two non-timber extractive booms. Naturally, there were differences between
Caquetá and Putumayo, but they do not present a problem for my argument insofar as
Putumayo, which today exhibits less cumulative deforestation than Caquetá, was the
more integrated region at the time. Understanding cumulative deforestation in the
Amazon piedmont thus requires an explanation for the reversal of fortune that
subsequently transformed our two selected cases (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson,
2002).

4.3.1. Economic Integration Through Extractive Economies
Important transformations occurred in the Amazon piedmont between the second
half of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth century. During
that period, two non-timber extractive booms quinine and rubber influenced the two
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regions of interest at roughly the same time. I argue in this section that these booms had
similar impacts on Caquetá and Putumayo.
The first boom resulted from the extraction of quinine, an anti-malaria medication
derived from the chicona tree and coveted by European powers hoping to advance their
colonial projects in tropical countries. The quinine boom promoted the early integration
of the Colombian Amazon through an extractive economy that was no longer based on
gold but on forest products (Zárate, 2001). The extraction of quinine markedly influenced
the region from 1850 until 1884, when the resource was depleted in the inter-Andean
valleys. At that time, indigenous peoples comprised a majority of the population in the
Amazon (Ramírez, 1996). The number of merchants, mostly whites and creoles, steadily
increased with the quinine boom. One of those merchants was the future general and
president of Colombia (1904-1909) Rafael Reyes. During the quinine boom, Reyes was
the legal representative of the Elías Reyes y Hermanos Company. His ambitious vision
was to build a road between Nariño and Putumayo to connect the pacific with the
Atlantic via the Putumayo and Amazon rivers (S. Uribe, 2017).
Although the quinine boom configured an extractive economy, it left important
spatial and infrastructural legacies. New population centers were established along with
trails connecting the Andean region with the Amazon piedmont. To facilitate the
connection between the Andes and the Amazon, most new towns were located in the
piedmont (next to the Andes) and near a navigable river (Zárate, 2001). Until the
twentieth century, rivers were the vertebrae of the Amazon piedmont, facilitating both
movement and the settlement of explorers, hunters, sawyers, natives, and colonos
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(Brucher, 1974). During the quinine boom, Mocoa, the capital city of Putumayo, was still
the most important and established town of the Colombian Amazon region (Gómez,
2015). The quinine boom ended in 1884 when European powers began establishing
plantations in their new colonies and then discovered a chemical substitute.
A rubber boom shortly followed the end of quinine extraction, benefitting from
the basic infrastructure the previous boom had left in place. In fact, there are many
examples of quinine merchants who transitioned to the extraction of rubber. Caquetá and
Putumayo were already connected to their neighbors in the Andean region by the trails
that had enabled merchants and missionaries to cross the Andean mountain range.4 The
international demand for natural rubber also left profound impacts in the Amazon
between the late nineteenth century and the 1920s.
It is necessary to highlight that both the quinine and the rubber booms were purely
extractive. There were no plantations in the Colombian Amazon, meaning that both forest
products were obtained from wild trees. Extraction techniques varied, but they did not
always require cutting down the tree, whose life was necessary to sustain economic
activity over time (Zárate, 2008). Bleeding techniques particularly in
Putumayo required the subsistence of the tree (Kuan, 2015). The forest experienced
only selective degradation during these booms, with no significant transformation of the
landscape. During the rubber boom, new centers of population and commerce
emerged

4

Florencia, Belén de los Andaquíes, San Vicente del Caguán, and Puerto

However, it is worth noting that one week of travelling was necessary in order to reach Huila. Since
Caquetá’s towns used to be poorly connected to one another, it was more efficient to cross the Andes twice
to move up or down the department (Melo, 2016).
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Rico and a complex network of trails connected them to the Andean region
(Artunduaga, 1984; Melo, 2016). The new towns were mostly places to exchange rubber
and acquire tools and products that could not be obtained in the forests where the wild
rubber trees where located.
Because the Putumayo river was navigable and the region was home to larger
native populations than Caquetá, Putumayo became the center of the rubber boom
(Pineda, 1987). The Caquetá river, by contrast, was not completely navigable—an
important difference at that time. The rubber boom promoted commerce with Brazil due
to the introduction of steam navigation along the Putumayo river. Rubber circuits were
mostly oriented towards the Amazon river, which was an important development given
that the quinine economy promoted linkages with the Andean region (E. Ciro, 2008).
This geographical shift resulted in the decline of commercial centers like Mocoa that
emerged during the quinine boom (Sánchez, 2015).
Similarly, merchants employed indigenous labor to collect the white sap of the
Hevea trees in the vicinity of the region’s most important rivers. The exploitation of
rubber was a violent process in which indigenous peoples in Caquetá and Putumayo
suffered greatly (CNMH, 2014). Indigenous peoples were enslaved en masse, exploited,
displaced, and assimilated during this period (Taussig, 1986). The rubber economy
brought about the beginnings of a demographic shift in which native populations ceased
to be the majority of the population in the Amazon piedmont. The second phase of that
shift came with the advancement of agrarian colonization following the rubber boom.
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4.3.2. The Varied Spatial Manifestations of the External Threat
Amazonian territories became an object of international dispute between
Colombia and Peru when rubber merchants and investors from the two countries reached
the region of the Putumayo river. Both the constant exhaustion of rubber trees and the
new commercial possibilities presented by the Amazon river induced further
encroachment by newcomers. Peruvians steadily moved north to extract rubber from a
territory that Colombia possessed on paper but barely controlled in reality. The growth of
the Amazon Rubber Company Casa Arana was perhaps the most salient example of
Peruvian advancement in the north (CNMH, 2014). Peruvians were able to acquire
substantial influence in the region because Colombian rubber merchants were not as
economically successful and eventually sold out to Peruvian buyers.
The rubber boom thus generated a border dispute between Colombia and Peru,
which was channeled through diplomatic and military channels. While Colombian
authorities complained about the unauthorized encroachment of Peruvian companies and
investors, Peruvian agents argued that de facto possession was more important than
juridical recognition. The entrance of Peruvian merchants and companies was implicitly
supported by the Peruvian government, which steadily deployed its army and navy to the
region (see, e.g., Weinstein, 1983). Diplomatic disputes and violent clashes erupted
during the first decades of the twentieth century. The Colombian state responded by
increasing state involvement in the southern part of the Amazon piedmont as a means to
control the plains and defend national integrity.
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However, the Colombian state expanded its presence through delegation. Statelike functions were formally delegated to the Catholic Church the Capuchin
Mission which soon became the political, civic, and religious authority in the Amazon
piedmont (Bonilla, 2006; Kuan, 2015; Serje, 2011; S. Uribe, 2017). In 1913, Fray Fidel
de Montclar claimed,
the missionary with faith has introduced civilization and progress, and the Church,
by extending the boundaries of the spiritual kingdom, has expanded the borders of
the Nation that has supported her divine work… the firmest step that Colombia
has taken in its advance towards the Amazon has been led by the church
(Republica de Colombia, 1913, p. 36).
Recalling my earlier typology of the varieties of state reach, we can conclude that
STR in the Amazon was mostly delegated (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). At the end of the
nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century, both Caquetá and
Putumayo were deeply influenced by the Capuchin Mission, which was tasked with
promoting “civilization” in the Amazon. As Víctor Bonilla (1968) has argued, the
Capuchin monks not only served god but enslaved indigenous peoples. In so doing, they
employed some of the trails that the quinine and rubber merchants had used.
In its early years

i.e., between 1893 and 1905

the Capuchin Mission launched

expeditions, some of them relatively well-documented, along the Amazonian rivers. Most
expeditions departed from Putumayo and some reached the territory of Caquetá, which
required missionaries to travel downstream on the Putumayo river and upstream on the
Caquetá and Orteguaza rivers. The expedition-based approach was modified after 1905,
when the Mission decided to implement a more ambitious strategy involving the
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establishment of new towns and settlements. Figure 4.1 illustrates the towns that the
Capuchin monks founded or re-founded between 1905 and 1925.

Figure 4.1. Towns founded or re-founded by the Capuchin monks (1905-1925)
Reprinted from Kuan (2015, p. 203).

At the time, Caquetá and Putumayo were part of the same political unit, which
first belonged to the Cauca territory and then to the “great territory of Caquetá.” Caquetá
and Putumayo nonetheless received unequal treatment. State efforts during this period
were largely directed to promoting the integration of Putumayo. Caquetá was, so to
speak, a periphery of a state: the influence of the Mission penetrated southern Caquetá
but tended to disappear as one moved north (A. Ciro, 2016). However, these differences
are inadequate to explain variation in levels of cumulative deforestation because
cumulative deforestation is today more advanced in Caquetá than in Putumayo.
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The dispute between Colombia and Peru over Amazonian territories provides the
relevant context for the relatively high public investments in the south. In particular, the
fact that the Putumayo region was a border territory helps us understand why it received
additional attention from the Capuchin Mission as compared to Caquetá. The ultimate
goal of the missionaries was to reach the Putumayo river, establish a port, and configure a
circuit of defense to preserve the sovereignty of the Colombian state (Academia
Putumayense de Historia, 2012).
There are at least three clear examples illustrating the Capuchin Mission’s focus
on Putumayo. First, the missionaries selected Putumayo to host the permanent
headquarters of the Mission, which was first established in Mocoa and then moved to the
Sibundoy Valley (Kuan, 2015). Second, newly created towns were also concentrated in
Putumayo. On the basis of the geographical location of these towns, one can conclude
that Putumayo was the core of the mission and that Caquetá played a secondary role.
Figure 4.1 above illustrates that new towns were mostly located alongside the Putumayo
river. These equidistant towns were consciously designed to supply a port for the
Putumayo river. By contrast, the Capuchin Mission founded only three towns in
Caquetá Florencia, Belén de los Andaquies, and Las Guacamayas.
But the clearest example of the emphasis on the Putumayo region was the
Mission’s massive infrastructure project connecting the city of Pasto in the Andean
region with Puerto Asís in Putumayo (S. Uribe, 2017). Fray Fidel de Montclar recalled
the role of the missionaries: “it was necessary to transform the missionaries into trenchers
and priests into engineers in order to blow up the rocks, to destroy the mountain ranges…
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to bring the light of the Gospel to these remote regions” (Republica de Colombia, 1913,
p. 36). The Capuchin Mission promoted the construction of the road by relying on
indigenous people in the upper Putumayo, often forced labor, and colonos from neighbor
Nariño (Bonilla, 1968; S. Uribe, 2017). The central government allocated additional
resources to this road in 1911 following a small-scale battle (La Pedrera) between
Colombian and Peruvian troops.

4.3.3. The Advancement of Agrarian Colonization
The agricultural frontier expanded in parallel to the advancement of quinine and
rubber extraction. Scholars tend to agree that both agriculture and livestock farming were
secondary sectors during the extractive booms: they supported the extractive economy
and provided for the local market (A. Ciro, 2008). The sustained entrance of merchants
into the region promoted the development of the early stages of commercial agriculture
by increasing the demand for food and incentivizing the use of the national currency
(Kuan, 2015).
Amazon rubber became unprofitable when European colonial powers established
rubber plantations in Asia (Coomes & Barham, 1994). International demand slowly
disappeared and rubber merchants and tappers either abandoned the region or created
permanent settlements (Zárate, 2008). When the rubber economy went bust in the 1920s,
a massive transition from extractive non-timber economies to agrarian colonization
commenced in both Caquetá and Putumayo. Extractive economies were slowly replaced
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by agrarian colonization, stimulated by the decline of the rubber economy, migration
from neighboring departments, and active promotion on the part of the missionaries.
In the Colombian Amazon rubber had been directly obtained from wild rubber
trees. The transition from the rubber economy to agrarian colonization thus entailed a
reconfiguration of human-nature relationships (Zárate, 2008). Unlike rubber extraction,
agrarian colonization required a profound transformation of the landscape. The literature
on Caquetá and Putumayo is rife with stories of land clearance by colonos. Settlers
migrated, cleared land, built houses, hunted, started to cultivate crops, and formed
families (Artunduaga, 1984; Melo, 2016; Perdomo & Quiñones, 2011). Newcomers
mainly settled in rural areas, where they produced for their own subsistence and the local
market (Artunduaga, 1984). Some pioneers were able to purchase cattle, but the average
farm was small and cattle faming was a luxury that not everyone could afford (CNMH,
2017).
The Capuchin Mission, the representatives of the Colombian state at the time,
played an important role in the advancement of agrarian colonization. Fray Fidel de
Montclar argued that “it comforts the hearts of those of us who are interested in this
territory to see the extensive logging of the jungle and the beautiful sown land that arise
in those places that previously oppressed the spirit with their wild aspect” (1913, p. 43).
The Capuchin Mission provided land, labor, tools, and training to colonos and indigenous
peoples who were willing to participate in the creation of the new towns (Academia
Putumayense de Historia, 2012). The Mission also established a farm with roughly 4,000
head of cattle in the upper Putumayo and used it to spread agriculture and cattle ranching
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to both Putumayo and Caquetá. Capuchin missionaries introduced basic farming tools
and techniques. According to the prefect Fidel de Montclar,
The purchase of domestic animals, the acquisition of horses for freight
transportation; of pairs of oxen for wood dragging; of cows for making
cheese or selling milk… are unequivocal symptoms that these natives
already developed some foresight: leave laziness, so connatural to them,
and already think on things of profit (1927, p. 275).
By the time agrarian colonization began to accelerate, the indigenous population
had been diminished and the demographic shift was already underway. There is some
evidence to suggest that the process unfolded differently in the two departments, with
Putumayo’s colonos encountering more indigenous resistance than Caquetá’s. In
Putumayo, conflicts between colonos and indigenous groups were more frequent and
sometimes violent. Displacement, assimilation, and domination of indigenous groups
(e.g., the Ingano, Siona, and Kofán) continued after the end of the extractive booms
(Chaves, 1945, p. 240). Although instances of violence against indigenous people in
Caquetá have been documented, the situation there was different: by the time agrarian
colonization had decisively advanced, the indigenous population had already been
significantly diminished (Pineda & Llanos, 1982).
In sum, prior to the 1932 Colombian-Peruvian war, both Caquetá and Putumayo
had undergone consequential transformations led economically by merchants and creoles
interested in the region’s land and resources and politically by the Capuchin Mission. The
sustained advancement of the Peruvians into Colombian formal territory deeply
influenced the state’s strategic interests, explaining its geographic focus on the southern
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part of the piedmont. Increasing degrees of integration and a corresponding increase in
deforestation were in the making.

4.4.

From the Colombian-Peruvian War to La Violencia

4.4.1. The Outbreak of the 1932 War
Until the war, Caquetá and Putumayo had undergone increasing degrees of
integration along similar paths, which for our purposes means that no substantial longterm differences between the departments up to that point can account for their different
levels of cumulative deforestation. In 1932, the international dispute over Amazonian
territories escalated into a limited war between Colombia and Peru when Peruvian troops
took over the city of Leticia (Picón, 2010). Despite the variety of different trails then in
existence, access to the Amazon region from the Andean core of Colombia was difficult
during the war. For this reason, the army implemented ambitious infrastructure projects
that configured a circuit of defense. The immediate effects of the war are an example of a
state deploying territorial power in the face of an external threat (e.g., Thies, 2005; Tilly,
1992). The war confirmed the necessity of establishing military control and promoted the
social and economic integration of the region. State power was deployed by building the
necessary infrastructure for the army to reach Colombia’s Amazonian territories and by
promoting the advancement of agrarian colonization (Brucher, 1974).
The army thus led the construction of the “National Defense Roads” and broke
down the Andean mountain range that had made the connection between the Amazon and
the Andean core difficult. The main purpose of these roads was to facilitate the entrance
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of the army in order to counter the Peruvian threat between 1932 and 1933 (A. Ciro,
2008). The army relied on and upgraded the trails that the Church had built and
established a connection between the two main towns of the Amazon piedmont

Mocoa

in Putumayo and Florencia in Caquetá and the Andean region (Uribe, 2017). The road
between Pasto and Mocoa was a means to reach the new town of Puerto Asís (see Figure
4.2).

Figure 4.2. Puerto Asís in 1933. A boat to transport freight and soldiers to the Guepí
campaign.
Reprinted from Corpoamazonia´s historical archive in Mocoa (Putumayo).
The army made a similar investment in Caquetá and built a road connecting
Caquetá with Huila (Altamira-Florencia), the purpose of which was to reach the Caquetá
river in La Tagua through the Orteguaza river. A third road was built between Puerto
Leguizamo and La Tagua, which facilitated the connection between the Putumayo and
Caquetá rivers (Vásquez, 2015). Provisional bridges accross the Orteguaza and San Pedro
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rivers were also built in Caquetá. The collaboration of civilians was essential during the
war because they built the infrastructure and boats, provided timber for boats, and
transported soldiers along the Orteguaza river between Puerto Venecia and La Tagua (G.
Uribe, 1998, pp. 24–31). Besides these investments in road networks, the state built the
Venecia Hospital, the military bases of Tres Esquinas and La Tagua, and the facilities of
the Juanambú Battalion in Florencia (G. Uribe, 1998, p. 26). The Colombian Central
Bank (Banco de la República) also opened a branch.
The army promoted the colonization of the Amazon by reliable colonos. Many of
the soldiers themselves decided to settle in the boundary region (Uribe, 1998) and
became the vanguard of the Colombian state along the Putumayo river. To prevent the
advancement of the Peruvian army, the government also promoted colonization along the
circuit of national defense in both Caquetá and Putumayo. For example, four state-owned
boats were employed on the Orteguaza river with the aim of supporting colonization. A
worker of these infrastructure projects said that these boats “… transported colonos for
free and left them where they wanted. When these boats went down or up, they bought
colonos’ firewood” (as cited in Uribe, 1998, p. 31).

4.4.2. Agrarian Colonization’s Dynamism After the War
The newly-built infrastructure and the crisis of the rubber economy facilitated
both the transformation of merchants into peasants and the entrance of new colonos from
neighboring departments (Brucher, 1974). The expansion of agrarian colonization was
therefore one of the most important consequences of the international dispute. Migration
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increased after the war at a similar pace in the two provinces, even though it was not
always directed by the state. New trails were established, old ones were improved, and
colonization quickly advanced. Although episodes of violence increased in the Andean
core during the mid-1930s, they were barely linked with migration to the Amazon
piedmont (G. Uribe, 1998, p. 45). Demographic increase, land inequality and the
proliferation of smallholdings that did not guarantee basic survival in the relatively more
integrated parts of Colombia were the primary motivations behind colonos’ migration at
that time (Fajardo, 1981). Colonization continued and increased during the thirties and
forties, made possible and induced by new state infrastructure.
Landless peasant were the main agents of agrarian colonization in both Caquetá
and Putumayo. Although official data on regional development and land use is difficult to
find, there is some evidence to suggest that most settlers engaged in subsistence
agriculture in both departments. For example, Milciadez Cháves, a renowned
ethnographer and economist who visited Putumayo argued that colonos “were poor
people [who] lacked both capitalist experience and capital to invest in new residences”
(Chaves, 1945). Similarly, Gabriel Perdomo (2011), a well-known historian of Caquetá,
compiled many testimonies suggesting that landless peasants were the main vehicles of
agrarian colonization during the first decades of the twentieth century.
An important feature of the postwar period is the steady infusion of capital
investments that occurred alongside the influx of landless peasants. Both Caquetá and
Putumayo received investors from neighboring departments. The scope and location of
these investments were different, however. Capital investments from Nariño increased
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after the war and were concentrated in the upper Putumayo, the region that was most
integrated to the market, relatively speaking. Cattle farming flourished in the upper
Putumayo, with the Capuchin missionaries playing an important role in its promotion
(Bonilla, 1968).
The situation was slightly different in Caquetá. Besides landless peasants, private
investors from the Huila department entered the region and moved into the core of the
piedmont. For example, the Lara family came from Huila with the aim of acquiring
relatively cheap land and investing in cattle (G. Uribe, 1998, p. 52). In 1934, they
established the “Land of the Lara Family,” known as Larandia, which became the biggest
farm in Caquetá and the Colombian Amazon, which wasfocused on cattle breading
(Vásquez, 2015).5 The farm was located around 40 km from Florencia, where the
municipality of La Montañita is today. The area of Larandia increased from 5,600 to
34,000 hectares in thirty years. The Lara family constantly acquired recently cleared land
and hired landless colonos to chop down the forest (G. Uribe, 1998, p. 53).6 Although
Larandia was a rare exception, scholars believe that the farm was very consequential for
the development of the region (Brucher, 1974; CNMH, 2017). It became a model of
economic appropriation, which most settlers wanted to replicate in their small openings.
In sum, I have provided historical evidence to suggest that after the 1920s agrarian
colonization was expanding in both Caquetá and Putumayo. Landless peasants and

5
Larandia is possibly the clearest example of corporate colonization (colonization empresarial) in the
Colombian Amazon region. This type of agrarian colonization is defined by the acquisition of land by
private investors instead of landless peasants (see Chapter 3).
6
Furthermore, Larandia had a port and an airport from which cattle were exported to Huila and other
departments (Vásquez, 2015).
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investors from Huila and Nariño moved into the piedmont in a dynamic process that was
stimulated by the investments that the Colombian state had made during the war.

4.4.3. La Violencia’s Impact in the Amazonian Piedmont
This section briefly emphasizes the formative role of partisan violence during the
historical period (1946-1960) that Colombian historians know as La Violencia. It briefly
reflects on the geography of partisan violence in the Amazon’s neighborhood, which is
analytically conceived as an “exogenous shock” that helps us understand why different
state-led strategies were implemented in the Amazon piedmont during the developmental
era, that is, the critical juncture that largely explains different levels of cumulative
deforestation.
Internal turmoil was mostly located in the Andean region and the inter-Andean
valleys of Colombia (Oquist, 1980; Pecaut, 1978). On the basis of the political geography
of La Violencia, I propose that its most important effect on the Amazonian piedmont was
mediated by the dynamics of migration. A comparative study of population growth is
thus necessary to understand why cumulative deforestation in Caquetá is higher than it is
in Putumayo. Figure 4.3 illustrates population growth in Caquetá and Putumayo between
1928 and 1973. This figure plots population density (left axis), operationalized as the
amount of people per square kilometer, and the absolute number of people (right axis)
that official censuses register.

2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
1928

1938

1951

1964

166

Population

200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Thousands

People per sq. kilometre

3

1973

Caquetá Population

Putumayo Population

Caquetá Population Density

Putumayo Population Density

Figure 4.3. Population and population density in Caquetá and Putumayo (1928-1973)
Data for population from the DANE and for area from the IGAC.
Three conclusions emerge from this figure. First, total population size in Caquetá
and Putumayo was roughly similar until 1951, after which Caquetá´s population
markedly increased. In 1928, just before the Colombian-Peruvian war, Putumayo had
more inhabitants than Caquetá. This different starting point provides additional evidence
to support that idea that Putumayo was slightly more integrated than Caquetá thanks to
the rubber economy and the necessity of defending Amazonian territories against
Peruvian encroachment. Second, although the reversal of fortune between Caquetá and
Putumayo begun in 1938, differences were moderate until 1951. Between 1951 and 1973,
Caquetá´s population grew to more than double Putumayo´s. Third, because Caquetá has
more territory than Putumayo, the former’s population density tends to be relatively low.
The number of people per square kilometer in Caquetá is consistently smaller than in
Putumayo.
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The Amazonian foothills were, relatively speaking, peaceful regions during La
Violencia (Uribe, 1998). However, this period is important for understanding variation in
cumulative deforestation in the Amazon because it influenced the amount and type of
migration that Caquetá and Putumayo received from neighboring departments, that is,
Huila-Tolima and Nariño, respectively. It is worth noting that there is no specific
information available about forced displacement during this period. The linkage can thus
only be inferred from data on homicide rates and population origins. As depicted in
Figure 4.4, the homicide rate in Huila-Tolima was much higher than in Nariño: these
departments were above and below the national average, respectively.
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Figure 4.4. Homicide rate in ejecting regions (1946-1960)
Data from Chacón (2004) based on Colombian Police.

On the basis of this difference, I suggest that relatively high levels of violence in
Huila and Tolima are an important factor in explaining high rates of early migration to
Caquetá. Unlike in Putumayo, migration to Caquetá from violence-afflicted neighboring
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departments rocketed. One can thus argue that violence in the neighborhood explains
differences in the timing and rate of migration to Caquetá and Putumayo. Figure 4.5
depicts the geographic origins of migrants to Caquetá and Putumayo and highlights the
regions afflicted by La Violencia.

Figure 4.5. Origin of Caquetá, Putumayo, and Meta’s migrants
Reprinted from Marsh (1983, p. 35).
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The consequences of La Violencia were not limited to population dynamics. In
addition, the diffusion of actual violence was more likely in Caquetá as compared to
Putumayo (Ramírez, 2011; G. Uribe, 1998). Caquetá became a “red frontier” because
many newcomers were close to the liberal guerrillas who were fighting the conservative
government: northern Caquetá received refugees belonging to the liberal guerrillas (Diez,
1990, p. 97). These guerrillas became the germ of the FARC in regions like Caquetá
(González, 1992; Vásquez, 2015), where this guerrilla group underwent a process of
transformation from a peasant to a war organization (Pizarro, 2011). By contrast, the
diffusion of violence into Putumayo was unlikely. Communist guerrillas like the FARC
only arrived in Putumayo with the coca cultivation boom of the mid-1980s (CNMH,
2012; Ramírez, 2011).
In sum, La Violencia can be interpreted as an “exogenous shock” that helps
explain the origins of different state-led integration strategies in the Amazon piedmont
during the developmental era. The Colombian state focused on Caquetá the
implementation of a non-redistributive land reform (based on the allocation of public
land) in order to achieve its goal of neutralizing violence in the Andean region and
preventing new forms of violence in the Amazon (see Chapter 5).

4.5.

Conclusion
This chapter has laid out some of the critical antecedents necessary to understand

the magnitude of the historical changes that occurred in the Amazon during the
developmental era. Although the integration degrees of both Caquetá and Putumayo
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increased between the late nineteenth century and the developmental era, their types of
integration were still similar by the mid-twentieth century.
In particular, I have argued that the territorial integration of Caquetá and
Putumayo prior to the developmental era can be divided into two phases. During the first
phase, the degree of territorial integration of both regions increased between the late
nineteenth century and the 1932 Colombian-Peruvian war. By the time the international
war broke out, Caquetá and Putumayo were on similar integration paths. In order to
counter Peruvian advancement into the Colombian Amazon, the state delegated power to
the Catholic Church. Even though Caquetá and Putumayo received important investments
before and during the war, public investments largely focused on Putumayo given its
location along the border. Agrarian colonization initially advanced to support extractive
economies and later became a viable alternative once the rubber economy collapsed.
In the second phase, which followed the 1932 international war, the influx of
colonos increased in both Caquetá and Putumayo, suggesting that the legacies of the war
did not differ significantly between the two regions. Agrarian colonization progressed in
Caquetá and Putumayo following the rubber boom, thus transforming the landscape in
the short term and promoting their territorial integration in the long term. Agrarian
colonization was mainly advanced by landless peasants, although capital investments in
the center of Caquetá and in the upper Putumayo played an influential role. While the
establishment of state order was still an important concern after the war, the nature of the
threat was different: the strategic interests of the state shifted from the external to the
internal threat. Although partisan violence in the neighborhood incentivized migration to
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the Amazon, the diffusion of violence presented a clearer risk in Caquetá than in
Putumayo. In theoretical terms, the differential influence of La Violencia on Caquetá and
Putumayo explains why the Colombian state implemented two different development
strategies in those regions during the developmental era.
The next chapter argues that state policies implemented during the developmental
era (1958-1982) were largely responsible for divergent cumulative deforestation in the
Amazon piedmont. During this period, Caquetá and Putumayo, once seen as the most
similar cases, embarked on distinctive trajectories of integration, which in turn produced
different levels of cumulative deforestation.
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CHAPTER 5. A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: SHAPING THE TWO
TYPES OF INTEGRATION AND DEFORESTATION DURING
THE DEVELOPMENTAL ERA
“High modernism was about ‘interests’ as well as faith. Its carriers,
even when they were capitalist entrepreneurs, required state action to
realize their plans. In most cases, they were powerful officials and
heads of state. They tended to prefer certain forms of planning and
social organization… because these forms fit snugly into a highmodernist view and also answered their political interests as state
officials.” James Scott (1998, p. 5)
“The beginning of every great era coincides with an extensive
territorial appropriation.” Carl Schmitt (1997, p. 38)

5.1.

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the first part of a contextualized paired comparison
between Caquetá and Putumayo, the two most similar provinces in the Colombian
Amazon that nonetheless experience different levels of cumulative deforestation. I
demonstrated that, despite minor differences, the ecological characteristics and long-term
integration trajectories of Caquetá and Putumayo had yet to markedly diverge by the midtwentieth century. In addition, I showed that the strategic interests of the Colombian state
in the Amazonian piedmont changed in tandem with the advancement of the agricultural
frontier during the first half of the twentieth century. The existential concern with the
encroachment of Peruvian merchants and officials was steadily replaced by the necessity
of ordering power domestically (Slater, 2010). The demographic and political impacts of
La Violencia acted as an “external shock” facilitating the divergence of developmental
trajectories in the Amazon region.
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This chapter moves our paired comparison into the developmental era, conceived
as a critical juncture during which two distinctive integration pathways were forged.
Between the late 1950s and the early 1980s, the Colombian state implemented diverse
regional policies that not only bequeathed profound institutional legacies but also help
explain subnational variation in levels of cumulative deforestation. While the state
actively promoted the consolidation of commercial livestock farming in Caquetá, its
strategy for Putumayo centered on the extraction of oil, thus defining two separate
integration trajectories.
The current chapter consists of five sections in addition to this introduction. The
next section characterizes two starkly different patterns of deforestation in Colombia. Its
conclusions are based on a unique set of data regarding forest cover over time that I
derived from Landsat satellite images (see Chapter 3 for general information and
Appendix 1 for details). The third section examines the state’s developmental-era
strategies in Caquetá, the Amazonian department in Colombia with the highest levels of
cumulative deforestation. The fourth section does the same for Putumayo, another active
agricultural frontier that nonetheless exhibits relatively low levels of cumulative
deforestation when compared to Caquetá. The fifth section offers a brief explanation for
the persistence of Caquetá and Putumayo’s distinct integration trajectories into the
neoliberal era. I then summarize the chapter’s conclusions in a final section.
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5.2. Cumulative Deforestation in the Amazonian Foothills
The aim of this section is to demonstrate the existence of two distinct patterns of
cumulative deforestation in the Amazon region of Colombia. I combine a visual
presentation consisting of five maps (one map per decade since the 1970s, see Figure 5.1)
with quantitative data on deforestation over time (Figure 5.2).
The maps in Figure 5.1 depict the results of my own analysis of historical Landsat
images and illustrate the existence of two starkly different levels of deforestation in the
area of study. As the two most populated and developed provinces of the Colombian
Amazon region, Caquetá and Putumayo are both agricultural frontiers in constant
expansion (Figure 1.3). Cumulative deforestation in Caquetá and Putumayo has not
proceeded at the same pace, however. While Putumayo evinces comparatively low
cumulative deforestation, forest loss in Caquetá overflows political-administrative
boundaries, impinging on areas like Southern Meta in the north and Northern Putumayo
in the south.

Figure 5.1. Cumulative deforestation and regrowth in the Amazonian piedmont (1970-2016)
Data for political-administrative divisions from the IGAC and data for land cover from Landsat images, which were retrieved
from the U.S. Geological Survey. My own processing and data base (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).
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Figure 5.2 likewise illustrates two different patterns of cumulative deforestation in
Caquetá (A) and Putumayo (B). It depicts non-forest land (land dedicated to uses other
than forests), total rural population, and the relationship between them over time. On the
basis of this data, we observe that both the area of non-forest land and the size of the rural
population are larger in Caquetá than in Putumayo.
We should not conclude, however, that Caquetá has experienced greater
deforestation simply because its area and population is larger than Putumayo’s. This
becomes clear when we consider non-forest land per rural capita. This indicator is
designed to facilitate historical comparison between the two provinces by accounting for
both differences in rural population size and land area over time. I focus on rural
population size because it is proximately related to land-use changes. The average nonforest land area per rural capita in Caquetá is 11.7 hectares; in Putumayo, by contrast, the
average is 5.5 hectares. In other words, a rural resident in Caquetá produces more than
double the deforestation of a rural resident in Putumayo.1 Furthermore, while
incorporated land per rural capita has remained stable in Caquetá, it has decreased in
Putumayo, where population increased faster than the area of non-forest land (see Figure
5.2).

1

These results do not radically change when the total population is considered. Non-forest land per person
in Caquetá is 7.1 and 4.6 in Putumayo.

177

A

B

Figure 5.2. Non-forest land area per (rural) capita in Caquetá and Putumayo
Population data from DANE and data for land cover from Landsat images, which were
retrieved from the U.S. Geological Survey. My own processing and data base. A:
Caquetá, B: Putumayo.
5.3.

Caquetá: Integration Through Commercial Farming (1958-1982)
The academic literature on Amazon deforestation in Colombia finds that livestock

farming is the most important driver of deforestation, and that Caquetá is the department
most impacted by contemporary deforestation trends (Andrade, 1992; Armenteras,
Rudas, Rodriguez, Sua, & Romero, 2006; Cabrera, Vargas, Galindo, & Ordoñez, 2011).
Among the six entirely Amazonian departments of Colombia, Caquetá has the highest
level of historical and contemporary deforestation. Unsurprisingly, most antideforestation policies and debates focus on Caquetá.
The purpose of this section is to explain the high rate of deforestation in Caquetá
using empirical evidence. I argue that Caquetá’s cumulative deforestation is the
consequence of an integration trajectory in which public and private strategies
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implemented during the developmental era (1958-1982) led to the consolidation and
democratization of commercial farming. In addition to describing the expansion of cattle
farming in Caquetá, I explain how this integration pathway is connected with rapid
deforestation. Examining Caquetá’s integration experience is key to understanding the
incentives, ideas, and institutions that drove cumulative deforestation in the department,
and thus to developing our empirically-grounded theory of subnational variation in
Amazon deforestation.

5.3.1. A Demographic and Developmental Big Push
In 1952, Colonel Juan B. Córdoba published his Geographical Compilation of the
Intendance of Caquetá, which offers a useful baseline for assessing the economic and
political integration of the region before the developmental era. Córdoba notes that
Caquetá only had two proper roads at the time of publication. The first road, built during
the war with Peru, connected Florencia with Gabinete in Huila (63km). The second
stretched from Florencia to Montañita (36km), where Larandia the farm of the Lara
Family was located. Florencia and Montañita were thus the two most integrated towns
in Caquetá at the beginning of the 1950s. Apart from these two roads, Caquetá’s
population had to use trails of varying quality to travel between the Andes and the
Amazon.
This reality rapidly changed during the second half of the twentieth century. Until
the early 1950s, agrarian colonization had proceeded in a linear fashion from west to east,
following the banks of the rivers. However, rivers were soon replaced by roads as
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agrarian colonization advanced (Brucher, 1974). Deforestation is closely linked to
population dynamics, and Figure 5.3 illustrates how Caquetá’s population dramatically
increased over the course of two decades. Based on official census data, it depicts total
population over time disaggregated by urban and rural population. The century’s most
important demographic change occurred between 1951 and 1964, when the population of
Caquetá increased by 175%.
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Figure 5.3. Population in Caquetá (1928-2005)
Data for population from the DANE.
Given this rapid demographic shift, it stands to reason that public and private
actions taken between 1958 and 1982 had profound consequences. During the 1960s and
1970s, Caquetá acquired its distinctive appearance (Ferro & Uribe, 2002, p. 62).
Livestock production was not only consolidated but also to some extent democratized
during those years as part of the region’s demographic and developmental big push.
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5.3.2. Integration Through the Agrarian Agenda
This section provides evidence for the claim that state agencies played a key role
in shaping integration pathways during the developmental era. Although agrarian
colonization and livestock farming were already present in Caquetá by the mid-twentieth
century, the state decisively facilitated the transition from subsistence agriculture to cattle
ranching and worked to consolidate the livestock industry. To be clear, I do not argue that
the Colombian state completely directed the colonization of Caquetá, only that it
employed strategies to support colonos, which in turn induced additional colonization of
the region.
Agrarian state agencies like the Caja Agraria, the INCORA, the ICA, and the
INDERENA actively promoted Caquetá´s colonization between 1958 and 1982. During
this period, these agencies established a permanent presence in the region, even though
they were legally dependent on the national government. In the developmental era,
Caquetá was formally designated an ‘intendancy” rather than a department.2 Unlike
departments which were relatively autonomous from the center and were entitled to
representation in the Senate and their own judicial districts—intendancies and
commissariats, the so-called “national territories,” were administered by delegates of the
national government and controlled by the DAINCO. All subdivisions of the Colombian
Amazon were either intendancies or commissariats until 1981, when the Colombian
Congress formally recognized Caquetá as a department.

2

Until 1991, the Colombian territory was divided into departments, intendancies, and commissariats.
Contemporary Amazonian departments used to be classified as “national territories,” that is, territories with
inferior rights and duties (Serje, 2011).
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What did Colombia’s agrarian agencies do in Caquetá, and what were the
consequences of their intervention? Generally speaking, I argue that the strategies
implemented by state agencies between 1958 and 1982 decisively shaped the integration
trajectory of Caquetá by promoting directed colonization and then actively supporting
spontaneous colonization. Both forms of support in turn induced the entrance of
additional colonos, who sought to benefit from state development investments in the
region.
Directed colonization was the dominant strategy at first. In 1959, the Caja
Agraria, a public agency mainly dedicated to promoting access to rural credit, was legally
authorized to invest part of its resources in colonization projects in different regions of
the country (Law 20 of 1959). Three directed colonization projects were implemented in
Caquetá during those years: La Mono (in Belén de los Andaquíes), Maguaré (in El
Doncello), and Valparaiso (CNMH, 2017). The Caja distributed plots of land of roughly
50 hectares per family and supplied colonos with food during the early years. By 1962,
the Caja had facilitated the settlement of around 500 families. The agency’s investments
in regions like Caquetá were understood as a response to La Violencia.
The critical problem was to solve the situation of those compatriots whom a
decade of violence had thrown over the cities. Therefore, those in charge of
rehabilitating them economically and socially looked for a solution in the
colonization of marginal territories. The first step was to sign an agreement
between the existing Rehabilitation Office and the Agrarian Credit Fund. This
agreement established the promotion of six colonization fronts. The Caquetá
intendancy was among them (Bonilla, 1966, p. 20).
In addition to spearheading directed colonization programs, the agency promoted
access to credit (Marsh, 1983). At the end of the 1950s, the Caja was one of the few
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banks in Caquetá and certainly the most important one. It was also the main state agency
in the region whose explicit goal was the advancement of agrarian colonization. Although
the Caja promoted the cultivation of products like rice and maize, most credits were
explicitly designed to facilitate the transformation of colonos into cattle ranchers. The
agency provided both cash advances and the animals themselves. Thanks to the Caja,
many colonos received the startup capital they needed to raise cattle. While the agency
lent out 4.5 million pesos in 1959, the amount increased by nearly 400% to 17.7 million
pesos in 1963 (Brucher, 1974).
The Caja also promoted the allocation of public land to landless peasants residing
beyond the boundaries of its three directed colonization programs. Figure 5.4 depicts both
the total area distributed per year and the cumulative percentage of public land that was
transferred into private hands. The figure also emphasizes four historical moments, the
first one being the empowerment of the Caja as a vital player in the colonization of
Caquetá. The amount of land allocated clearly increased in the late 1950s with the new
functions of the Caja, thus kicking off a trend towards the privatization of the Amazon—
an important step in establishing the territoriality of the state (see Chapter 3). The number
of non-directed colonos increased partly due to the possibility of receiving land property
and credits from the state (see Figure 5.3 above).
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Figure 5.4. Allocated public land in Caquetá over time
Data from the INCODER. A: Caja Agraria, B: the INCORA, C: Nestlé, D: The Caquetá
Department.
Directed colonization programs, pro-livestock credits, and the distribution of
public land continued during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Caja’s activities were
eventually restricted to the provision of credit. Law 135 of 1961 created the INCORA,
which took over the other developmental functions of the Caja. The INCORA was
deployed to Caquetá in 1963 (Resolution 25), and it quickly became one of the three most
important regional offices in charge of promoting agrarian colonization in Colombia
(Balcalzar, 1995; Melo, 2016).3 The objective of supporting colonization was to facilitate
access to land without challenging the land tenure system in Colombia’s agrarian regions
(Albertus, 2015).

3

The other two were located in Arauca and Ariari.
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During the developmental era, and particularly between 1963 and 1982, the
INCORA was the most important public agency in Caquetá. Most of the political leaders
I interviewed mentioned that being the manager of the INCORA was much more
important than being the governor of the Caquetá intendancy (interviews 12, 22, 31).
Given the magnitude of its investments, the INCORA, unlike the intendancy, was an
object of great political interest. Gustavo Artunduaga Paredes, a pilot and captain in the
armed forces, is the best remembered director of the INCORA in Caquetá. The airport in
Florencia was named in his honor.

Figure 5.4. Captain Artunduaga demonstrates a new technique for artificial insemination.
Image from González, Ramón, and Torrijos (2003, p. 83).
What did the INCORA do in Caquetá, and why was the agency so important?
First, the INCORA assumed responsibility for the directed colonization programs
established by the Caja. Although the state’s interest in promoting directed colonization
diminished over time, the INCORA continued to implement the three existing programs
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and supported additional colonization initiatives advanced by state agencies like the
army.4
Following the reduction of the Caja’s responsibilities, the dominant strategy of the
state shifted from directed colonization to active support for spontaneous colonization,
implying a wider scope of activity. The concrete strategies were not all that different at
first. For example, the INCORA became responsible for the allocation of public land to
landless peasants, which was among the primary instruments through which the state
promoted population settlement. The important role of the INCORA in configuring the
land market is widely remembered in the region, even if bureaucratic torpor and legal
limitations obstructed the efficient distribution of land titles.5 Figure 5.4 above takes the
form of an inverted U-shaped curve in which most peaks coincide with the time of the
INCORA.
In addition to allocating public land, the INCORA also promoted access to credit
for colonos. A former director of the INCORA in Caquetá explained in an interview its
programs “promoted livestock farming by giving credits to peasants, credits that were
characterized by low interest rates and a four-year grace period” (interview 67). As a
result of these favorable terms, at least 97% of recipients managed to pay back their
debts. An official report explained that 16,410 families benefited from the program and

4

For example, in 1964 the Colombian army and the Agrarian National Federation (Federación Agraria
Nacional) promoted the displacement of indigenous groups from Tolima (Pijaos) to San Vicente del
Caguán. After three decades, the Yaguará II indigenous reservation was finally recognized. Indigenous
groups were treated as if they were landless peasants and, unsurprisingly, most of them have adopted
similar cattle ranching techniques (Marsh, 1983).
5
One of the main historical constrains on the allocation of public land to landless peasants is the existence
of the forest reserves established by the Colombian Congress in 1959 (Law 2nd).
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roughly 400,000 female cows and 11,000 bulls were distributed (Serrano, 1994). The
INCORA funded roughly 50% of Caquetá’s cattle in 1976 (Michelsen, 1990, p. 20).
Furthermore, beginning in the mid-1960s, the INCORA invested in infrastructure
and provided some of the basic public goods that colonos needed. The agency
implemented two colonization projects in the region, Caquetá I and Caquetá II, with the
assistance of World Bank financing (Marsh, 1983). Naturally, the INCORA was unable
to satisfy the needs of the entire rural population of Caquetá, but the scope of its
necessarily limited investments was impressive. The INCORA not only built roads,6
schools, and health care centers but also provided technical assistance, supported peasant
organizations, and invested in malaria prevention initiatives. Table 5.1 provides a
comparative summary of the INCORA´s investments in Caquetá and Putumayo between
1961 and 1980. The main conclusion one draws from the table is that the INCORA
invested much more in Caquetá as compared to Putumayo. While the INCORA built 434
kilometers of road in Caquetá, it built not a single kilometer in Putumayo. The table
illustrates that Caquetá was the colonization region in Colombia that received the most
support from the state between 1961 and 1980.

6
With the aim of connecting the most important ports in Caquetá, Caguán and Orteguaza, Pescado and
Peneya rivers with the “marginal de la selva” road, the INCORA built the following roads: from
El Doncello to Maguaré the circuit of Río Negro, La Esmeralda, Puerto Manique; from Albania to Curillo;
from Morelia to Valparaiso and Solita, from Paujil to Cartagena, from Libano to La unión Peneya, and
km5-San Antonio de Getuchá, from Lusitania to Tres Esquinas del Caguán.
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Table 5.1.
The INCORA´s Investments in Colonization Regions (1961-1980)
Credit

Project
9900

Schools

No.

Amount*

No.

Amount*

512.3

434

125

582.2

71

41.5

Families Amount*
Caquetá

Health

Roads
(Km)

59%

66%

47%

98%

71%

97%

84%

641

17.8

0

0

0

0

0

4%

2%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Other Colonization
Fronts

6326

241

497

2

235

2

8

38%

31%

53%

2%

29%

3%

16%

TOTAL

16687

771.1

931

127

817.5

73

49.5

Putumayo

* Million pesos

Note. Data for the INCORA´s investments from Jimeno (1989).

These figures do not, of course, indicate that state investments in the region were
sufficient or that Caquetá’s inhabitants were fully satisfied with the performance of the
state’s agrarian institutions.7 In fact, between 1972 and 1979, peasants actively mobilized
to demand additional support for Caquetá’s colonization. “In this part of the country the
struggle is not for access to land, but for credits, road projects in remote areas, education,
health, and better prices for crops” (Ferro & Uribe, 2002, p. 62). These are the public
goods that rural communities in Caquetá have demanded from the state and organized to
obtain. Debt relief and the allocation of additional public land were the immediate gains
of the movement.
In sum, state intervention during the developmental era (1958-1982) was a
decisive factor in the consolidation of livestock farming in Caquetá as well as the
transformation of many landless peasants into cattle ranchers. Indeed, livestock farming

7

Some scholars have even classified state intervention during these years are a “failure” (E. Ciro, 2016, p.
49).
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was to some extent democratized in this period as raising cattle became an economic
activity pursued by both elites and non-elites. The state-backed livestock industry was the
main legacy of the developmental era.

5.3.3. The Role of the Market: Nestlé’s Dairy District
From the fact that the Colombian state played a vital role in defining a particular
type of integration trajectory during the developmental era, one should not conclude that
the state was the only relevant economic actor contributing to the consolidation and
democratization of cattle ranching in Caquetá. Here we must consider the development of
Caquetá’s dairy market.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Nestlé invested in Caquetá and joined the state’s
efforts to consolidate and democratize cattle ranching through the creation of a “dairy
district.” The company first built a pre-condensing plant in Florencia (1974) and then
reception and cooling plants in El Doncello (1977). These investments were part of
Nestlé’s ambitious plan to become a “pioneer in the development of unexploited areas
that were away from the main urban centers” (NESTLÉ, 1988, p. 1). When Nestlé
entered Caquetá, state agencies like INCORA were already actively promoting the
establishment of livestock farming. At the time, however, little of Caquetá’s livestock
was devoted to the production of milk. Until the entrance of Nestlé, the main products
were the animals themselves; milk and cheese were mostly produced for selfconsumption or the local market (Michelsen, 1990). According to the company, before
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Nestlé arrived in Caquetá, “there were no other companies interested in the collection,
transportation, marketing and distribution of produced milk” (NESTLÉ, 1988, p. 8).
Given Caquetá’s focus on raising and fattening cattle and the relative
underdevelopment of its dairy market, Nestlé had to play an active role in transforming
and developing the livestock economy. In order to make its investments worthwhile,
Nestlé implemented an ambitious “Milk Promotion Plan,” which linked up with public
efforts to consolidate Caquetá’s livestock economy. Once the pre-condensing, reception,
and cooling plants were built, Nestlé began to collect milk from cattle ranchers. Using the
existing but constantly expanding road networks, Nestlé established routes for collecting
fresh milk (see Figure 5.5), of which “[t]here were 51… and more than one hundred
collection points in 1987. The demand area covers almost all passable roads of the region
and the banks of the main rivers” (Michelsen, 1990, p. 15).
Nestlé’s routes maintained a distance of 25 kilometers from Florencia because the
company did not want to disrupt the growing urban milk market (NESTLÉ, 1988).
Furthermore, Nestlé promoted the displacement of cheese production from suburban
areas of Florencia to “distant areas, in which it is impossible for Nestlé to collect milk”
(NESTLÉ, 1988, p. 17). It is probable that these decisions, justified by the necessity of
protecting the local market, ended up accelerating outward development by promoting
the incorporation of distant regions into the dairy market (Michelsen, 1990).
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Figure 5.5. The organization of the milk market in Caquetá: dairy routes
Reprinted from Michelsen (1990, p. 17).
The investments were a real success. The company quickly became the first largescale buyer in the region because it offered regular payments, consistent prices, and
stable milk collection. Small and mid-size cattle farmers were offered an efficient and
predictable way to sell their product at local collection points, thus avoiding the trouble
of transporting heavy containers of perishable milk to urban centers, where prices were
uncertain and demand limited (Michelsen, 1990). Despite complains about Nesté’s unfair
prices, most ranchers and locals tend to recognize the economic and social importance of
the company (Marsh, 1983).
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In addition to stabilizing the demand for milk, Nestlé actively invested in making
Caquetá’s livestock farming suitable for both meat and milk production (ganadería doble
propósito). It was necessary for the company to promote milk production beyond the
mere establishment of constant demand. For example, Nestlé supported the creation and
maintenance of new roads that allowed it to expand its operational area; facilitated
ranchers’ access to cooling and storage facilities; issued credit to ranchers; provided
technical assistance to improve productivity; and promoted the genetic improvement of
both cattle and pastures.8
Table 5.2 presents the basic achievements of Nestlé’s Milk Promotion Plan and
illustrates its far-reaching consequences. The table summarizes the company’s impact by
showing the dramatic increase in its area of operation, number of suppliers, routes, and
journeys, volume of milk collected, pasture area, and milking between 1974 and 1986. In
slightly more than a decade, the area that Nestlé covered increased by 533%. “After 10
years of operations, the value of milk production was placed in third place among the
main economic activities of the region” (NESTLÉ, 1988, p. 18).

8
When Nestlé arrived in Caquetá in the mid-1970s, most cattle were creole Zebu, a breed whose milk
productivity is known to be low. Zebu is a type of cattle that originated in Asia and is well-adapted to the
tropics and its diseases. The company subsequently promoted a combination of the Zebu (3/8) and Holstein
(5/8) breeds, which can endure harsh climates but also produces abundant milk. Something similar
occurred with pastures: Brachiaria, Leucaena, and Desmodium were introduced during these years as a
result of the combined effort of the INCORA, the ICA, and Nestlé (Serrano, 1994).
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Table 5.2
Nestle’s Dairy Market in Caquetá
Operation area (km2)
Suppliers
Daily reception routes
Daily journeys (km)
Daily average reception
(litters)
Meadows with pastures (ha)
Total milking

1974

1986

Variation (%)

3,500
90
6
720

14,700
1,400
40
3,840

420%
1556%
667%
533%

2,444

50,000

800,000
21,000

1,280,000
105,000

2046%
160%
500%

Note. Data from Nestlé (1988, pp. 11–15)
It is important to note that the fruits of this expansion were not concentrated in the
hands of an elite few: public and private investments facilitated the consolidation of small
and mid-size cattle ranchers. Unlike meat production, which requires time to raise and
fatten cattle, dairy production ensures a constant income, easing the conversion of
colonos into cattle ranchers (Michelsen, 1990). In fact, one can argue that the creation of
the dairy district made livestock farming more accessible.9
As a result of public and private investments, Caquetá was able to establish and
consolidate a dairy district that has been an important part of the regional economy since
the developmental era. Nestlé was not only a vital player but also acquired a market
monopoly. Although Nestlé’s demand for milk has steadily increased over time, its

9

The percentage of Nestlé´s suppliers producing less than 40 liters per day decreased from 95% in 1975 to
60% in 1986. Despite the reduction of small suppliers, the production of milk was not concentrated on few
hands (NESTLÉ, 1988).
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monopoly disappeared by the end of the 1980s as new companies, some of them local,
began to emerge.

5.3.4. A Consolidated Livestock Economy in Constant and Rapid Expansion
I have explained thus far that the consolidation of the livestock economy, which
the academic literature identifies as the main proximate driver of Amazon deforestation,
resulted from an enduring integration trajectory shaped by both state agencies and private
capital investments in the developmental era. Cattle ranching emerged as the dominant
economic activity between 1958 and 1982, with clear implications for the environment.
Figure 5.6 depicts the total number of animals in Caquetá over time, confirming the
dramatic increase that occurred between 1958 and 1982.

Developmental era

Neoliberal

Figure 5.6. Total livestock in Caquetá (1959-2018)
Data for the number of animals, between 1959 and 1985, from Michelsen (1990), and
from the Caquetá’s Governor’s Office for the remaining series.
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In addition, one of the most important achievements of the developmental era was
the limited democratization of cattle ranching. Naturally, benefits were not equally
distributed and there indeed remain pervasive inequalities that track those of Colombia’s
rural sector as a whole. However, both rural elites and non-elites are deeply interested in
the economic progress of the livestock economy.
A consolidated and relatively democratized livestock economy, therefore,
constitutes the baseline condition for analyzing high cumulative deforestation in Caquetá,
which has resulted from economic success rather than failure and from agrarian rather
than extractive development. In this section, I examine the economic mechanism through
which livestock farming in Caquetá is linked to deforestation. Because environmental
activists tend to portray local actors as irrational, immoral, illegal, or oblivious (see
Chapter 1), my goal is to study the concrete economic incentives at play. Cattle ranchers
have indeed acted rationally, but their rationality is not of the type that environmental
activists value.
In attempting to understand this rationality, we might first consider Caquetá’s soil
quality, which is highly acidic and poorly suited for commercial agriculture. The soil is
both old and constantly awash in rainfall. Poor soil quality constrains productivity, which
must then be increased by incorporating new land area or introducing additional capital
and technology. Livestock farming in Caquetá is extensive because it uses relatively large
areas of land with low inputs of capital, labor, and fertilizers. The use of large areas of
land is not driven by economic calculations alone: state intervention is also at play. Land
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area is officially conceived in a way that compensates for acidic soils by introducing the
idea of a Family Agricultural Unit (UAF), defined by the minimum amount of land that a
family needs to survive.10 The size of the UAF varies according to agro-ecological
conditions: a rural family in the Amazon region, for instance, needs more land than a
family in the Andean region due to differences in soil quality. Therefore, land area alone
is not an instructive metric.
In theory, it is possible to improve soil quality by investing in capital, labor, and
fertilizers. In reality, however, it is more convenient to buy or clear additional land.11
Elites have bought or rented additional land in order to enlarge the number of animals in
their possession. Colonos are subject to strong incentives to sell or rent their land and to
engage in colonization elsewhere. If colonos are young enough and security conditions
permit, there is always the option of establishing a new farm in parts the country where
roads and basic state services are in short supply. Cheap or “free” public land is almost
always available.
Wide availability of land and, thus, low purchase prices made investments to
increase soil productivity unprofitable and the expansion of the frontier highly
profitable. For example, the cost of controlling weed in one hectare of pastures
was higher than the cost of one hectare of land (Michelsen, 1990, p. 48).
Furthermore, the existence of numerous legal restrictions on the recognition of
private property national parks, forest reserves, indigenous reservations, maximum land
area, administrative procedures of acquisition

10

has not prevented the emergence of a

Law 160 of 1994, art. 38. A similar idea was recognized in 1961, when Law 135 introduced the concept
of a UAF for the first time.
11
The use of fire is a modified version of the older slaw-and-burn agriculture system that has been used by
indigenous peoples in the Amazon region and rural populations in the tropics for centuries.
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land market. Extensive livestock farming has coexisted with a very active, informal
market for recently cleared lands. Land accrues economic value due to labor inputs, and
poor rural populations are either hired to work the land or act independently and then sell
the fruits of their labor on the informal market.
Roads have been a crucial part of this story. Roads networks not only facilitate
commerce between buyers and cattle ranchers but also promote access to basic state
services (Moreno, 2015). In fact, roads delimit the milk market because buyers, as
mentioned, established daily routes to collect this highly perishable product. Under such
circumstances, colonos came to expect access to the market and state services, both of
which require roads. During the developmental era, some roads were built by state
agencies. However, most Amazonian roads, particularly secondary and tertiary roads,
were built by community members themselves, who naturally take pride in their efforts
even as they demanded support from the state to maintain, improve, enlarge, and pave
existing roads (CNMH, 2017).
In sum, by the end of the developmental era Caquetá’s livestock economy had
consolidated and to some extent democratized the milk, cheese, and meat markets, in
which buyers

local, national, and international

interfaced with suppliers who were

constantly expanding into new lands. Producers worked to ensure their accessibility in
order to reduce transportation costs. The successful collective action of local populations
in building and maintaining road networks is what made this happy marriage between
supply and demand possible.
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5.3.5. Caquetá Reaches “Adulthood”
The development of livestock farming in Caquetá also facilitated the
consolidation of a regional elite that steadily gained political influence at the national
level. The recognition of Caquetá as a department illustrates both the connections
between regional elites and livestock farming and their leverage at the national level.
Caquetá was the first Amazonian province to acquire the status of department through a
bottom-up political process. The other Amazonian provinces, including Putumayo, were
only recognized as full departments by the 1991 Constitution—that is, from the top
down.
Caquetá’s economic and political elites formed a pro-recognition committee in the
late-1960s to promote the intendancy’s incorporation as a department with equal rights
and duties.12 Hernando Turbay Turbay, a talented liberal politician, party bigwig, and
Caquetá’s most important congressman between 1968 and 1990 (Mojica, 1993), had
always been a strong supporter of the idea of departmental recognition (Diario del Huila,
1979a). He was also the clearest example of a regional elite tied to the livestock
economy he was a rancher himself who wielded significant national influence
(Mojica, 1993). The recognition proposal was also backed in the 1970s by the liberal and
conservative elites of Huila,13 Caquetá’s most developed neighboring department, and the

12

This pro-recognition committee was established by Hector Orozco, Floresmiro Robles, Gustavo
Artunduaga, Jorge Daniel Santos, Rafael Urquina Tamayo, and Jorge Olaya Lucena y Oliver (Ortiz
Fajardo, 1982, p. 110).
13
Three congressmen from Huila were particularly important: Alberto Galindo, Luis Enrique Valenzuela,
and Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. In addition, Misael Pastrana (former Colombian president) and Bertha
Hernández de Ospina (former first lady) supported similar initiatives (Diario del Huila, 1979b). Also
important were Omar García Ortega (senator), Daniel Domínguez, and Armando Barona (Ortiz Fajardo,
1982, p. 109).
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one from which most of its settlers had originated. The Colombian Congress, however,
repeatedly rejected the initiative, arguing that Caquetá lacked the minimum number of
inhabitants required by the 1886 Constitution before a region could be recognized as a
department.
The question of recognition came to the fore during the presidential campaign in
1978, when Julio César Turbay Ayala, the uncle of Hernando Turbay Turbay, visited the
region and promised grant Caquetá departmental status if elected president (Mojica,
1993). There are reasons to believe that the family relationship between Julio César and
Hernando helped clinch Caquetá’s recognition as a department (A. Ciro, 2016, p. 50),
although concrete evidence is lacking. Julio César Turbay Ayala, president of Colombia
between 1978 and 1982, stood by his promises, and requested the elaboration of a
legislative project. Turbay also tasked Germán Zea Hernández, the Minister of
Government, with advancing the legislative process towards recognition of Caquetá as a
department (Diario del Huila, 1979a).
The process of obtaining departmental recognition for Caquetá was difficult for at
least two reasons. First, Caquetá only had 103 of the 370 thousand inhabitants that the
1886 Constitution (Art. 5) required. Given these shortcomings,14 the Colombian Congress
could not recognize the intendancy without violating the Constitution, making a
constitutional amendment necessary.15 Second, although it was necessary to gain the

14
Caquetá met the other requirements: local support, solid budget, and a favorable recommendation from
both the national government and the Council of State (Art. 5).
15
Constitutional amendments were more difficult to pass because not only the two chambers needed to
approve them twice but also it was necessary to obtain the positive vote of two-thirds of the members of
each chamber (Art. 5).
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support of both chambers of Congress, as an intendancy Caquetá was only represented in
the lower house; it did not have a voice in the Senate.
In order to demonstrate that Caquetá deserved recognition as a department, the
government argued that the census was outdated and that Caquetá was in compliance
with the other requirements (Colombian Congress, 1981, p. 16). Records of the
Congressional debate reveal that recognition was justified by the necessity of promoting
full political integration. Caquetá was compared to a child who had grown up and
reached adulthood, and congressmen pointed to the national interests at stake: taking
advantage of the territory’s rich natural resource endowments; recovering the region from
abandonment (El Espectador, 1981); preventing the expansion of guerrilla forces; and
recognizing the courageous efforts of the local population. According to Daniel
Domínguez, Congress’s reporting speaker, the proposed reform made “feasible the
longing of a noble, hardworking people, who cleared the jungle with the swing of their
axes and hoes, opened furrows in the earth, and projected a promising future” (p. 23).
The Colombian Congress unanimously amended the Constitution to facilitate the
recognition of Caquetá as a department (Colombian Congress, 1981, p. 24). The
Constitution now explicitly authorized Congress to establish Caquetá “even though it
does not have the number of inhabitants required by articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution”
(Legislative Act 1 of 1981, art. 1), an authorization that was implemented in a matter of
months (Law 78 of 1981). It is worth noting that Hernando Turbay Turbay was
unanimously elected president of the House of Representatives in the middle of the
legislative process, illustrating the way his political career and Caquetá’s recognition

200

were intertwined (Mojica, 1993). Unsurprisingly, Hernando Turbay became the first
senator of the newly recognized Caquetá department.
In conclusion, close study of Caquetá’s integration path confirms that, although
livestock farming is the main driver of deforestation in the Colombia Amazon, the
transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture was not a “natural” process. The
consolidation of a livestock economy in Caquetá was the result of public and private
strategies aimed at integrating the region into the market and the state project. High
cumulative deforestation in Caquetá is the product of a particular path of integration in
which cattle farming was consolidated and partially democratized. Between 1958 and
1982, the basic features of Caquetá’s livestock economy were shaped first by the state
and then by the market. This section has provided the basic foundations for understanding
how different levels of cumulative deforestation result from different types of integration.

5.4. Putumayo: Integration Through the Extractive Agenda
The previous section focused on Caquetá’s path of economic and political
integration and explained its relatively high cumulative deforestation. Given that active
agricultural frontiers in the Amazonian piedmont of Colombia do not expand at a similar
pace, this section looks at territorial integration in Putumayo, where cumulative
deforestation is relatively low. The objective is to complete our study of the critical
juncture at which the trajectories of the two departments diverged and explain why
cumulative deforestation is more severe in Caquetá than it is in Putumayo. By comparing
the two most-similar Amazonian departments in Colombia that nonetheless experience
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different levels of cumulative deforestation, I am able to pinpoint the underlying forces
that account for more or less expansive agricultural frontiers, and advance an empiricallygrounded theory about the different ways in which territorial integration drives
deforestation.
I argue that cumulative deforestation in Putumayo is relatively low because the
province has not been able to consolidate a legal commercial farming economy. The
department’s comparatively less consolidated farming sector is in turn the consequence
of a different integration trajectory configured by the Colombian state and the market
during the developmental era. While it is true that state intervention promoted both
regional development and migration to Putumayo during the developmental era, the
state’s strategy in Putumayo differed from its approach to Caquetá in that it promoted the
region’s integration through the extraction of oil instead of the consolidation of
commercial farming. As a result, by the end of the developmental era, commercial
farming was barely consolidated in Putumayo, explaining the department’s relatively low
levels of cumulative deforestation.

5.4.1. Integration Through Oil Extraction
Chapter 4 showed that La Violencia was more consequential for Caquetá than it
was for Putumayo. Compared to the high levels of violence experienced by Caquetá’s
neighbors, which in turn prompted many of their inhabitants to migrate, violence in
Nariño, the province from which most of Putumayo’s colonos originated, was
significantly lower. In addition, migration to Putumayo in the late 1940s and 1950s was

202

less connected to the particular political dynamics of La Violencia. The varied influence
of La Violencia consequently affected the strategic calculations of the Colombian state in
the Amazon piedmont. Following the 1932 international border dispute, the state refocused its interests on Caquetá. Putumayo did not become a priority in the state’s
agrarian agenda until the beginning of the developmental era: the Caja did not implement
state-directed colonization projects in Putumayo during the 1950s the way it did in
Caquetá.
Migration to Putumayo between 1951 and 1973 was moderate, while migration to
Caquetá over the same period was extensive (see Figures 4.3 and 5.3 above). Although
Putumayo’s population increased throughout the twentieth century, the increase
proceeded at a relatively slow pace until 1973 (Figure 5.7). While it is difficult to
demonstrate exactly why migration to Putumayo did not increase dramatically during this
period, I propose that slow population growth was partly the consequence of low levels
of violence in neighboring provinces and the state’s accordingly limited efforts to
consolidate the rural economy. The state introduced fewer incentives for migration to
Putumayo as compared to Caquetá.
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Figure 5.7. Population in Putumayo (1928-2005)
Data for population from the DANE.
The economic and political integration of Putumayo was largely linked to the
extraction of oil, which was first discovered in the 1940s and extracted beginning in the
mid-1960s. The Colombian state completed a road connecting Puerto Asís with Puerto
Caicedo in 1957 and then signed a contract with Texaco to facilitate the extraction of
Putumayo’s oil. The contract enabled the company to build the necessary facilities and
infrastructure. Texaco established its main camp in Santana in northern Puerto Asís, from
where the company’s engineers and workers were initially transported by helicopter to
extraction sites.
The expansion of the extractive frontier in Putumayo was riddled with conflicts
between indigenous peoples, Texaco, and colonos, all of whom laid claim to the land and
its natural resources. On the basis of a contract that Texaco signed with the Colombian
government, the company began to claim ownership over land that was possessed by
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indigenous groups. The Sionas, Cofanes, and Ingas peoples were displaced (CNMH,
2015), and indigenous land was occupied by the oil company and then by colonos eager
to benefit from the economic opportunities that Texaco brought. The company, however,
did not initially build access roads, thereby obstructing agrarian colonization. Colonos at
first used rivers to gain proximity to the company’s investments, including the 150 oil
wells it was constructing. Texaco even demanded that the state halt the entrance of
colonos into its area of influence (CNMH, 2015).
This initial strategy changed in 1966 when the company built a road connecting
Santana with Orito, where most of its oil wells were located. The road facilitated the
influx of newcomers seeking employment with the company, or to engage in trade or
colonize new land (CNMH, 2015, p. 105). But the allocation of public land to private
owners required encroachment on a considerable part of the reserve forest. To that end,
the state reduced the boundaries of the reserve in 1966. This change deprived the
company of legal tools it had used to prevent the entrance of colonos into its area of
influence. Constraints were finally removed from agrarian colonization and the state
began to advance an extremely limited agrarian agenda, leading to a moderate increase in
population (see Figure 5.7).
Texaco also built a pipeline (oleoducto transandino) to transport Putumayo’s oil
to the Pacific Ocean in Tumaco (Nariño). The pipeline was activated in 1969 and its
construction promoted the entrance of additional colonos.16 Texaco subsequently
constructed a small refinery in Orito and a road connecting this town with San Miguel.

16

The initial goal was to also transport Ecuadorian oil through this pipeline.
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These private investments altered the spatial pattern of agrarian colonization as roads
became more important than rivers. When it came to infrastructure building, during the
developmental era Texaco was, so to speak, the INCORA of Putumayo.
The state thus promoted the expansion of the extractive frontier but did not
facilitate the consolidation of agricultural industries. The INCORA, the most important
public agency in Caquetá, played no significant role in Putumayo in the 1960s and 1970s.
While the regional director of the INCORA in Caquetá was more important than the
governor of the intendancy, in Putumayo the INCORA was subordinated to neighboring
Nariño, employed very few state officials, and did not maintain a proper branch office as
it did in Caquetá (1963). Putumayo’s INCORA was entirely dependent on decisions
made in Pasto (interview 50).
Although the state’s agrarian agencies were relatively insignificant in Putumayo,
they were not altogether absent. It seems that the INCORA’s activities in Putumayo
during the developmental era were limited to the allocation of public land to those
colonos who followed the expansion of the extractive frontier. Figure 5.8 depicts the total
land area that has been transferred into private hands in Putumayo over time. We observe
a peak between 1967 and 1971 following the above-mentioned reduction in the area
dedicated to reserve forests. The INCORA intervened to legalize the status of the colonos
who had arrived with the extractive boom.
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Figure 5.8. Allocated public land in Putumayo over time
Data from the INCODER.
In addition to the allocation of public land, there is evidence that the INCORA
issued credit to promote livestock farming in both Puerto Asís and Mocoa (Molano,
1968). The loans were similar to those issued in Caquetá, but their scope was radically
different (see Table 5.1 above). An official survey, conducted in the two departments at
the end of the 1960s to identify colonos’ needs, found that 53% of Putumayo
interviewees viewed credit as an important necessity, while only 7.9% of Caquetá
interviewees responded similarly (Medina, 1971, p. 95). Furthermore, according to
another official investigation from the time,
Considerable economic efforts were concentrated in the two areas, especially in
Caquetá, where numerous loans financed by IBRD were invested, both in the
construction of infrastructure and in supervised credits for farming exploitation.
By contrast, Putumayo did not receive this type of support, but its inhabitants
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requested it before the national government and currently receive some support in
credit and technical assistance (Medina, 1971, p. 30).
Despite the relative insignificance of the INCORA in Putumayo, it is worth noting
that the agency implemented a project called Putumayo 1 in 1964 (Cabeza, 1971). This
project involved the draining of wetlands in order to divide properties and foster
agricultural productivity in the upper Putumayo, the part of the region that was already
relatively consolidated. The expansion of the agricultural frontier in upper Putumayo was
only possible by draining water from the valley (CNMH, 2015, p. 76; Preciado, 2003, p.
117). Apart from this project, to the best of my knowledge, the INCORA did not
implement any other colonization projects in Putumayo’s piedmont or planes.
It is difficult to find historical evidence about the agrarian agenda of the state in
Putumayo during the developmental era. Generally speaking, secondary sources on the
economic and political history of Putumayo are silent when it comes to the role of state
agencies like the INCORA (CNMH, 2015; Restrepo, 1985).17 Nor did my interviewees
from the region remember the agency or its bureaucrats. The likely reason for this is that
the INCORA did not invest in infrastructure, health, or education in Putumayo as it did in
Caquetá (see Table 5.1 above).

5.4.2. Early Contraction and Delayed “Adulthood”
I have argued thus far that the Colombian state shaped the integration trajectory of
Putumayo during the developmental era. After the international dispute between

17

I found something similar when analyzing the historical archive of Corpoamazonia.
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Colombia and Peru and in the absence of pervasive partisan violence in neighboring
provinces, Putumayo, once the center of economic and political concern in the Amazon
region, ceased to be a strategic priority. This transformation helps us understand why,
instead of facilitating the consolidation of commercial farming, the Colombian state
promoted the integration of Putumayo through the expansion of the extractive agenda. As
a result, at the close of the developmental era, the mining sector accounted for 54% of
Putumayo’s GDP (Realpe, 1992). The department’s poorly consolidated farming sector,
long neglected by the state, in turn explains its relatively low levels of cumulative
deforestation.
The deforestation that did occur in Putumayo was the result of agrarian
settlements that cropped up around the main sites of the oil industry. Unskilled labor was
required to build oil wells, camps, roads, and the pipeline. However, once this basic
infrastructure was built, the demand for local labor rapidly diminished (CNMH, 2015)
and the oil economy was unable to absorb additional newcomers. Some left the region,
but others decided to remain and cultivate rice, beans, cane, plantains, maize, and yucca.
Livestock farming also developed in Putumayo, but it was less widespread and
industrialized than in Caquetá. Although farming became an economic alternative to the
oil economy, the rural market was poorly consolidated.
Furthermore, the limited prosperity generated by oil in Putumayo soon came to an
abrupt halt when the economy was plunged into a crisis in the early 1980s. Figure 5.9
depicts the number oil barrels extracted from Putumayo between 1969 and 1986. We can
observe that production declined following its initial peak in the early 1970s. This trend,
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along with the discovery of new oil fields in the Casanare and Arauca departments,
diminished the relative significance of Putumayo’s oil for Colombia. For example, while
Putumayo provided 27% of all Colombian oil in 1975, by 1990 only 3% came from
Putumayo (Realpe, 1992, p. 18). Texaco broke its contract with the Colombian state
because, the company said, known oil reserves in Putumayo had been exhausted. The
company’s departure was premature, however, and the exploitation of oil in Putumayo
was later resumed by Ecopetrol (Realpe, 1992, p. 17).
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Figure 5.9. Produced barrels of oil in Putumayo (1969-1986)
Data from Devia (2004, p. 83), based on official data provided by Ecopetrol.
Putumayo’s troubled integration trajectory had clear political implications. Full
political integration was not achieved during the developmental era, and the province’s
recognition as a department was delayed for a decade thereafter. Unlike Caquetá, which
was recognized in 1982, Putumayo remained under the direct control of the national
government (the DAINCO) throughout the 1980s, becoming a proper department only in
1991, when the Colombian Constitution automatically transformed all “national
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territories” into departments.18 The recognition of Putumayo (again unlike Caquetá) was
the result of a top-down process in which regional elites played a secondary role. As a
consequence of the 1991 Constitution, Putumayo was granted the right to administer its
own resources, democratically elect its governor, and establish additional state agencies
(e.g., a comptroller, administrative courts).
In conclusion, this section has argued that state strategies implemented during the
developmental era radically altered Putumayo’s integration trajectory. The Colombian
state neglected to consolidate commercial farming, instead promoting integration through
oil extraction, which in turn incentivized migration, commerce, and agriculture in a
cyclical, boom-and-bust pattern. Although the farming sector in Putumayo developed
parallel to the oil industry, its scope was limited: few farming products were subject to
stable and constant demand. Putumayo’s less expansive and self-sustaining agricultural
frontier is one of the consequences of the state’s developmental strategy for the region.
During the developmental era the state configured an extractive trajectory with a poorly
consolidated legal farming sector. By the early 1980s, when this era came to an end, the
most basic features of Putumayo’s trajectory of economic and political integration had
already been defined.

18

Every “national territory” (i.e., Putumayo, Guaviare, Amazonas, Vaupés, and Guainía) was recognized as
a full department in 1991 under the new Constitution. Recognition occurred regardless of the number of
inhabitants (Colombian Constitution, transitory article 39; Decree 2274 of 1991).
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5.5.

Path Dependency in Neoliberal Times (1982-)
This section briefly explores the three most important changes affecting the

Amazonian foothills during the neoliberal era, without providing a comprehensive
account of them. My goal is simply to provide evidence to support the claim that
transformations since the developmental era are less consequential in explaining
differential levels of cumulative deforestation in Caquetá and Putumayo. During the
neoliberal era, state intervention in the economy changed, coca cultivation and violence
increased, and the state’s non-developmental agendas grew stronger in both provinces.
However, the impacts of these phenomena differed in Caquetá and Putumayo,
respectively, due to the two provinces’ distinct integration trajectories. In what follows, I
argue that none of the three neoliberal-era transformations was able to significantly alter
the overall integration trajectories configured during the developmental era.

5.5.1. The Withdrawal of the State
The role of the state in Caquetá and Putumayo shifted markedly in the early 1980s
as a result of market-oriented reforms: state agencies that were once in charge of
supporting agrarian colonization began to withdraw from the active promotion of
economic development. However, these national-level developments interacted in
different ways with the two provinces’ respective integration trajectories, exerting
correspondingly different effects on cumulative deforestation.
Market-oriented reforms in Caquetá negatively impacted the development of the
livestock economy. But the state-created agricultural market, configured during the
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developmental era, survived under the new circumstances. The INCORA was unable to
attract support and funding from the national government to implement its ambitious new
colonization project, Caquetá III (1983-1991).19 As a result, since the 1980s, the
INCORA’s functions have been limited to allocating public land, issuing supervised
credit, and providing technical assistance (Serrano, 1994). Nor was the INCORA the only
public agency to withdraw from the active promotion of the agricultural market.
Interviewees still recall the important role once played by the IDEAM, the state agency in
charge of acquiring agricultural goods from peasants.
State-led deforestation became market-led deforestation in Caquetá. The
consolidation of livestock farming in Caquetá after the developmental era was possible
due to the transformation of the market itself. As mentioned above, Nestlé lost its dairy
monopsony as regional companies like Trebol began to purchase fresh milk in the mid1980s (Michelsen, 1990, p. 14). Intermediaries started collecting milk in order to sell it to
the big companies. Furthermore, the diversification of the livestock economy contributed
to its consolidation: following the developmental era, three legal farming products were
produced and exchanged in Caquetá milk, cheese, and meat. The meat market is
dominated by large cattle ranchers who are able to wait long periods of time for their
returns.20

19

It seems that international agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) began
campaigning against peasant settlement in the region out of concern for the environment.
20
Small owners save animals and only sell them when problems arise. A small cattle rancher explained that
“having a cow is like having a bank account: anyone will buy it” (interview 33).
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The most consequential transformation of the neoliberal era was the consolidation
of the cheese market. Cheese production is appealing because the product does not perish
as quickly as milk, nor does it require cooling. Cheese can resist the high Amazonian
temperatures and humidity for long periods, meaning that it can be produced in remote
locations far from road networks. Milk production, however, is still safer and more
profitable. For this reason, cheese production is regarded as a transitional activity slated
for disappearance once the advanced milk market reaches a region. Distance from a
major road makes a clear difference, as the fresh milk market is largely dependent on
road networks. Although the meat and cheese industries also stand to benefit from better
transportation infrastructure, the existence of roads is not a necessary condition of
production the way it is for milk (Balcalzar, 1995).
By contrast, the impact of market-oriented reforms and the corresponding
withdrawal of the state on Putumayo’s integration trajectory was significantly more
damaging. The oil crisis amplified the problems of the agricultural sector when Texaco,
the largest company in the region, broke its contract with the government. Furthermore,
there was no large-scale investor interested in farming products in Putumayo the way
Nestlé invested in Caquetá. The IDEMA and Putumayo’s decanter of liquor, both state
agencies, were in charge of acquiring rural products until they were liquidated by market
reforms (interviews 12, 57).21 The reduction of developmental state functions in

21

At the end of the 1980s, the state made important investments in infrastructure, which improved
Putumayo’s market connections. Until the beginning of the 1990s, the only way to reach Putumayo by road
was through its traditional neighbor, Nariño. In 1991 a new road was built to connect Putumayo and Huila.
Similarly, a couple of years later, the state built the San Miguel international bridge to connect Colombia
and Ecuador (Realpe, 1992).
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Putumayo thus made the consolidation of the legal commercial farming sector even more
difficult.
In sum, the withdrawal of the state as a vital developmental actor dampened the
integration trajectories of both Caquetá and Putumayo. However, given the different
pathways configured during the developmental era, commercial farming was able to
survive in Caquetá, despite its problems, while in Putumayo the withdrawal of the
developmental state ended up deepening the legal farming sector’s enduring problems of
consolidation.

5.5.2. Integration Through Coca Cultivation
The withdrawal of the state as a developmental actor in the Amazon coincided, on
the one hand, with the escalation of violence and, on the other hand, with the proliferation
of coca crops. At first glance, one might consider these factors irrelevant to explaining
subnational differences in cumulative deforestation because both have impacted Caquetá
and Putumayo alike since the early 1980s. Coca has been grown and cocaine produced in
both departments for more than four decades (E. Ciro, 2016). However, while I
acknowledge that coca crops have played an important role across the board, I emphasize
the importance of regional variation. Although this section does not provide a
comprehensive account of the coca question, I offer evidence for an empiricallygrounded hypothesis: namely, that the effects of coca crops and violence on cumulative
deforestation are mediated by the enduring integration trajectories configured during the
developmental era.
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Coca helps explain deforestation as both a proximate and an underlying driver
(Geist & Lambin, 2002). However, the literature traditionally focuses on the role of drugs
as a proximate driver (Dávalos et al., 2011). Forested land is often cleared to cultivate
coca, once again reproducing the positive relationship between agricultural development
and deforestation (see Chapter 3). As such, the cultivation of coca has been an important
driver of deforestation in both Caquetá and Putumayo, although reliable historical data
prior to the turn of the twenty-first century is lacking. The cultivation of coca was
declared illegal in Colombia and I was told repeatedly by interviewees in both regions
that colonos, in order to avoid criminal prosecution, cultivate coca away from the main
road networks and urban centers, where state authority is relatively strong (interviews 23,
29, 43). Illegality introduces incentives to conceal coca cultivation, thus displacing
agriculture to the margins. While the cultivation of coca has incentivized the clearance of
forests in both Caquetá and Putumayo, the later has historically had more growing areas
than the former (see Figure 6.2).
Coca’s contribution to cumulative deforestation is not limited to this proximate
effect, however. I hypothesize that coca cultivation has also acted as an underlying driver,
albeit one that is mediated by existing integration trajectories. Our contextualized paired
comparison between Caquetá and Putumayo helps illustrate the way coca crops can affect
deforestation dynamics by inducing agrarian colonization and aiding the consolidation of
legal commercial farming.
One the one hand, coca cultivation engendered an economic boom in both
Caquetá and Putumayo that attracted new settlers hoping to grow the cash crop
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(Jaramillo, Mora, & Cubides, 1989; Ramírez, 2011; Torres, 2011). Scholars refer to this
phenomenon as “coca colonization” (colonización cocalera), that is, a process of agrarian
colonization in which the main agricultural product to be cultivated is coca. Although
both departments witnessed an influx of newcomers, the total number of migrants
differed. Figure 5.10 depicts population growth in Caquetá and Putumayo over time.

Developmental era

Transition

Neoliberal era

Figure 5.10. Population increase by period and department
Data from the DANE, the author´s calculations.
This figure illustrates that population increased at a higher rate in Caquetá than in
Putumayo during the developmental era, providing additional evidence that this period
was a path-shaping moment for the Amazonian foothills. The figure also shows that
between 1973 and 1985, which I describe as a transitional period, population increased
dramatically in Putumayo but only moderately in Caquetá. We can see the effect of coca
colonization on deforestation by comparing the 1973 and the 1993 censuses. In two
decades, Putumayo’s population increased by 269% while Caquetá’s increased by only
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104%.22 In fact, over the entire period depicted in Figure 5.10 (1938-2005), these two
decades represent 60% of the total increase in Putumayo and 46% in Caquetá. Most
migrants to Putumayo settled in lower Putumayo, where forest cover rapidly changed
(see Figure 5.1). In Caquetá, by contrast, population increase during this period was
mostly urban (see Figure 5.2 above).
On the other hand, coca crops also affected deforestation thorough their influence
on legal commercial farming. While coca cultivation facilitated the consolidation of the
livestock economy in Caquetá, where the agricultural market was already relatively
advanced and democratized, it became the dominant agricultural undertaking in
Putumayo. In Caquetá, coca growers have the option of investing in cattle, and cattle
ranchers have the option of growing coca. Interviewees explained to me how they were
able to inhabit the two markets simultaneously or transition from the illegal to the legal
economy (interviews 2, 10, 30, 32). The relationship between legal and illegal economies
is very fluid in Caquetá, and even those who specialize in one market must coordinate
with their peers in the other market to promote common objectives.23
The situation in Putumayo turned out differently because the province had barely
consolidated its legal farming sector by the time coca cultivation commenced in the late
1970s. A poorly consolidated farming sector and an extractive economy in crisis

22

Unsurprisingly, historians of Caquetá tend to claim that migration decreased during this period due to the
interference of illegal activity (Almario Rojas, 1987, p. 25).
23
Milk, coca, and cheese are the three rural products that enjoy an assured demand. However, coca buyers
(unlike milk buyers) are able to reach places far from roads and urban centers: coca cultivation is profitable
even beyond the agricultural frontier assuming production sites are a reasonable distance from the main
markets. Cheese can also be produced at far-flung sites. Given this close connection, coca growers often
employ terms that are also used for producing cheese. See Ciro (2016) for a comprehensive study of this
connection.
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facilitated the proliferation coca cultivation, which quickly became the only rural product
subject to constant, stable and unlimited demand. Furthermore, most colonos transitioned
from the poorly consolidated legal farming sector to the illegal one (Realpe, 1992). The
amount of Putumayo’s agricultural goods that were traded in other departments decreased
from 40,751 tons in 1980 to 3,781 tons in 1982, a reduction of 1,078% (Ministry of
Agriculture, 1984, p. 30). The cultivation of coca suffocated legal commercial farming by
providing a highly profitable alternative. It also helped sustained the region’s remaining
population in the wake of the oil bust (interviews 3, 10, 34).
In sum, the cultivation of coca has influenced the economic and political
integration of our two departments since the early 1980s. On the basis of empirical
evidence, this section proposes that the effect of both coca crops and violence on
deforestation dynamics is mediated by the different long-term integration trajectories
described in this chapter. In Putumayo the province that was placed on an extractive
integration path during the developmental era

coca cultivation both promoted mass

migration and suffocated the region’s underdeveloped farming market. By contrast, in
Caquetá, where integration was promoted through livestock farming, coca crops tended
to reduce internal migration and support the existing legal livestock economy.

5.5.3. The Empowerment of the Non-developmental Agendas of the State
The third important transformation of the neoliberal era relates to the
empowerment of the non-developmental agendas of the state in both Caquetá and
Putumayo. In recent decades, the scope of the state has broadened to include
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environmental and ethnic agendas, thereby influencing the integration trajectories of the
two departments. Figure 5.11 depicts national parks and indigenous reservations in
Caquetá and Putumayo and notes the time period during which they were formally
recognized by the state.

Figure 5.11. National Parks and indigenous reservations in Caquetá and Putumayo over
time
Data for National Parks from UAESPNN (2018), for indigenous reservations from
Ministry of Government (2016), for road networks from IGAC (2012) (coauthored with
Nicolás Herrera).
As Figure 5.11 shows, three national parks were established in Caquetá over the
last several decades

Picachos (1977), Chiribiquete (1984) and Alto Fragua Indiwasi

(2002) and Chiribiquete Park has been enlarged twice since I began writing this
dissertation (2013 and 2018). At present, these national parks cover 37% of the Caquetá
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department. Similarly, three national parks were declared in Putumayo during the
neoliberal era: La Paya (1984), Los Churumbelos Auka Wasi (2007), and Orito IngiAnde (2008). These three parks together comprise 17% of Putumayo’s area. In terms of
the size of their natural parks, Caquetá and Putumayo were similar until just five years
ago, when parks in Caquetá comprised only 14% of the department’s area.
Despite its importance, I propose that the formal recognition of natural parks has
not radically changed the developmental-era integration trajectories of Caquetá and
Putumayo. The six parks are all well preserved compared to other areas of the two
departments.24 On the basis of my data set on land cover, there are also no important
differences between parks in Caquetá and Putumayo.
Furthermore, natural parks cannot have influenced variation in levels of
cumulative deforestation between Caquetá and Putumayo because they only represent a
small part of the total deforested area: just 2% and 3% of the cumulative deforestation in
Caquetá and Putumayo, respectively, occurred in natural parks. Most cumulative
deforestation has occurred outside of natural parks, suggesting that the decisive factors
explaining subnational variation lie elsewhere. Primary and secondary sources on the
history of Caquetá and Putumayo rarely mention recognition of natural parks as an
important event in these departments’ economic and political history (Artunduaga, 1984;
A. Ciro, 2016; CNMH, 2015, 2017).

24

The academic literature on the efficacy of national parks emphasizes the difficulty of differentiating the
effects of institutions i.e., active protection from the effects of the biophysical characteristics or
isolation i.e., passive protection (see Chapter 3).
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The ethnic agenda of the state has also increased in strength since the 1980s, a
transformation that can be observed in the recognition of multiple indigenous
reservations in Caquetá and Putumayo (see Figure 5.11 above). The objective has been to
prevent additional displacement and assimilation of the Amazon’s indigenous
populations of the sort that occurred during the period when the state actively promoted
agrarian colonization (Bonilla, 1968; Friede, 1953; Pineda, 1985). Although indigenous
reservations represent only a small part of each department, it bears emphasis that
reservations comprise 7% and 22% of the territory of Caquetá and Putumayo,
respectively. On the basis of this difference, one might surmise that cumulative
deforestation in Putumayo is lower than it is in Caquetá because of the more pronounced
role of indigenous reservations.
Although additional evidence is needed to properly test this hypothesis, I do not
believe that cumulative deforestation has been significantly affected by the ethnic agenda.
Indigenous reservations tend to be less deforested than other types of land in Caquetá and
Putumayo; the biggest indigenous reservations in the two departments are isolated from
agrarian colonization; and indigenous reservations close to agrarian colonization tend to
be small, suggesting that their possible contribution to cumulative deforestation dynamics
in the region is minor (see Figure 5.11).
In sum, the developmental era was a path-shaping moment that configured the
basic features of the integration paths of Caquetá and Putumayo. This critical juncture left
a self-regulating and consolidated market economy in Caquetá and a cyclical and
unstable extractive economy with a poorly consolidated farming in sector in Putumayo.
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This section demonstrated that these trajectories were amplified and reinforced by the
transformations of the neoliberal period. I provided evidence that the retreat of the state
from the market, the onset of coca cultivation, and the empowerment of the nondevelopmental agendas of the state did not radically alter integration trajectories in the
Amazonian foothills.

5.6. Conclusion
This chapter examined the transformations of the Amazon piedmont during the
developmental era, which I conceived as a critical juncture during which the basic
parameters of two distinct integration trajectories were configured, in turn producing
differential levels of cumulative deforestation. In particular, the chapter demonstrated
how Caquetá and Putumayo began to diverge as a result of the different developmental
strategies implemented by the state between 1958 and 1982. I argued that the different
levels of cumulative deforestation that characterize Caquetá and Putumayo—both regions
with active agricultural frontiers—resulted from the fact that the state promoted
commercial farming in the former and extractive development in the latter.
The Colombian state decided to actively promote agrarian colonization and
support the consolidation of a livestock economy in Caquetá, which was one of
Colombia’s most important colonizing frontiers during the developmental era. Caquetá´s
countryside received substantial public investments from state agencies like the
INCORA, which were funded by the national government and the World Bank. The
integration experience was very different in Putumayo, where the state made minimal
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public investments aimed at promoting agrarian colonization and the consolidation of
commercial farming. Instead, the Colombian government authorized Texaco to explore,
build infrastructure, and extract oil, all of which defined an integration trajectory led by
the state’s extractive agenda. As a result of these different state-led strategies, only
Caquetá was able to consolidate and to an extent democratize a livestock economy, which
in turn explains the department’s high level of cumulative deforestation. Putumayo´s
commercial farming sector, by contrast, was left behind.
Although the reasons for these different forms of state intervention are not entirely
clear, I hypothesized that an historical explanation needs to consider the strategic
interests of the state, which refocused from the external to the internal domain, and from
Putumayo to Caquetá, during the first half of the twentieth century (see Chapter 4). In
other words, when the state’s primary interest was to ensure territorial sovereignty
against the Peruvian encroachment, Caquetá was of relatively less strategic importance
than Putumayo, which was a border region requiring defense.
The strategic interests of the state radically changed following the 1932
international war, however. Caquetá quickly became a priority when violence erupted in
neighboring departments. The active promotion of both agrarian colonization and
commercial farming was part of an ambitious strategy to reduce violence in the Andean
core of Colombia and prevent its diffusion to marginal areas like Caquetá. At the same
time, Putumayo ceased to be a priority: not only had the international dispute between
Colombia and Peru ended, but the level of violence in Putumayo’s immediate vicinity
was relatively low. As such, migration to the region and the risk of diffusion were
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correspondingly insignificant. The lack of a more ambitious development strategy to
support agrarian colonization in Putumayo was, I suggest, a result of the shifting strategic
interests of the state.
By the early 1980s, the two Amazon departments exhibited the basic
characteristics of two distinct types of integration: while Caquetá was integrated through
the expansion of livestock farming, Putumayo was integrated through the expansion of
the extractive frontier. I have argued that the basic features of these integration
trajectories did not significantly change during the neoliberal era. Rather, they were
reinforced by consequential phenomena like the withdrawal of the state as a
developmental actor, the entrance and proliferation of coca crops, and the strengthening
of the non-developmental agendas of the state. Therefore, path dependency best describes
historical transformations since the end of the developmental period.
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CHAPTER 6. DIVERSE LEGACIES IN THE AMAZONIAN FOOTHILLS

6.1. Introduction
This chapter represents the last of three steps in a contextualized paired comparison
between Caquetá and Putumayo, the Colombian Amazon’s two most developed and
populous departments that nonetheless display starkly different patterns of historical and
contemporary deforestation. Chapters 4 and 5 focused on a path-shaping period, the
developmental era, to illustrate the similarities between Caquetá and Putumayo until the
mid-1950s, when their economic and political integration paths and corresponding levels
of deforestation began to diverge as a result of differential state intervention. While
Caquetá consolidated a relatively democratized farming system by the end of the
developmental era, Putumayo was integrated into the Colombian economy through oil
extraction, which did not lead to the consolidation of a farming economy. As a result of
this initial divergence, factors like the introduction of coca crops generated different
effects in the two regions during the 1980s. Coca crops became a complementary and
transitional product in Caquetá, and a dominant one in Putumayo.
This chapter continues the paired comparison by exploring the legacies of the
developmental era that go beyond the limited horizon of utilitarian economics. Certainly,
the objective of this chapter is not to provide a complete narrative of contemporary
transformations in the Amazonian foothills, which remain exceptionally dynamic because
the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC is very recent.
Instead, my goal is to lay out some of the most salient political and cultural
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characteristics of Caquetá and Putumayo, and explain why these features are entrenched
legacies of the developmental past.
Studying these legacies is vital to understanding not only the continuity of
cumulative deforestation over time but also the relative inefficacy of state policies
designed to stop it. By focusing on their most salient and enduring features, scholars and
practitioners can better understand the spatial patterns of deforestation in post-conflict
Colombia. The FARC was once very influential in both Caquetá and Putumayo, where it
constrained the development of the farming economy. However, the effects of the
FARC’s demobilization on deforestation have been uneven. Unsurprisingly, Caquetá is,
among the cases studied, the province with the highest rates of deforestation since the
withdrawal of the FARC. Putumayo, by contrast, experienced relatively low levels of
historic and contemporary deforestation despite being impacted by the FARC. In order to
understand the contemporary dynamics of forest loss in the Amazonian foothills, I argue,
we must consider the interaction effect between historic integration trajectories, their
contemporary legacies, and the demobilization of the FARC.
The aim of this chapter is not to test but to generate an empirically-oriented theory
that accounts for different levels of cumulative and contemporary deforestation and takes
into consideration the role of history. To this end, I provide and compare thick
descriptions of contemporary Caquetá and Putumayo with the aim of generating a set of
hypotheses that can be tested in the future. This chapter is therefore a preliminary effort
to explain subnational differences in Amazon deforestation.
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The chapter consists of four parts. The first part explores transformations in the
Amazonian foothills following the peace process between the Colombian government
and the FARC. It highlights the importance of both temporal and spatial differences when
it comes to explaining the dynamics of deforestation and the influence of the FARC’s
demobilization. The second part of the chapter focuses on the political economy of the
environment in Caquetá and Putumayo as a window into the markedly different political
interests and actions in the two regions. The third part looks at the most salient cultural
legacies affecting contemporary dynamics of deforestation in the Amazonian foothills. I
then summarize my argument in a brief concluding section.

6.2. Current Environmental Issues in Caquetá and Putumayo
The demobilization of the FARC has facilitated the expansion of agricultural and
extractive frontiers in Caquetá and Putumayo. However, the speed and scope of change
has varied according to the particular type of integration. While most existing academic
literature emphasizes temporal transformation

that is, before and after demobilization—

I argue for the importance of spatial differences as well, to the degree that they reveal the
legacies of the past. Figure 6.1 illustrates two of the most salient environmental issues in
Caquetá and Putumayo today, which relate to the expansion of the agricultural and
extractive frontiers.
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Figure 6.1. Most salient environmental issues in the Colombian Amazon foothills
Data for hydrocarbons from ANH (2018), for deforestation alerts from CIAT (201(, for
primary and secondary roads from IGAC (2016) (co-authored with Nicolás Herrera).
6.2.1. The Expansion of the Agricultural Frontier
Deforestation has increased in Caquetá and Putumayo in parallel with the most
important successes of the peace process. However, following the demobilization of the
FARC, deforestation increased far more rapidly in Caquetá than in Putumayo: between
2015 and 2017, deforestation increased by 177% and 98% in Caquetá and Putumayo,
respectively (see Figure 6.2 below). In addition to this uneven rate of increase, the overall
magnitude of deforestation is much greater in Caquetá as compared to Putumayo, and
most Terra-i deforestation alerts pertain to the Caquetá department (see Figure 6.1
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above).1 Contemporary explanations that emphasize the role of the FARC are incomplete
insofar as they fail to recognize that the guerilla organization was once very influential in
both departments. If the withdrawal of the FARC were the main driver of deforestation,
we would observe equally rapid deforestation in both departments. Why is post-conflict
deforestation less intense in Putumayo than in Caquetá?
A

B

Figure 6.2. Annual deforestation, coca crops and livestock inventory by department
Data for forest loss from Global Forest Watch, for coca crops from Ministry of
Government-UN, for livestock from Fedegan and ICA. A: Caquetá, B: Putumayo
On the basis of my fieldwork and official data, I argue that the impact of the
demobilization of the FARC can only be understood in relation to the regions’ enduring
integration trajectories (see Chapters 3 and 5). The demobilization of the FARC has
accelerated deforestation in regions like Caquetá, where the legal farming system was
already consolidated due to a particular type of integration based on commercial farming.
Conversely, post-withdrawal deforestation has been relatively less intense in regions like

1

There have been some deforestation alerts for Putumayo as well. However, they tend to come from the
north of the department, specifically the municipalities of Puerto Guzmán and Puerto Leguizamo, into
which Caquetá´s deforestation path has expanded.
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Putumayo, where the consolidation of legal farming is still in its infancy. The crucial
relationship between historic integration trajectories and contemporary transformations in
Caquetá and Putumayo can be appreciated by considering two proximate drivers of
deforestation: coca crops and livestock farming.
In addition to forest loss, Figure 6.2 above depicts the land area dedicated to coca
cultivation in the two departments over the last decade. Part A of the figure provides vital
evidence for the proposition that coca cultivation is not the main proximate driver of
deforestation in Caquetá: although coca cultivation has certainly increased in the last
three years from 7.7 to 11.7 thousand hectares—the change in the magnitude of
deforestation was much larger

from 22.3 to 62.1 thousand hectares. Even assuming that

each hectare of coca cultivation required land clearance, the total amount of cultivated
area in 2017 would only account for 19% of the cleared land in the same year. Something
very different took place in Putumayo (Part B), where annual forest loss and illegal
cultivation increased by similar magnitudes and at comparable rates: cleared forests
increased from 13.1 to 26.2 thousand hectares, while coca cultivation increased from 20
to 29 thousand hectares. Although Caquetá and Putumayo both experienced deforestation
without coca cultivation and coca cultivation without deforestation, Figure 6.2 suggests
that coca crops were the dominant driver of deforestation in Putumayo but not in
Caquetá.
On the other hand, the opposite is true when we look at cattle ranching, which the
literature identifies as an important proximate driver of deforestation (see Chapter 2).
Figure 6.2 also provides aggregate data on the number of animals in Caquetá and
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Putumayo over the last decade, from which we can infer that cattle has been the main
driver of deforestation in Caquetá, but not in Putumayo. The number of animals in
Caquetá has markedly increased in the last four years from 1.35 to 1.8 million
animals—whereas the increase in Putumayo has been minor from 203 to 255 thousand
animals. Only in Caquetá does increasing deforestation coincide with an increasing
number of animals. The impact of the FARC’s withdrawal was thus mediated by the
preexisting degree of consolidation and democratization of the farming system, which
was largely shaped during the developmental era.2

6.2.2. The Expansion of the Extractive Frontier
I end this section by emphasizing that both the agricultural frontier (legal and
illegal) and the extractive frontier have progressed in the Amazonian foothills in parallel
with the peace process. Figure 6.1 above illustrates that oil production is exclusively
concentrated in Putumayo and non-existent in Caquetá. The figure thus provides a visual
representation of the different types of integration trajectories I described in the previous
chapter. After the developmental era, the number of oil wells has only gradually
increased in Putumayo.
However, the sharp difference in terms of active oil production is steadily
changing due to state promotion of the extractive agenda. The figure shows that most
area in the Amazonian foothills of both Caquetá and Putumayo is currently available and

2

The previous chapter explained that by consolidation I mean the existence of a constant, safe and stable
demand for farming products.
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under evaluation or exploration. Nevertheless, the prospect of oil extraction carries
different implications for the two departments. The expansion of extractive industry in
Caquetá would be a fundamental change with the potential to radically transform its
enduring integration trajectory. Conversely, the same changes in Putumayo would be
better conceived as incremental: instead of profoundly transforming the integration path
of the region, additional oil extraction would likely reinforce its historical trajectory. The
next section of the chapter examines the political economies of oil and deforestation in
the Amazonian foothills and defends the significance of developmental-era legacies.

6.3.

The Political Economy of the Environment in the Amazonian Foothills
There have been both changes and continuities in deforestation dynamics since

the demobilization of the FARC. Most studies and journalistic accounts focus on
temporal, rather than spatial, variation and emphasize change over continuity. I argue that
Amazon deforestation after the peace process has been spatially uneven and that such
unevenness is the product of divergent integration trajectories and their enduring legacies.
In this section, I explore one of those legacies, the political economy of the environment,
and conclude that Caquetá and Putumayo represent two distinctive dominant political
economies.
The dominant political economy of each department, I argue, is comprised of two
related but independent sets of political interests and actions: those related to Amazon
deforestation, which is driven by agrarian colonization (legal and illegal) and cattle
ranching, and those related to the extraction of oil. The next sections offer a preliminary
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characterization of the two provinces’ dominant political economies, which I consider
enduring legacies of the developmental era.

6.3.1. The Political Economy of the Environment in Caquetá
In addition to the expanding economic rationale for Amazon deforestation in
Caquetá, I propose that this department has, over time, developed a dominant political
economy of the environment. This characteristic political economy is one of the
entrenched legacies of an integration path that was largely based on commercial farming
and that was constrained until the demobilization of the FARC. I provide evidence for the
claim that in provinces like Caquetá an anti-deforestation agenda solely focused on
enforcement tends to attract few local allies, whereas opposition to large-scale extractive
industries tends to be unified and radical. To illustrate this claim, I briefly reflect on the
role of the environment in relation to (a) political interests, (b) institutionalized politics,
and (c) dynamics of contention.
(a) Political interests. On the basis of my own interviews and observations of
political events and episodes of contention in Caquetá, I argue that most people in the
department are interested in promoting farming development, which implies misgivings
about anti-deforestation policies that do not take those interests into consideration, as
well as opposition to the advancement of the oil industry.
First, many people in Caquetá are interested in promoting the development of a
regional economy that is mostly based on livestock farming. Sectoral alliances are
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possible because both elites and non-elites benefit to some degree from cattle ranching.
Livestock production is not entirely concentrated into a few hands.
The consolidation of livestock farming in Caquetá brought with it a measure of
democratization. Figure 6.3 below, based on the 2018 official inventory of cattle,
illustrates the relative importance of small and mid-size farms in Caquetá. Compared to
Putumayo, where slightly more than 80% of the farms are small

between 1 and 50

animals—mid-size and large farms in Caquetá are relatively significant. On average, a
cattle farm in Caquetá has 108 animals, while in Putumayo the average is 33 animals.
The official data on land inequality for 2014 offers a complementary picture. Although
rural properties are on average larger in Caquetá than in Putumayo,3 land inequality is
lower in the former: the Gini coefficient is 0.59 in Caquetá and 0.74 in Putumayo
(UPRA, 2016, p. 15). Therefore, compared to Putumayo, farms in Caquetá are larger and
the total area of properties is better distributed among land owners and holders.

3

A farm in Caquetá is 72.6 hectares on average, whereas in Putumayo the average is 15.5 hectares. In
addition, 80% of Caquetá’s farms are smaller than 90.1 hectares, whereas 80% of Putumayo’s farms are
smaller than 20 hectares (UPRA, 2016, pp. 258, 437).
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Figure 6.3. Farms by number of animals in Caquetá and Putumayo (2018)
Data on livestock from the ICA.
However, it is important to recognize that elites tend to benefit more than nonelites and that important partisan cleavages divide cattle ranchers. Caquetá has two
established associations of cattle ranchers: a right-wing cattle association in Florencia and
a left-wing one in San Vicente del Caguán (Vásquez, 2015). Although these
organizations have many disagreements and compete against one another electorally,
their differences vanish when it comes to defending the interests of Caquetá´s cattle
economy. While these associations rarely coordinate, they pursue similar goals across
geographical and political differences. Sectoral interests tend to be more consequential
than political, geographical, and other social cleavages.
I arrived at this conclusion by asking cattle ranchers and representatives of the
two associations for their opinions about Nestlé, the multinational company that operates
in the department. The answers I received were not radically different because both
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associations value the social role of the company in the generation of income.4 Sectoral
interests also come into play when actors demand developmental policies and state
investments in, for example, road networks, electricity, technology, and land titles. An
important part of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC
is the participatory elaboration and implementation of Territorially Focused Development
Plans in regions that were severely impacted by the war. To this end, from the second
half of 2017 through 2018 the Colombian government held meetings in Caquetá to hear
the demands of approximately 12,922 participants (ART & Presidency, 2019). I had the
opportunity to attend some of these meetings, where I observed how people in Caquetá,
regardless of partisan allegiances, demand the provision of basic public goods such as
roads, electricity, land titles, education, and health—i.e., investments necessary to
promote the farming sector and the local economy.5
For example, in May 2016 I participated in a town meeting that was organized in
San Vicente del Caguán. During the meeting locals repeatedly complained about “state
abandonment” and the poor provision of roads, electricity, health, and education. Over
the course of three hours, not one participant mentioned the environmental consequences
were such demands to be satisfied. The issue was only broached at the very end of the
meeting, when an indigenous woman rose to critique state policies that promote the
advancement of the cattle frontier. Despite the fact that environmental protection was not
a salient concern, participants voiced their discontent with the entrance of the oil

4

Moderate critiques are emphasized by the northern left-wing association (interviews 15, 20).
A demand for investment projects and state support in exchange of voluntary substitution of coca crops
was an important part of these meetings.
5
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industry. State investments have yet to be allocated, but the official account of these
meetings, published in January 2019, confirms my observation that participants
overwhelmingly demanded infrastructure and farming development (ART & Presidency,
2019).
The academic literature finds that Amazon deforestation in Colombia mainly
results from agrarian colonization whether legal or illegal

and cattle ranching

(Armenteras, Rudas, Rodriguez, Sua, & Romero, 2006). Unsurprisingly, antideforestation policies in departments like Caquetá are usually perceived as threats to the
development of the farming sector. For that reason, they tend to be advanced by national
or international environmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, courts,
university professors, students, and the press, all of which are remote from local demands
for the expansion of the agriculture and extractive frontier.
Environmental agencies have been implementing different projects to promote
“livestock conversion.” Interviewees recalled that the government of Caquetá
implemented an ambitious project in 2014 aimed at intensifying the use of cleared land
through education, technological investments, and the introduction of silvopastoral
systems. The former governor of Caquetá, a member of the Christian political party
MIRA, led the initiative and enlisted two national non-governmental organizations in its
implementation (Arco Irís and Misión Amazonia). Despite their political differences,
Caquetá’s two cattle associations both severely criticized the project on the grounds that
they had been excluded from its design and implementation, a fact they perceived as a
direct challenge to their basic demands. The project continued without input from the
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livestock associations, which were aligned in terms of their sectoral interests rather than
their partisan and geographical identifications.
Local opposition to anti-deforestation initiatives contrasts markedly with the
overwhelming negative response to the encroachment of the oil industry. A powerful
environmental movement has emerged in Caquetá in response to the recent advancement
of the extractive agenda. Since 2014, a number of oil companies have received
authorization to implement seismic studies, which do not require social participation or
environmental licensure. To this end, oil companies have arrived in the region in parallel
with the advancement of the peace process between the Colombian government and the
FARC.
Residents of Caquetá clearly oppose the introduction of oil companies, and their
reasons are diverse. Some have adopted an environmental discourse, which recognizes
that Caquetá is part of the Amazon and emphasizes that water is more important than oil
for life. “Water, not oil” is now a common expression in Caquetá. The defense of clean
water has become an end in itself as well as a means to protect public health, guarantee
access to food, and maintain the productivity of farming. In addition, some residents
articulate related concerns that are not strictly environmental. It is argued, for instance,
that oil extraction incentivizes both the presence of the army a serious problem for
those who cultivate coca crops—and violence between the state and the guerrillas. Some
also express fear of losing their informally held lands, as many peasants and ranchers do
not have legal title, making it possible for the state to allocate their lands to the oil
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companies. Lastly, others express the concern that oil extraction would promote massive
migration and thereby disrupt local practices.
Opposition to extractive industries is thus diverse. To promote the coordination of
the various interests opposed to the oil industry, local leaders organized the Mesa
Departamental por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida in 2010. The main achievement of this
alliance, according to one of its leaders, has been to insert the debate about oil extraction
into Caquetá’s political agenda.
(b) Institutionalized politics. Political interests concerned with the environment
have exerted influence on institutionalized forms of politics. Given the historical
trajectory of Caquetá, which was based on commercial farming, it is highly unpopular to
oppose livestock farming and defend the implementation of environmental laws. By
contrast, it is very popular to oppose the extraction of oil. Given this political context,
few politicians harshly critique cattle ranchers and openly defend the entrance of the oil
industry. Cattle ranchers tend to be vital players as elected officials, candidates, and
voters, even as they remain divided along partisan lines. Electoral campaigns tend to
reflect a broader context in which it is not strategic to emphasize the negative
consequences of cattle ranching.
Politicians, then, have strong incentives to criticize anti-deforestation policies.
Avoiding the topic of deforestation or justifying the problem tends to be politically
beneficial. As an illustration, consider the political forum organized by the Universidad
de la Amazonia during the 2018 Congressional race. Asked to identify the most important
environmental problems facing the department, all candidates initially agreed that the
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advancement of the oil industry was the most pressing concern. Deforestation was
addressed only after a student raised the issue. It was a difficult question that candidates
hoped to avoid in the first place. Despite partisan differences, however, answers to the
question were remarkably similar: candidates recognized the environmental challenge but
strongly defended cattle ranching. For instance, Óscar Conde, a left-wing candidate and
well-known lawyer, answered the question by drawing an explicit connection to the
advancement of the oil industry. Conde said:
Now they are telling us that, since peasants already deforested the region, oil
companies are now allowed to destroy it. If I have to choose between peasants and
companies, I am clear: I choose peasants and not the oil aggression.
The quote is instructive for the way it illustrates, first, how even leftist politicians
tend to defend livestock farming and, second, the strategic importance of criticizing the
oil companies. Both right-wing and left-wing politicians voice support for cattle ranching
and opposition to oil extraction. The left emphasizes the opportunism of right-wing
politicians who oppose oil extraction in Caquetá and support it in Bogotá, the capital city
of Colombia. However, even if right-wing politicians do not genuinely oppose oil
extraction, their double strategy is revealing of the unpopular reception of oil companies
in Caquetá. Different participatory mechanisms have been promoted to voice local
discontent with the entrance of the oil companies.6
(c) Dynamics of contention. Needless to say, political conflicts related to
environmental issues in Caquetá are not always handled through institutional channels.

6

Environmental activists are using varied institutional mechanisms to voice their disagreement: signatures
are being gathered, annual parades organized and consultation processes promoted (Caro, Aristizábal, &
Ciro, 2019; Gómez & Harman, 2014).
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Open confrontation between local populations and state authorities has increased since
the demobilization of the FARC, and part of this dynamic of contention has to do with
environmental politics. Briefly, I provide some examples that illustrate how local
populations in Caquetá have actively rejected both anti-deforestation policies linked to
law enforcement and the sustained advancement of the extractive frontier.
Residents of Caquetá rarely mobilize against deforestation. Instead, they tend to
complain about state policies designed to address deforestation by simply enforcing
environmental laws and about the militarization of the environment. A telling episode
occurred in San Vicente del Caguán in October 2018. A judge in Medellín, in northern
Colombia, ordered the police and the Office of the Attorney General to arrest five
ranchers and confiscate their cattle because their farms were located inside Picachos
National Park, where ranching is prohibited by law. It was a massive operation that
required the deployment of many police, judicial personnel, and trucks. To my
knowledge, it was the first operation of this magnitude in the Colombian Amazon,
although the incarceration of local populations is steadily increasing.
Unsurprisingly, while the judiciary, the army, and environmental activists
celebrated and justified the operation, locals largely complained about it. Residents
conceived the military operation as a direct challenge to their way of life: “We are asking
them to release my father... the second thing we ask is that they give us the confiscated
cattle, and the last thing is to give us the land title. We, as peasants, demand to sit down
because we have been there for more than thirty-five years” (Lente Regional, 2018).
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To resist the police action, people in San Vicente del Caguán engaged different
strategies of contention: they destroyed community-built roads (see Figure 6.4 below),
erected roadblocks, marched, and sent letters to the relevant judicial and environmental
agencies (Asociación Nacional de Zonas de Reserva-ANZORC & Asociación Campesina
Ambiental Losada-Guayabero-ASCAL-G, personal communication, October 29, 2018).
For the locals, the fact that the state was simultaneously promoting the entrance of oil
companies into the department raised doubts about the motivations behind the state’s
anti-deforestation policies. One political leader in Caquetá concluded that the operation’s
true objective was not to protect the environment “because multinational oil companies
are being allowed to destroy our territory” (A. Mayorga, personal communication,
October 27, 2018). Given the parallel progress of the two agendas in the region,
opposition to anti-deforestation policies tends to be justified by highlighting the state’s
hypocrisy when it comes to environmental protection. The relevant question, according to
local leaders, is not so much whether environmental exploitation is allowed by the state
but which actors are legally permitted to engage in it.
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Figure 6.4. The destruction of community-built roads by local residents
Reprinted from Lente Regional (Oct 26, 2018)
In addition to actively mobilizing against the enforcement of anti-deforestation
laws, people in Caquetá have actively protested the entrance of the oil industry. Locals
have physically blocked the roads and bridges used by oil company personnel to conduct
their exploratory studies (Ciro, 2018). Due to the persistence of these protests, oil
company activities in Caquetá are now facilitated by police action to opens roads and
bridges by force. Consultation with locals is not required by law because oil exploration
occurs not on indigenous reservations but on privately-held land whose legal status is not
always recognized by the state. These localized conflicts between ranchers, peasants,
companies, and the police also extend to the capital city, where regional discontent is
expressed through at least an annual demonstration. Every year since 2012, protestors
have marched in opposition to the entrance of the oil industry. Thus far, these marches
have not resulted in open confrontations with the police.
In sum, the expansion of agricultural and extractive frontiers has accelerated in
Caquetá since the demobilization of the FARC. This section has provided some evidence
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illustrating how Caquetá´s population tends to reject state policies aimed at containing the
farming frontier and advancing the extractive frontier. Residents of the department prefer
the opposite: that is, policies to promote agricultural development and contain the
advancement of the extractive frontier. This basic disagreement over developmental
strategies in Caquetá has impacted both institutionalized and contentious politics. On the
basis of this evidence, I hypothesize that provinces like Caquetá, which were integrated
via commercial farming during the developmental era, are likely to exhibit this same
political economy of the environment in the present.

6.3.2. The Political Economy the Environment in Putumayo
Putumayo has also configured a dominant political economy of the environment,
one that is a legacy of an integration trajectory based on the production of oil. I
previously showed that deforestation has increased at a slower pace in Putumayo than in
Caquetá since the demobilization of the FARC. For this reason, Putumayo has not been
an important target of anti-deforestation debates and policies. The contemporary political
economy of the environment in this department revolves around two issues: the
expansion of the extractive and coca-growing frontiers. Unlike in Caquetá, opposition to
the expansion of the oil industry in Putumayo is fragmented, and opposition to antideforestation policies tend to be moderate. In what follows, I briefly describe the
department’s dominant political interests and actions.
(a) Political interests. The fact that Putumayo was integrated through the
extractive agenda of the state configured a political economy of the environment that
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differs markedly from that of Caquetá. Political interests vis-à-vis the exploitation of oil
are diverse, and opposition to extractive activity is fragmented. Put differently, the
farming sector in Putumayo, consisting of elites and non-elites, is not united with respect
to extraction: many local populations benefit, directly or indirectly, from the oil industry.
The income of many families in Putumayo depends on the active production of
oil. The extractive path of integration promoted the migration of colonos, whose labor
enhanced the regional economy. Camps were formed close to the oil wells, and some of
them became urban centers over time. Locals work for oil companies or invest in hotels,
parking lots, bars, and means of transportation. In times of crisis the vital role of oil
exploitation in Putumayo becomes even more evident. A former director of the Chamber
of Commerce explained that approximately 200 tank trucks left the region during the
2014 oil crisis, precipitating a deep economic recession in the department (interview 55).
The crisis could be seen on the streets of Puerto Asís during Christmas: few lights were
up and running during the crisis. “It was a dark Christmas” remarked a local merchant
(interview 55).
Next to oil extraction, cocaine production is the second most significant economic
activity when it comes to environmental politics in Putumayo. Based on my interviews in
the region, I observed a sharp mismatch between the interests of national state agents and
local populations: while the state emphasizes the negative consequences of cultivation
(deforestation) and oil production (industrial pollution), people in Putumayo criticize the
implementation of a drug policy that relies on aerial spraying. The opposite is also true:
people in Putumayo tend to deny or justify the environmental consequences of cultivation
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and oil production, and the state does something similar in defense of drug policy. This
disagreement suggests that environmental issues are often strategically mobilized to
frame other political demands.
Despite this conflict between residents of Putumayo and the Colombian state, it is
worth noting that the coca-growing population has demanded state presence in Putumayo
rather than completely rejecting it (Ramírez, 2011). People in the countryside have selforganized to provide for their own needs, which is insufficient when the scale of the
demanded investment is large (Torres, 2011). In such cases, residents demanding state
investments argue that both the substitution of coca crops and the protection of the
environment are possible.
(b) Political action. Neither public interest in preventing deforestation nor
discontent with the implementation of anti-deforestation policies have, to my knowledge,
resulted in episodes of contention in Putumayo. However, we should view deforestation
debates in light of public and private actions related to oil extraction and drug policy.
Social protests associated with oil extraction in Putumayo are frequent. Unlike in
Caquetá, however, the opposition to extractive industry in Putumayo is fragmented. For
this reason, I suggest viewing episodes of contention related to oil extraction in Putumayo
as distributive conflicts. Interviewees mentioned many protests in which locals
complained about one of the most important negative externalities of oil production:
water pollution. The impact of oil production on the quality of water has to do with
technical problems or oil spills caused by guerrilla warfare. People tend to protest the oil
companies even when they acknowledge that “third parties” caused the oil spill.

247

Residents of Putumayo demand the rapid and complete cleaning of the affected area, a
task that oil companies do not often perform to local satisfaction.7
Furthermore, I heard many stories of residents protesting both the negative
externalities of oil transportation and proposals aimed at modifying the status quo.
Putumayo’s oil is today transported to the Pacific through a pipeline built during the
developmental era and to the north through tank trucks along the secondary and tertiary
roads of oil-producing municipalities. For example, people in Puerto Asís have criticized
the way tank trucks not only damage the roads but also produce unhealthy dust. As a
result of these conflicts, many companies have improved roads and employ water to keep
dust settled in affected residential areas. However, the necessity of tank trucks has
resulted in a local economy characterized by the use of parking lots, hotels, restaurants,
bars, etc. The suppliers of these services tend to be part of the regional elite. This picture
makes it easier to understand why people in Putumayo rarely demand the end of oil
exploitation or transportation. Interviewees recalled local discontent when one company
expressed interest in building a new pipeline that would obviate the need for existing
transportation infrastructure.
We should not conclude from the above that radical opposition to the expansion
of the extractive frontier is absent from the region. In fact, indigenous groups lead a
strong opposition movement whose concerns have been loudly voiced in municipalities
like Puerto Asís and Villagarzón. There are also cases like that of Puerto Guzmán, where

7

Radicals invoke these negative experiences to defend the importance of actively opposing the expansion
of the extractive frontier.
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colonos have opposed oil extraction. For this reason, my claim is not that radical
antagonism to the oil industry in Putumayo is non-existent, only that the opposition is
highly fragmented: as I have illustrated, some actors support extractive industries, some
benefit from the status quo, and some hope that a better balance of interests will be
achieved.
It is worth noting that political elites and state agents were deprived of concrete
incentives for supporting the extraction of oil after 2011, when the Colombian Congress
reformed the mechanism for allocating royalties from oil. Prior to the reform, which
centralized resources and regulated their allocation, state agents had a clear incentive to
facilitate the expansion of the extractive frontier. However, the fact that state agents lost
these incentives does not necessarily mean that they oppose oil extraction.
In addition to oil exploitation, social mobilization in Putumayo also revolves
around the “war on drugs.” Coca crops promote deforestation and cocaine production
pollutes water and soil because peasants use chemicals like hydrochloric acid and
acetone. Most social contention in Putumayo is directed against the implementation of a
drug policy based on the aerial spraying of glyphosate.8 This conflict recently dropped off
after Colombia decided to suspend the use of aerial spraying in 2015. The state’s drug
policy shifted from aerial fumigation to a combination of forced eradication and
voluntary substitution.

8

The aerial application of glyphosate is usually resisted by local populations because it not only affects
their income but also damages health, legal farming activities, water, forests, flora, and fauna (Ciro, 2016;
Ramírez, 2011).
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Peasants tend to be the main political actors in these contests. In the absence of a
strong legal farming sector, Putumayo did not see the emergence of a rural economic elite
capable of influencing state power. It has for this reason been argued that territorial
control tends to be more important than land ownership in Putumayo (CNMH, 2015). For
a long time, peasants in Putumayo have expressed a willingness to replace their coca
crops were the state to prove an economically viable alternative (interview 23). The
challenge for the state is finding an alternative that is comparable to coca cultivation in
economic terms and environmentally friendly at the same time.
In sum, this section has proposed that Caquetá and Putumayo have different
dominant political economies of the environment, which are in turn legacies of the past.
Caquetá, the province with higher and more rapidly increasing rates of deforestation,
tends to oppose the expansion of the extractive frontier, favor the advancement of the
agricultural frontier, and thus critique anti-deforestation policies with the potential to
negatively affect their economic interests. In Putumayo, conversely, the expansion of the
extractive agenda encounters fragmented opposition and few critique anti-deforestation
policies whose objective is to constrain the advancement of the legal agricultural frontier.

6.4.

The Moral Economy
The second legacy analyzed in this chapter pertains to the dominant moral

economies of the two regions of interest (see Chapter 3). I interpret those distinct moral
economies as legacies of the two departments’ historic integration trajectories. During my
fieldwork in the Amazonian foothills of Colombia, I came to understand the importance
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of the non-utilitarian values associated with the economic dynamics that, in turn, explain
different levels of cumulative deforestation. Between 2016 and 2017, I had the
opportunity to participate in public events where I encountered the official symbolism of
the two departments: anthems, coats of arms, and flags. Most of these symbols were
designed by school teachers and then recognized as official by local state authorities. On
the basis of these initial observations, I concluded that a systematic study of official
symbolism would usefully illustrate the sharp cultural differences between Caquetá and
Putumayo that help explain their differential levels of deforestation.
On the one hand, official symbolism can be understood as an observable
manifestation of a region’s most important identity features.9 On the other hand, it also
works to actively configure and reproduce that identity. Such symbols tend to be an
important part of everyday state rituals. Coats of arms are printed on government
letterheads, emblazoned on official uniforms and vehicles, and displayed at statesponsored events like fairs, festivals, and beauty contests. Similarly, anthems are played
at the beginning of almost every public event and used as pedagogical tools to promote
regional identity at schools.
I therefore collected the anthems, coats of arms, and flags of every municipality in
Caquetá and Putumayo, as well as the symbols of the governments of the two
departments.10 My goal was to systematically decode and analyze the messages conveyed

9

It is worth emphasizing that these symbols depict an exaggerated version of history. From the inclusion of
indigenous peoples, one cannot conclude that a society is inclusionary.
10
In fact, I collected official symbols for the entire Amazon region in Colombia, most of which are not
included in this dissertation.

251

by official symbolism. To this end, I consulted different sources of information: local
development plans and the official websites. Although I collected coats of arms,11
anthems, and flags, I focus less on the flags because their meanings were too general.12
My analysis of these official symbols followed the general protocols of content analysis. I
was mostly interested in understanding if a symbol recognized particular actors (colonos
or indigenous groups), specific economic activities (farming or oil extraction), and the
role of “progress” or “development.” I coded each symbol on the basis of these factors.
While the remainder of this section emphasizes the differences between Caquetá
and Putumayo, it is necessary to highlight one powerful similarity. Official symbolism in
the Amazonian foothills of Colombia does not depict battles against oppressive powers
(revolutions), global empires (decolonization), or other foreign enemies (external wars).
Instead, it illustrates a harsh battle against nature, a battle that colonos fought and won
through bravery and exertion. The official symbols of the two provinces celebrate
agrarian colonization, which I interpret as creative destruction. As I illustrate, however,
the symbolism tends to emphasize creation over destruction (see Chapter 3).

6.4.1. The Dominant Moral Economy of Caquetá
While Caquetá and Putumayo were born out of twentieth-century agrarian
colonization, only Caquetá was able to build a ranching economy and culture. The

11
Coats of arms use very few words to convey their messages, but they usually contain the basic
components of the founding myth of a region. As with most regions of Colombia, Caquetá and Putumayo
follow the European rules of heraldry.
12
It is worth mentioning, however, that flags employ the color green for nature, forests, pastures, and
swamps (canaguchales); blue for rivers and skies; white for peace; yellow for enlightenment; and red for
either blood or hard work.
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historical trajectory of Caquetá has additionally configured a dominant moral economy
that is deeply linked to agrarian colonization and cattle ranching. Any explanation of
Caquetá’s high cumulative deforestation should consider the way culture and nonutilitarian values affect the market economy (see Chapter 3).
At present, state agencies like the IGAC and IDEAM conceive the mass
transformation of forests into pastures as a land-use conflict because land is being used
for unsustainable purposes (IGAC, 1993, 2014). However, based on my interviews in the
region, I believe the idea of a land-use conflict fails to capture the complexity of the
problem. I argue, instead, that the so-called land-use conflict is in fact a conflict between
two visions of the land’s “vocation.” While the IGAC argues that forestry is the vocation
of Caquetá, locals tend to believe that the vocation of the region is cattle farming. My
interviews with cattle ranchers, peasants, and political leaders revealed that I was asking
questions about the very foundation of the region, its history, economy, and identity.
Although interviewees agreed that forest loss is a serious environmental concern, most of
them justified it for particular reasons. Interviewees tended to believe that Caquetá’s
vocation is both agrarian colonization and cattle farming.
In order to systematically explore the ideas conveyed by my interviewees, I
collected and analyzed official symbols in order to determine whether they explicitly
represent colonos, indigenous groups, livestock farming, oil extraction, and the concepts
of “progress” or “development.” Table 6.1 presents my basic findings and specifies the
type of symbol (anthem or coat of arms) for each municipality of Caquetá.
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Table 6.1
Official Symbolism in Caquetá

Note. Data from official websites (2016). a: anthem / c.a: coat of arms
The upshot of Table 6.1 is that most of Caquetá’s regional symbols represent and
celebrate both agrarian colonization and livestock farming, while only few of them
include indigenous groups. However, since this abstract summary does not reflect
important differences among Caquetá´s municipalities or the particular manner in which
each dimension is represented, Figure 6.5 provides four typical examples of coats of
arms.
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A

B

C

D

Figure 6.5. Four examples of coats of arms in Caquetá
Reprinted from official websites (2016). A: El Doncello, B: San Vicente del Caguán, C:
La Montañita, D: Solita.
The recognition of colonos is thus one of the main features of Caquetá’s
symbolism: colonos are represented in fourteen local anthems13 and nine coats of arms.
These symbols honor the heroic labor undertaken by colonos’ in the establishment of new
farms. Colonos conquered “uninhabited” lands, transformed the landscape, and
introduced cattle ranching. Not surprisingly, colonos are depicted as brave fighters and

13

Only the anthems of Florencia and Morelia are silent about colonos.
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anthems explicitly recall their harsh battle against nature. The anthems of Belén de los
Andaquíes and the department of Caquetá, respectively, claim that “it was the courage
and sweat of your colonos and the iron determination of your women that transformed
your virgin jungles into this majestic promised land,” and that colonos “were able to
forge with sweat this emporium of wealth.” The coats of arms of Caquetá represent a
similar idea in the form of rural labor tools like axes, machetes, saws, blades, and picks.
The case of La Montañita (C) is possibly the clearest example.14 Sometimes these
symbols even illustrate the linkage between labor, land clearance, and forest loss: the coat
of arms of San Vicente del Caguán (B) depicts a steel ax embedded in a tree stump, while
El Doncello’s coat of arms (A) includes a tree that was recently cut down. The tree on the
ground is known as doncello (prosopis juliflora), which is the name of the municipality
(Melo, 2016).
In addition to this recognition of colonos’ labor, the region’s symbolism also
glorifies livestock farming. Fifteen municipalities depict cattle ranching in either their
coats of arms or their anthems (see Table 6.1).15 At least six regional anthems explicitly
mention cattle as the region’s main source of wealth. The anthem of Cartagena del
Chairá, for example, claims that “its colonos transform the jungle with tools and will /
They produce livestock and seeds that are the heritage of Caquetá.” The anthem of
Solano conveys a similar idea: “Fishing, beaches, and livestock enrich your region / [and]
your people with emotion, their customs have persevered.” Moreover, thirteen coats of

14
15

It is less common to depict colonos as peasants (San Jose del Fragua) or with white skin (Milán).
The municipality of Solita is a remarkable exception (see image D in Figure 6.5.).
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arms honor livestock farming by depicting at least one cow. The cases of San Vicente del
Caguán (B) and La Montañita (C) above are examples of this.
By contrast, indigenous groups occupy a secondary place in Caquetá’s official
symbolism. Ten municipalities in Caquetá do not even mention or depict them (see Table
6.1). Five anthems refer to indigenous people as the ancestors who lived in the region
prior to agrarian colonization. Furthermore, six coats of arms represent indigenous groups
by including feather crowns (Solano), spears (La Montañita), monuments (Belén de los
Andaquíes), myths (Cartagena del Chairá), or people with darker skin (Milán).
Finally, at least ten municipalities convey the ideas of “progress” or
“development.” Seven coats of arms include these words alongside other valued ideals
like peace, well-being, and labor (see, for example, A and C). Furthermore, municipal
anthems provide rich information about how progress is conceived and reaffirmed. The
anthem of Solita, for example, claims that religion and colonos brought progress with
them: “Christianity and colonizers / by bringing us light and progress / gave life with
faith and sweat / to Solita, corner of my dreams.” Similarly, the anthem of Solano asserts
that the region where the municipality is located “demonstrated to peasants / labor,
progress, and candor / and your forests are the roads / that elevate your wild flower
aroma”.16
I hypothesize that official symbolism is the expression of much deeper cultural
attachments. Tributes to agrarian colonization are observable on streets, neighborhoods,

16

Nature also has a place in these symbols, but it is usually shown as an external entity or a natural
resource ready to be used.
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stores and monuments in parks, all of which explicitly use the highly-valued expression
colono. There is, for example, a public transportation company, a daily newspaper (El
Colono del Sur), and an annual music festival (El Colono de oro) whose names include
the word. My interviewees repeatedly recognized the efforts of past generations: the
“founders,” “pioneers,” or “firsts.” This recognition of agrarian colonization is the
starting point of a tribute to cattle ranching. Additionally, all of Caquetá’s municipalities
hold regular cattle fairs (ferias ganaderas), which are important public festivities.17 These
fairs tend to begin with a parade and a riding party. Plots of land are auctioned and
different breeds of cattle are exhibited and traded. These events are the main “showcases”
of ranchers’ efforts to increase productivity and improve cattle genetics (interview 67).
Contests are organized and awards granted to the best cattle (breed and size), the best
dairy cow (la vaca lechera), and the person most skilled with a chainsaw.
Caquetá´s cattle-centered culture also has aesthetical manifestations. I was
occasionally told that pastures are valued for their beauty. Elena, the sister of a small
cattle rancher in El Doncello, explained this point to me (interview 74). She told me how
she had given her brother one million pesos (slightly more than US $300) to hire
someone to “clean up” (limpiar) areas of his farm that were becoming overgrown. She
and her brother believe that overgrowth is a sign of abandonment, poverty, or laziness.
The real problem for them was the lack of resources and time to keep the farm clean.

17

Florencia’s cattle fair is the oldest in Caquetá: in 2018 the city will hold its 56th annual fair. It is
organized by the Regional Committee of Ranchers (Comité de Ganaderos) and the Company of Fairs and
Slaughterhouses (Compañía de feria y mataderos del Caquetá - Cofema) and supported by the government
of Caquetá and the municipality.
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They both admiringly recalled how their father, who was a pioneer and direct beneficiary
of the INCORA, used to keep the farm clean.
Given the deep roots of this cattle culture, few locals criticize it. Those who raise
questions tend to be based in the educational sector, which is relatively more exposed to
environmental discourses and less dependent on farming. Unsurprisingly, these critiques
tend to be more important in urban areas and in Florencia, the capital city.
As far as criticisms are concerned, it is worth recalling a political debate over
regional symbolism that occurred a decade ago. In 2009, Florencia approved a new coat
of arms that highlighted the importance of both nature and cattle ranching. Figure 6.6
presents the old (A) and the new (B) coat of arms. I here emphasize three important
changes. First, the new symbolism no longer includes tools associated with rural labor.
The two axes were replaced with a pair of Gucamayas (scarlet macaws), a distinctive bird
species from the Amazon region, and a pair of Heliconias. Second, the new coat of arms
recognizes the existence of a unique type of cattle: caqueteño creole. Although the old
(A) and the new (B) coats of arms both depict cattle, the type of cow was changed from
Zebu to creole, reflected in its new color and absence of humps. Finally, the message
along the bottom of the old coat of arms— “god, union, and progress”—was simply
erased.
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A

B

Figure 6.6. Old and new coat of arms of Florencia, the capital city of Caquetá
Reprinted from municipalities’ development plans. A: Old / B: New.
It is important to note that Florencia’s new coat of arms of was the result of a
conscious political decision in which the city council unanimously approved the project
of the Secretary of Education. The proposed modifications aimed to recover a regional
identity through the inclusion of the creole cattle, to honor the Amazon’s indigenous
fauna, to recognize the abundance of water, and to modernize the image of the city as a
way of strengthening local institutions. The new coat of arms was also part of a plan to
promote ecotourism and attract national and international visitors. The Municipality of
Florencia claimed that the local government had been “working for the modernization of
the municipality and… looking to strengthen institutions by introducing a new corporate
image that allows us to project the city to Colombia and the world as a place for
ecotourism” (Town Council of Florencia, 2009). All members of the local council were
content with the proposal, and one claimed that the new coat of arms finally recognizes
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that “Florencia is the golden gate of the Amazon region: the old one does not represent us
and conveys the very opposite” (Town Council of Florencia, 2009).
In sum, Caquetá’s official symbolism illustrates that its identity is largely based on
the valorization of agrarian colonization and livestock farming. What’s more, these
symbols were explicitly designed to convey this impression. Raising cattle and becoming
a rancher is a source of not only economic income but also of prestige and pride.

6.4.2. The Dominant Moral Economy of Putumayo
A different type of integration trajectory configured a different dominant moral
economy in Putumayo. As in the case of Caquetá, I propose that the study of Putumayo’s
official symbolism can shed light on the economic practices valued at the local level. To
this end, Table 6.2 provides basic information about Putumayo’s symbolism (anthems
and coats of arms) using the same methodology employed above to study Caquetá. The
table’s columns provide information about relevant social actors (colonos and indigenous
groups), economic activities, (livestock farming and oil extraction), and values (progress
and development).
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Table 6.2
Official Symbolism in Putumayo

Note. Data from official websites. a: anthem / c.a: coat of arms
Chapter 5 explained Putumayo was integrated through the active promotion of oil
extraction during the developmental era. Agrarian colonization advanced as a byproduct
of extractive industries, with little support from the state. Putumayo is also a region of
recent agrarian colonization whose identity emphasizes oil extraction over cattle
ranching. Table 6.2 illustrates that Putumayo’s symbolism celebrates the role of colonos.
In total, nine municipalities explicitly represent colonos in their anthems or coats of
arms.18 However, compared to Caquetá, recognition of colonos is somewhat less frequent
in Putumayo, where four municipalities do not mention them at all. The overall
difference is minor, however.19

18
I should make an important coding rule explicit at this point. Sometimes Putumayo’s regional symbolism
depicted inhabitants of the municipality without explicitly indicating whether they were colonos, peasants,
or rural laborers. When this was the case, I assumed that the symbol did not represent colonos.
19
Almost every municipality in Caquetá recognizes the historical role of colonos by representing a harsh
battle against nature in which colonos are the soldiers and tools used in the countryside are the weapons.
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In addition to recognizing colonos, Putumayo’s symbolism represents indigenous
groups as protagonists. In fact, only three municipalities fail to mention them, which
suggests the strength of indigenous recognition in the department. For example, the
anthem of Valle del Guamuéz highlights and alliance between indigenous groups and
colonos: “Praise to men and women / Pioneers of trails and tillage / The dreams they
brought in their hands / Founders of this town’s history / And with indigenous groups
they planted / Seeds of progress and hope.” A similar example is Puerto Leguizamo’s
anthem:
In the new conquests Leguizamo goes with faith on the future, with joy and honor
/ The native, the settler, and urban people too / Everyone is solidary for our good /
Today I scream hope for a better world / The jungle is Colombia, the homeland
will be.
The important place accorded to indigenous peoples in Putumayo’s official
symbolism is also evident in eight coats of arms. For example, two of them Valle del
Guamuéz and Santiago—include feather crowns to represent the presence of indigenous
groups (Figure 6.7, A and C). In particular, Santiago’s crest (C) represents a handshake
between a colono and an indigenous person who live together in harmony.
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A

B

C

Figure 6.7. Three examples of coats of arms in Putumayo
Reprinted from official websites. A: Valle del Guamuéz, B: Orito, C: Santiago
Putumayo’s symbolism is also useful when it comes to identifying the economic
sectors that are culturally valued. Official symbols in Putumayo do not exalt livestock
farming.20 The third column of Table 6.2 above (livestock farming column) is almost
empty, suggesting that Putumayo, unlike Caquetá, has not configured a regional identity
centered on cattle ranching. Naturally, this absence does not mean that cattle farming is
not present in reality, as Figure 6.2 illustrated. It merely suggests, as a hypothesis, that
Putumayo is not as culturally attached to livestock farming as Caquetá is.
By contrast, eight municipalities of Putumayo recognize the importance of oil
extraction (Table 6.2), a finding that reflects the profound social legacies of this industry,
first introduced during the developmental era. It is worth noting that the recognition of oil

20

Only three coats of arms in Putumayo represent livestock farming: Orito, Villagarzón, and San Francisco.
For example, Orito’s coat of arms (B) includes the silhouette of a cow surrounded by an oil platform.
Furthermore, the anthem of Villagarzón directly presents the municipality as the “livestock capital” of
Putumayo.
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extraction is not uniform but exhibits a clear geographical pattern21 and is present even in
municipalities without active exploitation. Oil extraction is frequently represented by a
platform on most coats of arms (see, for example, Figure 6.7, images A and B) and with a
black stripe on the department’s flag (Figure 6.8)

Figure 6.8. Putumayo’s flag
Reprinted from the department’s development plan (2016).

Furthermore, although Putumayo’s anthems are less explicit than its coats of
arms, oil is mentioned in the anthem of Orito: “Black gold lies on its floor / And its fertile
fields are seen / Their rivers are golden snakes / That today are seen offering life.”
Putumayo’s official symbolism is replete with the color black and images of oil
platforms.22
In sum, my analysis of Putumayo’s official symbolism suggests that Putumayo
has a regional identity that is distinct from Caquetá’s. Agrarian colonization, progress,
development, and indigenous peoples are recognized by both departments. However,

21

While the symbols of the municipalities of the upper Putumayo do not represent oil extraction, those of
every municipality of the plains, apart from Puerto Leguizamo, do.
22
In addition, the ideas of “progress” and “development” are weaker in Putumayo. Five municipalities
mention it in their anthems or on their coats of arms.
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Putumayo’s recognition of agrarian colonization and progress is weaker, whereas its
recognition of indigenous groups is stronger. Most importantly, livestock farming is
culturally marginal in Putumayo, which overwhelmingly celebrates oil extraction.

6.5. Conclusion
This chapter is the final step in a contextualized paired comparison between
Caquetá and Putumayo whose objective was to illustrate those entrenched legacies of the
developmental era that transcend purely utilitarian economics. The contribution of this
chapter has been to generate a set of new, empirically-grounded hypotheses that can help
us better understand variation in cumulative deforestation and its reproduction over time.
To this end, instead of narrating the history of the two regions after the developmental
era, I analyzed three of the most important contemporary phenomena impacting the
environment in the two departments: the peace process, the political economy, and the
moral economy. The legacies of the developmental era are far more extensive than mere
utilitarian considerations, and the objective of this chapter was to examine the social,
political, and cultural factors shaping prospects for environmental policies in the region
of interest.
First, scholars, journalists, and activists observing increased Amazon
deforestation following the demobilization of the FARC tend to emphasize temporal
rather than spatial differences. Amazon deforestation is an uneven phenomenon, and this
dissertation analyzed the difference between Caquetá and Putumayo. It is still necessary
to determine why deforestation is geographically concentrated in the northern parts of the
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arc of deforestation given that the FARC was influential in both the north and the south.
This dissertation suggests that contemporary deforestation is not simply the result of the
power vacuum left by the FARC. Rather, it is a product of the particular trajectories of
economic and political integration that this dissertation highlighted. Caquetá, the region
where deforestation has increased most markedly in recent years, displays high overall
levels of cumulative deforestation. By contrast, Putumayo, the region that was integrated
through oil extraction, has experienced only moderate deforestation since the withdrawal
of the FARC.
Second, with respect to the regions’ dominant political economies, this chapter
highlights the difficulty of finding local allies to promote anti-deforestation policies in
Caquetá, in contrast with the population’s radical and unified opposition to the
introduction of oil extraction. Conversely, in Putumayo opposition to oil extraction is
fragmented and moderate, and resistance to anti-deforestation laws is weak. These
differences allow me to hypothesize that Amazonian regions that were integrated through
commercial farming will oppose both anti-deforestation policies and large-scale
extractive activities in the twentieth-first century. By contrast, I predict that opposition to
anti-deforestation policies and additional extractive activities will be moderate in
provinces integrated through the extractive agenda during the developmental era.
Third, in relation to the moral economy, this chapter showed how livestock
farming, which the academic literature has identified as the main proximate driver of
deforestation in the Amazon, is positively valued in Caquetá. Compared to Putumayo,
where different economic sectors and social actors are valued, Caquetá exhibits a clear
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cattle ranching culture that celebrates agrarian colonization, progress, and development.
This chapter thus suggested that cumulative deforestation is higher in Caquetá compared
to Putumayo because cattle ranching not only introduces concrete economic incentives
but also creates and reproduces particular cultural attachments. In abstract terms, one can
hypothesize that Amazonian provinces integrated through the commercial farming
agenda during the developmental era will have a farming identity, which is an important
factor in explaining high levels of deforestation.
When the interaction between integration trajectories and contemporary
transformations is considered, we observe that Caquetá, the province with high
cumulative deforestation, exhibits the economic, political, and cultural features that tend
to reinforce its deforesting path. Conversely, in Putumayo, not only is cumulative
deforestation moderate but the legacies of the developmental era themselves facilitate the
modification of its contemporary features. On the basis of my empirical findings, I
propose that provinces integrated through commercial farming will tend to strongly
oppose both anti-deforestation policies and extractive industries given the political and
cultural legacies of the developmental era. By contrast, provinces integrated through the
extractive agenda of the state will exhibit little opposition to anti-deforestation policies or
the advancement of the oil industry. Naturally, these hypotheses need to be properly
tested.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

7.1. Introduction
Deforestation in the Colombian amazon has recently become one of the most important
environmental issues of the country. There was an increase in academic and public
attention regarding this matter, after the achievements of the peace process between the
government and the FARC. Initial fears about the possible negative consequences of the
demobilization of the guerrilla group materialized, and annual deforestation rates in the
Amazon rapidly increased. However, my dissertation argued deforestation in the Amazon
should not be conceived as a new phenomenon, its history dates back to at least the
beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, it is convenient to study the role of
Colombia´s conflict and contemporary deforestation as part of enduring trajectories of
territorial integration. These historical paths are useful to comprehend what is new and
what is not.
The main objective of this last chapter is to summarize the key contributions of
the dissertation, highlight some avenues for future research, and develop some
implications for policy regarding the dissertation’s argument. In this vein, the chapter has
four additional sections. The second section quickly summarizes the types of
contributions contained in this dissertation. The third section reflects on possible
alternative explanations. The fourth section briefly presents the limitations of the
arguments presented and delineates some avenues for future research. The last section
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develops some implications for policy, which defend the importance of taking historical
legacies into account when designing contemporary anti-deforestation policies.

7.2.

Contributions: Deforestation in the Amazon, Subnational Development, and STR
This dissertation makes at least three types of contributions. First, it helps

deforestation scholars and comparativists understand territorial integration and the
ensuing deforestation in the Colombian Amazon piedmont, which is a relatively
understudied case. Pervasive violence in the region has prevented the in-depth study of
the Colombian Amazon. Unsurprisingly, most of the social sciences literature focuses on
countries like Brazil, Peru and Ecuador (Rudel, Flesher, Bates, Baptista, & Holmgren,
2000). Furthermore, this dissertation has the merit of anticipating the negative
environmental effect of the FARC´s demobilization. Although I did not directly study the
role and actions of this guerrilla group, the basic inspiration of my research agenda arose
from the expectation that a successful peace process could bring about major
transformations for the region.
Second, in theoretical terms, this thesis proposed both a conceptualization
(Chapter 2) and a parsimonious set of empirically-grounded hypotheses (Chapter 3)
regarding deforestation dynamics in subnational Colombia. This was done with the aim
of understanding the complex relationship between the state’s strength and deforestation.
The analysis goes beyond the traditionally narrow focus on the enforcement of antideforestation policies (Alcañiz & Gutiérrez, 2018; Fernández & Garay, 2019). As such,
the analytical contributions of my thesis should be interpreted as part of a hypothesis-
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generating effort on a relatively new topic in political science. The empirical data is
meant to support these hypotheses, but additional research is necessary to test their
accuracy and explore their ability to inform out-of-sample contexts. In the dissertation, I
elaborated on the relationship between forest cover and state territoriality in leu of two
emerging political science scholarship concepts: the enforcement paradigm and
subnational state strength. I proposed that forest areas tend to be “brown zones” because
agrarian colonization transforms the landscape in the short term and leads to the
formation of the state in the long term. Due to this proposal, I believe that my thesis
reflects on the importance of avoiding geographical determinism in political science, and
emphasizes basic ecological characteristics of territories that are usually seen as hostile
for the proper development of state authority.
Based on this general concern, I proposed that cumulative deforestation largely
results from different degrees and types of integration. Cumulative deforestation tends to
be high in territories that are relatively more integrated such as Caquetá and
Putumayo and where legal commercial farming had been consolidated during the
developmental era such as in the case of Caquetá). Furthermore, I propose that these
major features associated to different integration trajectories need to be considered when
studying the impact of posterior, secondary transformations like market-oriented reforms,
coca cultivation, capital investments, violence, and opposition to anti-deforestation
policies based on pure law enforcement.
Finally, an additional contribution of this dissertation is to combine different
methodological approaches that are rarely implemented by studies on deforestation. As
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most contemporary deforestation scholarship does, I incorporated an aerial view that is
based on geographical information systems and technical processing of Landsat satellite
images (Appendix A). This aerial view was analyzed parallel to a ground level view,
which is based on qualitative fieldwork in Caquetá and Putumayo The objective of the
ground level fieldwork was to dialogue with local populations and understand the why
and the how of their actions (Hoffmann, García, & Krueger, 2018). Furthermore, because
most existing literature is focused on contemporary, short-term transformations of the
landscape, I decided to incorporate a historical perspective that can map different paths of
destruction and elaborate some hypothesis to explain them. It is worth noting that an
original geodatabase on cumulative deforestation and forest regrowth was produced,
which complements contemporary efforts to monitor annual deforestation rates.

7.3.

Alternative Explanations
In order to properly understand the contributions of this thesis, it is necessary to

analyze at least three plausible alternative explanations of cumulative deforestation in the
Colombian Amazon.
First, one could suggest that subnational variation in deforestation is the result of
different levels of economic development, thus implying that the most developed
departments are highly deforested and the least developed ones are not. Based on this
argument, one can claim that Putumayo is less deforested than Caquetá because the
former is more peripheral and less developed than the later. My thesis captures the
importance of economic development by talking about different degrees of integration
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(see Chapter 3). In this sense, different levels of economic development are vital to
understand the basic difference between departments that are part of the “arc of
deforestation” and those that are not. However, the difference between Caquetá and
Putumayo, two provinces of the arc of deforestation, can not be explained by different
levels of economic development. First, Chapter 4 provided historical information to
understand why Putumayo was strategically more important than Caquetá in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which means that there was a reversal of fortune
during the twentieth century. Second, contemporary data on economic development
suggest that Putumayo has not only higher GDP but also population density compared to
Caquetá.
The second alternative explanation would emphasize the fact that different levels
of cumulative deforestation are simply the result of distinct economic sectors in place. In
other words, in order to extract the market surplus, different economic sectors require
different infrastructures. Agriculture requires infrastructures such as roads, cooling plants
and electricity. The extraction of oil, by contrast, requires the construction of basic
infrastructures such as a pipeline. In this context, my argument on different cumulative
deforestation in Caquetá and Putumayo does not contradict this alternative explanation
based on the economic sectors in place. In fact, the idea of different types of integration
(see Chapter 3) refers to the advancement of different economic sectors in the Amazon
region. However, my argument emphasized the fact that these economic sectors neither
emerged nor consolidated naturally. The Colombian state implemented different policies
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during the developmental era, which explain the advancement of different economic
sectors and the corresponding requirements to take the market surplus out.
The third and final reasonable alternative explanation suggests that different levels
of Amazon deforestation in Colombia are mainly the result of coca cultivation. While
Chapter 6 provided concrete empirical evidence to understand the role of coca crops in
deforestation, at this moment I would like to assess its analytical significance for
explaining my outcome of interest. There is no doubt that forests are cleared with the aim
of cultivating coca in the Amazon region. However, I propose that coca cultivation is
unable to explain different levels of cumulative deforestation between Caquetá and
Putumayo for two reasons. First, coca cultivation may be able to explain different rates of
deforestation after the eighties. Because I adopted the long view, my outcome of interest
is not annual rates of deforestation but the stock of deforestation. Coca crops are unable
to explain different levels of cumulative deforestation because they are relatively recent.
Second, during the last two decades, coca cultivation has concentrated in Putumayo
instead of Caquetá, which is the department that has deforested the most.
In sum, there are at least three important competing alternative explanations that
one can imagine for explaining subnational differences in Amazon deforestation. I have
argued that the level of economic development, the economic sectors in place and the
cultivation of coca are unable to explain different levels of cumulative deforestation in
the Colombian Amazon: they either naturalize economic dynamics or rarely consider the
long view.
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7.4.

Limitations: The Road Ahead
My thesis should be interpreted as the first step of an agenda-setting effort that

needs to be further developed and theorized in the years to come. The objective of this
section is to be explicit about some of the argument´s limitations in order to sketch out
concrete avenues for future research. I broadly identify at least two main challenges: the
transition from hypothesis generating to hypothesis testing and the determination of the
ability of the proposed hypotheses to inform out-of-sample contexts.

7.4.1. From Hypothesis Generating to Hypothesis Testing
Although my conclusions are still preliminary, their value lies in the fact that they
were able to generate a parsimonious set of politically-oriented hypothesis that could be
properly tested. Although contemporary standards in political science are more interested
in hypothesis testing than in hypothesis generation (Lieberman, 2016), these two types of
research are part of the same research process and face different challenges. “It is
difficult to devise a program of falsification the first time a new theory is proposed. Pathbreaking research is, by definition, exploratory. Subsequent research on that topic is
confirmationist insofar as its primary task is to verify or falsify a preexisting hypothesis”
(Gerring, 2004, p. 9). In this context, I have provided data to comprehend cumulative
deforestation caused by different degrees and types of integration. These hypotheses are
based on a paired, contextualized comparison that explores the historical process in
which Caquetá and Putumayo diverged during the developmental era. This divergence is
presented as a consequential critical juncture.
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Despite the strengths of this research strategy, I believe that additional theoretical
and empirical work need to be carried out in order to properly exploit the promising
comparison. For example, one would still need to collect: historical data to understand
forest cover in in the early fifties, the political process by which Caquetá, instead of
Putumayo, was selected to expand the agrarian agenda, the rationale of the investments of
Nestlé and Texaco in Caquetá and Putumayo respectively, and the role of agrarian
agencies in Putumayo (although this department was mostly integrated through the
extraction of oil, the agrarian agenda of the state was not entirely absent).1
Besides the study of this critical juncture, many other topics were briefly analyzed
in this dissertation. For example, the dissertation covered: advancement of marketoriented reforms, empowerment of the non-developmental state agendas, generalization
of coca crops, influence of illegal groups, cultural legacies, and concrete interests and
actions to prevent deforestation. All these aspects are secondary analytically speaking
because they were not able to radically modify the types of integration trajectories
defined during the developmental era. In fact, a good argument can be made to emphasize
the fact that these transformations reinforced enduring integration trajectories in Caquetá
and Putumayo (see Chapters 5 and 6).
However, the way in which these factors contribute to the dynamics of
deforestation should be studied individually. A concrete challenge arising from my thesis

1

Historical evidence regarding the role of the INCORA in Putumayo is very difficult to find. In theory, I
should be able to obtain better data of the agrarian sector in this province before the 1980s to illustrate not
only the result, but also the historical process by which commercial farming was barely consolidated. I
requested access to the INCORA´s archives in Bogotá, but it was not possible.
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is to determine to the extent to which these secondary and subsequent changes need to be
elaborated on. Each of these factors could be conceived as one autonomous project. I
would need to improve both my research design and my empirical strategies to develop
them.2 The most similar systems design that I employed was useful to explore divergent
trajectories over time in the Amazon. Nevertheless, after the developmental era, the idea
of two similar provinces is difficult to defend. Contemporary comparisons between
Caquetá and Putumayo need to seriously consider the fact that Caquetá and Putumayo are
not as similar as they used to be in the mid-twentieth century.

7.4.2. Do the Findings Travel?
Given the limited state of knowledge of the topic in political science, my thesis
chose depth over breadth. This allowed me to underpin the particular characteristics of
the selected cases but risked my ability to research additional cases. An additional
concern relates to the external validity of my findings, that is, their ability to inform outof-sample cases. I do not propose a theory to explain deforestation around the globe. My
argument is very limited to explain deforestation beyond the tropics. The dissertation,
however, could be useful to enlighten other developing countries which still have dense
standing forests. In this vein, I would expect to find similar cultural, political, and
economic legacies concerning development and colonization projects that were
implemented after WWII.

2

For example, one could consider increasing the number of observations by disaggregating the unit of
analysis to the local level.
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External validity is, therefore, high in tropical rainforests, developing countries,
and densely forested areas that were under massive transformation during the twentieth
century. However, it is important to recognize the importance of studying cumulative
deforestation in regions where forests are not dense but fragmented and where timber
markets are an important driver of deforestation. Based on deforestation literature, I
assume that agricultural expansion is the main driver of deforestation in Latin America.
However, I am aware that timber markets could be more important in other continents.
Given these continental differences regarding the drivers of deforestation, a theory
on the drivers of Amazon deforestation would probably be limited to the ecological
region in question. An important avenue for future research is to refine and bolster the
arguments of my dissertation by expanding its geographical and theoretical scope.
Although the subnational comparative method is very powerful for generating and testing
new hypotheses on very complex issues, it limits researchers’ ability to inform out-ofsample country contexts. For this reason, I would plan to expand my study beyond
Colombia to the Peruvian Amazon in upcoming years. I would systematically compare
the state-led strategies of regional development in the Amazonian regions in Colombia
and Peru. This combined, cross-national, and sub-national approach would allow me to
explain different levels of Amazonian deforestation between and within countries.
Finally, although I did not study every region of the Colombian Amazon, I would
claim that my case selection allows me to draw a conclusion about the Colombian case at
large. This is due to the fact that 75% of cumulative deforestation in the Colombian
Amazon has occurred in Caquetá and Putumayo. I would extrapolate that my findings
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could explain the integration trajectories and ensuing deforestation of both Guaviare and
southern Meta. It seems that the department of Guaviare has followed a similar trajectory
to that of Caquetá. Despite some ecological differences and pre-twentieth century
development paths, livestock farming was consolidated as a result of state interventions.
Similarly, cumulative deforestation in southern Meta could be interpreted as an extension
of Caquetá´s expansion (Leal, 1995).3

7.5. Implications
Besides its general empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions, my
dissertation illustrates the potential of political science to inform real-world debates.
Given that Amazon deforestation is an issue of public interest, this dissertation cannot
finish without reflecting on its implications regarding public policy. I recognize that,
instead of studying the design and implementation of specific anti-deforestation policies,
my thesis focused on the long-lasting consequences of varied integration trajectories.
However, I believe that the enduring legacies of past development strategies can illustrate
contemporary policy debates. The goal of the following paragraphs it to explain how
policy debates could be enriched.

7.5.1. State Detachment and Dislocation
This dissertation studied the complex relationship between the territorial reach of
the state, subnational development, and deforestation. Dense forests in the tropics such as

3

There is even a border dispute between Caquetá and Meta over these territories, because people in La
Macarena tends to recognize their cultural, economic and political ties to Caquetá.
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the Amazon tend to be “brown” zones (O’Donnell, 1993). Territorial integration and
forest cover are related because they are both influenced by social factors such as
agrarian colonization, commercial agriculture, and road networks. These factors tend to
promote massive forest clearance in the short term and territorial integration in the long
term. Put differently, the expansion of the agricultural frontier has historically preceded
the territorial reach of the state. The recognition of this negative association does not
necessarily mean that densely-forested areas of the Amazon are always out of reach.
After the developmental era, the territorial reach of the state became more diverse
because it pursued at least four distinctive sectoral agendas in the region: agricultural,
extractive, environmental, and ethnic agendas. However, recent non-developmental forms
of reach tend to be institutional rather than organizational. They also tend to promote
indirect rule rather than direct rule and have a restricted rather than an ambitious scope.
Although the state is not absent, its reach is certainly limited.
Historical and contemporary deforestation has tended to occur where state reach is
formal, delegated or focalized. As a consequence, environmental regulations are difficult
to implement due to the fact that the social conditions that favor the exercise of state
authority (e.g., road networks) are rarely in place. However, it is important to highlight
that the absence of these conditions is one of the main explanations of forest preservation.
In other words, while deforestation traditionally happens in “brown zones,” the expansion
of the agricultural frontiers over forests may facilitate the proper integration of the region.
The implementation of any state policy, including anti-deforestation policies, becomes
easier after massive forest loss. Thus, a policy implication of the persistent association
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between territorial reach and forest cover

resulting from state embeddedness in agrarian

colonization is the Janus face of the state.
One of the most important challenges to effectively prevent forest loss in the
Amazon region is to avoid this statehood trap. If the antecedent conditions of state reach
are not questioned, the trap could become a tragedy in which forest clearance is the cost
of extending state power and state retrenchment is the price of protecting the forest.
Needless to say, this standard is very high for an historically weak state like Colombia,
where local populations in the margins tend to be in need of and call for the most basic
public goods and services.
History is as much about persistence as it is about change, which means that
deeply entrenched historical paths could be altered to some extent. State embeddedness in
agrarian colonization does not need to be immutable. It is time to envision concrete ways
to consolidate a weak state without previously having closed its internal frontiers: a state
that is not only detached from the social conditions that favor deforestation but also has a
different kind of territoriality. In my opinion, increasing agrarian colonization, emerging
commercial agriculture, and expanding infrastructures should no longer be crucial
antecedent dimensions of the territorial reach of the state if conservation of the Amazon
is a serious commitment.

7.5.2. Dealing with the Legacies of the Developmental Era
This dissertation claimed that agricultural frontiers are not equally active by
conducting a paired, contextualized comparison between Caquetá and Putumayo.
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provided crucial evidence to understand the formative role of stateled policies that were implemented during the developmental era. The developmental era
is a historical period that was analytically conceived as a critical juncture. I also argued
that later transformations such as market-oriented reforms, coca cultivation, violence, the
empowerment of the environmental, and ethnic agendas were not able to alter the basic
characteristics of each region´s integration path. In fact, the environmental impact of
these phenomena is mediated by the studied underlying trajectories.
After the developmental era, the role of the state is mostly confined to its
regulatory functions. The empowerment of the environmental and ethnic political
agendas occurred in parallel to the advancement of market-oriented reforms.
Unsurprisingly, neoliberal discourses tend to govern the way in which deforestation is
perceived by state authorities. “Most forest policies articulate the core principles of
neoliberalism, such as a minimal role of the state, an emphasis on voluntary
commitments (for both state and business), market-based solutions and private sector-led
solutions such as REDD+ and forest certification schemes” (Bhagwat, Humphreys, &
Jones, 2017, p. 4).4
Most anti-deforestation policies tend to be restricted to the realm of regulation and
prohibition, and Colombia is not an exception. This restriction is due to an assumption
that the state no longer coordinates development nor its environmental impacts. Thus,
state policies tend to be focused on the design and enforcement of land-use planning

4

See Humphreys (2009) for an theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between forest policies
and neoliberalism.
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institutions such as reserve forests and natural parks. Scholars have also adopted the
enforcement paradigm to study deforestation dynamics and political scientists are no
exception (e.g., Alcañiz & Gutiérrez, 2018; Garay & Fernández, 2018). However, if the
argument of this dissertation is correct, state-made markets will not be so easily stopped
by introducing and enforcing regulations that hardly consider enduring integration
trajectories. For this reason, I believe that my thesis makes an important contribution to
contemporary debates on possible anti-deforestation strategies by highlighting the
importance of considering varied legacies of the developmental era.
One of the main challenges of our times is to envision meaningful policies and
actions that have the potential to tackle the environmental legacies of the developmental
era. The simple imprisonment of colonos, ranchers, loggers, and coca growers has the
potential of escalating conflict (the region was deeply afflicted by violence and it is
crucial to build a stable and durable peace) and mimicking the inefficacy of the war on
drugs; the policy that after four decades has been unable to eradicate coca crops from the
Colombian Amazon.

7.5.3. The Environment for Peace and Peace for the Environment
Amazon deforestation has markedly increased during the implementation of the
peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. Due to the fact that
most research at present is focused on short-term aggregate effects, my dissertation has
the potential of unveiling the role of enduring trajectories of territorial integration and
concrete causal mechanisms.
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The effect of the demobilization of the FARC on deforestation has not occurred in
a vacuum, it is mediated by varied, enduring trajectories of economic and political
integration. Although the FARC has withdrawn from different territories while
deforestation has increased in the aggregate, the rate of change has not been the same.
While Caquetá and Putumayo were deeply influenced by the FARC (Ramírez, 2011;
Torres, 2011; Vásquez, 2015), increases in deforestation are comparatively much higher
in Caquetá. After studying the way in which these departments diverged throughout
history, one can easily understand at this point why the environmental effect of the FARC
does not happen in a vacuum and is, in fact, mediated by enduring integration paths.
Deforestation scholarship has only studied the aggregate, causal effect of
violence on deforestation, which means that the concrete causal mechanisms by which
deforestation results from violence still need to be uncovered. I propose that a promising
avenue of research is to rigorously study the FARC´s role before demobilization. Just like
the state, the FARC pursued different sectoral agendas in the region: the guerrilla was
Janus-faced too. This nuanced approach avoids an over-simplistic and often politicallybiased analysis meant to blame or praise the environmental impact of the armed group.
On the one hand, there is important evidence to suggest that the FARC may have
contributed to Amazon deforestation because they not only promoted (and sometimes
forced) the cultivation of coca crops and the production of cocaine, but also helped to
build and maintain road networks. Because both the cultivation of coca and the
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construction of roads are important drivers of deforestation in the Amazon, one could
state that the guerrilla promoted deforestation.5
Nevertheless, there is important evidence to suggest that the FARC played an
important role in protecting the forest. Although systematic research still needs to be
carried out, I would suggest that the FARC´s environmental effect was both regulatory
and structural. On the one hand, the regulatory role of the FARC can be described as an
example of “gunpoint conservation,” which rests on the authority of the group in the
region. Since the late nineties, the FARC regulated the use of natural resources: they
limited (but did not prohibit) activities such as hunting, fishing, and logging. Local
populations were punished when those limitations were not respected. The FARC
behaved as a multi-dimensional authority and environmental issues were no exception
(Arjona, 2016). Therefore, it is still necessary to study the objectives of the group when
introducing these regulations as well as their spatial and temporal differences: and
efficacy. This research avenue would allow us to assess if the state has something to learn
from the strategies of the FARC.
On the other hand, the influence of the FARC also favored the conservation of
standing forests beyond intentional regulations by constraining economic investments
and migration to the region. Economically, the FARC´s presence made investments risky,
which, in turn, limited the expansion of both the agricultural and the extractive frontiers.6

5

Furthermore, the guerrilla did not always oppose the expansion of the extractive agenda and attacked the
infrastructures of the oil industry, which has caused substantive environmental damage.
6
It has been suggested, for example, that guerrilla presence and armed confrontation in Caquetá delayed the
entrance of oil companies (Ciro, Barbosa, & Ciro, 2016, p. 425).
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The FARC implemented a system of “revolutionary taxes”, which are locally known as
vacunas (vaccines in Spanish – a term for an illegal fee). Farmers and merchants were
forced to pay annual taxes to the guerrilla. The calculation of the tax often depended on
different levels of wealth. Those who did not pay were forced to leave, kidnapped or
killed (interview 29). Furthermore, migration to the rural and forest areas of the Amazon
region was strictly controlled by the FARC to prevent the entrance of their enemies. In
order to reach and settle in a particular area, it was necessary to know a local person,
which would not only facilitate the entrance of the outsider, but also took responsibility
for his/her actions (Cancimance, 2017).7 Thus, based on my fieldwork, I hypothesize that
the demobilization of the FARC increased deforestation by fostering investments and
migration to the Amazonian region.
In conclusion, to understand the environmental consequences of civil wars, it is
necessary to develop studies that are not solely focused on temporal variation and the
aggregate causal effect. It is convenient to study not only spatial variations, as this
dissertation did, but also the causal mechanisms by which civil wars may affect the
forest. To that end, this section proposed some ideas to unpack these mechanisms. The
FARC´s authority was a Janus that preserved the Amazon by introducing environmental
regulations, limiting investments, and controlling migration to the region. The FARC also
promoted forest transformation by inducing road building and coca cultivation.

7

Furthermore, authorization to permanently settle was dependent on residence certificates that were given
by peasant organizations (Juntas de Acción Comunal), which were closely watched by the guerrilla.
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7.5.4. A New Developmental Critical Juncture?
Scholars strongly disagree on the possibility of identifying a critical juncture
while it happens due to the magnitude of its influence and the endurance of its legacy is
still unknown at that point. The identification of a critical juncture is, at best, uncertain
when the enduring consequences of a particular historical moment have not happened
(Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Despite this important cautionary note, one could suggest
that Colombia is undergoing a new critical juncture (see, for, example García Villegas,
2018) that has the potential of having profound environmental consequences in the
country’s Amazonian region (PNUD, 2014).
The idea that peace could only be achieved through the active promotion of
economic and social development in regions that were deeply-afflicted by violence, has
returned as a consequence of the peace process between the Colombian government and
the FARC. This dissertation suggested that state power and order could be established
through economic and political integration. Sergio Jaramillo, former High Commissioner
for Peace in Colombia, defended the concept of a “territorial peace,” to support the idea
that the implementation of integral policies in particular territories is necessary for
building peace (Jaramillo, 2013). Furthermore, the peace agreement explicitly recognizes
several tools to promote the economic and social development of marginal and often
problematic regions. Peace building efforts in Colombia are territorially prioritized
according to specific factors. Given their high levels of violence, most of the
municipalities in Putumayo, Caquetá, Meta, and Guaviare, where deforestation has
historically occurred, have been prioritized.
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If the theoretical claims of this dissertation are correct and the Colombian
Amazon region is undergoing a new developmental critical juncture, contemporary
peace-building efforts can end up promoting massive deforestation in the long run. Given
that (compared to the developmental era) the environmental agenda is stronger at present,
one would expect to find not only different strategies from state agencies, but also
different demands from local populations. How do environmental concerns shape peacebuilding efforts in the Amazon region?
Briefly, the demands of local populations have not changed over time, nor has the
state seriously considered the ecological challenge at hand. After the peace agreement,
the state implemented an ambitious participatory process to aggregate the demands of
local populations in prioritized regions. The idea was to design Development Programs
with Territorial Perspectives (PDETs) through participatory mechanisms. Although the
implementation of these programs had not started when I finished this thesis, the
expectation is that state investments will likely increase in the upcoming years. I was able
to participate in a couple of these meetings, where I observed how historically excluded
populations were in need of and called for basic public goods and services such as roads,
bridges, electricity, schools, and health posts; as well as access to land and credits.
Explicit concerns on the probability of fostering deforestation were rarely voiced. The
peace agreement was mostly seen as a window of opportunity to mobilize historical
demands.8

8

The official documents with these development plans were recently released and basically confirm what I
was able to observe.
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The basic concerns of the state were not radically different in these meetings.
Apart from clarifying that land-use planning institutions needed to be respected,9 most
PDETs were discussed and designed without considering their possible impact on
deforestation (interview 34). Therefore, the usual provision of highly-valued public goods
is likely to replicate the problems of the past that this dissertation presented.
The only program being implemented promotes the voluntary substitution of coca
crops in exchange for monthly payments.10 These programs could increase deforestation
depending on the way in which farmers decide to invest the cash transferred to them.
Although it is too early to know how farmers are investing this payment, it is reasonable
to expect that their decisions would be highly dependent on the dominant economic
alternatives in place and the activities that are proven to work. A farmer in Caquetá
explained me this idea with a Colombian saying: “seeing is believing” (interview 78).
Based on my dissertation´s argument, I hypothesized that the environmental impact of
crop substitution on the forest would probably depend on the region. The voluntary
substitution of coca crops in Caquetá is likely to increase cattle farming. The
transformation would be uncertain in provinces like Putumayo, where a default economic
alternative is barely consolidated.11

9

The peace agreement also promised to discusses land-use planning institutions. Given that peasants and
ranchers have occupied forest reserves for a long time, the idea is to subtract additional areas of the reserve
in order to allow the allocation of public land to private hands.
10
Coca growers are compensated for pulling out coca crops. Peasants are receiving around $US 350 per
month during two years. In theory, this program will be complemented by more ambitious programs to
promote the legal farming economy.
11
Aerial fumigation introduces additional ecological problems that are worth to mention. However, because
the impact of this drug policy is not dependent on economic endowments on the ground, these final remarks
focus on voluntary substitution.
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The last topic that could configure a new developmental critical juncture is the
expansion of the extractive frontier, which is in fact the main socio-environmental
concern for local populations. Unlike the Putumayo department, where integration was
promoted through extractive industries, the production of oil has the potential of
introducing significant changes to Caquetá´s enduring trajectory.
In sum, by promoting the development of conflict-afflicted regions in Colombia,
peace-building strategies have the potential of generating serious environmental problems
such as deforestation in the Amazon. Nevertheless, it is too early to know if peacebuilding programs have configured a new developmental critical juncture that will alter
or reinforce enduring paths of economic and political integration. After all, when I
submitted this dissertation (July 2019) the implementation of developmental plans in
prioritized regions had not started; and there were important doubts about the willingness
of the new, right-wing government to implement them.
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APPENDIX A. MAPPING CUMULATIVE DEFORESTATION

Given that many of the figures included in this dissertation were made using remote
sensing data, the purpose of this Appendix is to provide additional information regarding
the methodological decisions and general principles that guided my use of this technique.
This appendix is written in plural, because the dataset on cumulative deforestation was
built with the superb research assistance of the engineer Nicolás Herrera. His abilities
with geographical information systems made the construction of the dataset and maps
possible.
Artificial satellites were first put into orbit in the late 1960s as part of the “space
race” between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Since then, the number of
satellites in space has increased markedly, and artificial flying objects have steadily
accumulated. Over the last several decades, these satellites have produced thousands of
images of the earth’s transformations. The mere existence of such images, however,
would be of little relevance to the public if access to them were barred or prohibitively
expensive. Fortunately, in recent years many restrictions have been lifted and large
amounts of raw geographical data are now freely available on the internet.184
Technological developments and new availability policies have enabled scholars,
activists, and governments to closely monitor landscape transformations. This is no minor
transformation. For example, in the mid-1970s, Camilo Dominguez (1975, p. 302), a

184

See Wulder et al. (2012) for an interesting history of Landsat data policy and the scientific implications
of freely-available images.

291

recognized Colombian geographer, acknowledged the importance of remote sensing
techniques but complained that the Colombian government was technically and
economically “incapable” of obtaining and processing satellite images. That unfortunate
reality has thankfully changed; today, both scholars and governments in the developing
world have the option to work with satellite images at no cost.
Remote sensing is a research technique that allows governments, activists, and
scholars to obtain information about the surface without making physical contact with the
object of interest (thus the descriptor “remote”). The technique is commonly used by the
so-called hard sciences (e.g., geography, geology, climatology, and environmental
studies) to track phenomena such as weather patterns, natural disasters, fires, ice
formations, and land use (Campbell & Wynne, 2011). While deforestation scholarship
has also utilized remote sensing, it tends to adopt short time horizons and an exclusive
focus on contemporary transformations (see Chapters 1 and 2). For instance, Global
Forest Watch, the most important and ambitious research project to measure forest loss
(and gain) around the world, has produced annual data since 2001.185 Similarly, in
Colombia, the IDEAM has produced reliable data on deforestation since the 1990s, and
particularly for the last decade.
Despite the fact that it is possible to produce historical data on forest cover from
raw data, few scholars have applied recent methodological developments to the study of
older satellite images. Landsat images are freely available on the website of the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), which provided the basic data we needed to create an

185

See http://www.globalforestwatch.org.
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original database going back to the 1970s. Additionally, in order to make the results
comparable over time, we applied the same procedures to contemporary images, which
was necessary to reduce bias and standardize the methodology. My dissertation does not
rely on official data because historical images had not been processed and processed
contemporary images did not allow for temporal comparability.
Although the use of remote sensing is relatively rare in the social sciences, some
scholars have defended the utility of the technique in combination with other research
methods (Anselin, 1999; Hall, 2010). An important advantage of remote sensing is that
the resulting data is largely “unbiased” because aerial photography is relatively
independent of local data-collection capabilities and political interests (Huntington &
Wibbels, 2014, p. 640; Herrera & Kapur, 2007).186 In peripheral and conflict-affected
areas like the Amazon region where little infrastructure is present, this advantage makes a
clear difference.
Academic interest in remote sensing is steadily increasing and the technique will
likely become an important part of the “data-rich future of the social sciences” (King,
2011).187 Political science is no exception, even though scholars in the discipline have
barely explored the wide array of existing sensors (see Table A1). Some political
scientists have used data on nighttime lighting produced by the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) to measure concepts like

186

See Min (2015, Chapter 4) for an interesting discussion of bias in remote sensing.
Scholars in the social sciences have relied on remote sensing to study topics like economic development
(Chen, 2016) and violence (Witmer, 2015). See, in addition, Donaldson and Storeygard (2016) for an
enlightening review of remote sensing in economics.
187
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electricity provision, state capacity, and economic development.188 For instance, Brian
Min, a pioneer in the use of satellite images in political science, employs nighttime
lighting patterns to study electricity provision, which is a concrete public good that
governments often provide (Min, 2015; Min, Gaba, Sarr, & Agalassou, 2013; Min &
Gaba, 2014; Min & Golden, 2014). Similar data was used by Hollenbach et al. (2012)
and Harbers (2015) to measure state capacity in Africa and Ecuador, respectively. To be
sure, Harbers did not directly measure state capacity with satellite images.189 Instead, she
built a complex index for subnational state capacity that combined indicators for
collected taxes and economic development, the latter measured using remote sensing
techniques. These examples raise concerns that the utility of satellite imagery in political
science largely depends on its validity when it comes to capturing the concepts and
phenomena that scholars purport to measure.
On the basis of the above introductory discussion, the following paragraphs
describe the most important methodological decisions that went into constructing this
dissertation’s original geo-database of cumulative deforestation.
Sensor Selection. We utilized data from the Landsat program, the longestrunning satellite imaging project offering free access to collected images with a moderate
spatial resolution. Landsat is a joint program of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the USGS that provides remote sensing data for the entirety

188
Furthermore, Table A1 is useful to illustrate that the DMSP-OLS has a coerce spatial resolution
(2700m). Sensors with moderate (e.g., Landsat) and fine spatial resolutions have rarely been used in
political science.
189
Since the Ecuadorian government did not provide data on economic development by locality, she used
nighttime lighting patterns as a proxy for economic development (Harbers, 2015).
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of the Earth’s surface. Between 1972 and 2019, Landsat took a picture of each region of
the Earth approximately every two weeks, producing more than twenty images per year
per region over that period. When open access to Landsat’s data was granted in 2008, its
archives contained more than 2 million images (Woodcock et al., 2008). The new data
policy triggered a dramatic increase in the use of Landsat data: while only 3,000 images
were purchased in the best month prior to 2008, an average of 250,000 images per month
were distributed between 2008 and 2012 (Wulder, Masek, Cohen, Loveland, &
Woodcock, 2012, p. 5).
Furthermore, most scholarly publications on land use and land cover utilize
Landsat imaginary due to its moderate spatial resolution, that is, the size of the smallest
spatial unit that an image is able to represent. Table A1 presents different sensors and
classifies them according to spatial resolution: very fine, fine, moderate, and coarse.
Images with very fine and fine spatial resolution capture more detail. However, fine
resolution also means that more images are necessary to cover the same land area and
that image processing consumes additional time. More importantly, highly detailed
images are often neither free, historical, nor constant over time. Landsat, which captures
land-use changes larger than 30 meters (spatial resolution) and smaller than a hectare,
offers a welcome balance between detailed-but-costly and free-but-coarse images.
Landsat’s spatial resolution “is fine enough to detect and monitor anthropogenic changes
in land cover, while at the same time having an imaging footprint that is sufficiently large
to enable wide-area applications” (Wulder et al., 2012, p. 3).
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Table A1
Sensors by Spatial Resolution

Source: Reprinter from Witmer (2015, p. 2328)
Landsat has launched eight satellite missions, which are typically identified by
their numbers: Landsat 1 (1972-1978), Landsat 2 (1975-1982), Landsat 3 (1978-1983),
Landsat 4 (1982-1993), Landsat 5 (1984-2013), Landsat 6 (1993), Landsat 7 (1999-), and
Landsat 8 (2013-). The technical characteristics of these missions have markedly
improved over time and, as a result, more recent Landsat images tend to be of higher
spatial, radiometric, spectral and temporal quality than older ones.
Study area and image selection. Relevant images were identified using
Landsat’s Worldwide Reference System (WRS), which allows users to find images of
any part of the world by entering unique path and row numbers (e.g., 8-59). Figure 3.7
included images for the row and path numbers covering the “arc of deforestation” in the
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Colombian Amazon. As that figure suggests, a single mosaic required ten images with
path numbers from 6 to 9 and row numbers from 58 to 60. As a result, at least fifty
images were downloaded from the USGS’s website in order to build five mosaics of ten
images from the mid-1970s to the present (see Figure A1).

Figure A1. Five mosaics of ten Landsat images per decade
Images were carefully selected in order to ensure that cloud cover did not pose a
problem and that they were temporally proximate. An ideal mosaic is one constructed
from ten images taken at roughly the same time and not covered by clouds. However, this
standard was almost impossible to meet for tropical rainforests, where clouding is not
only a technical problem but also the main source of “missing data.” For this reason, we
privileged low clouding over temporal proximity. Although we are aware that a region
can change significantly in the span of a single year, and that the quality of data can vary
between wet and dry seasons, we considered the problem secondary when compared to
pervasive clouding. We thus downloaded images with less than 10% cloud cover, which
meant working with images that were not taken during the same year or season. An
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important consequence of this decision was that not every image in a particular mosaic
was taken during the same year and/or by the same Landsat mission. Despite this
limitation, it is worth recognizing that we consciously tried to download images that were
taken during dry seasons when clouding was low.
Image processing. After obtaining the initial data, we undertook the timeconsuming task of processing the images, which involved three procedures: radiometric
correction, geometric correction, and resampling (see Table A2 below). Radiometric
correction is used to correct for data loss, remove haze, and enable both comparison and
mosaicking (Chuvieco, 2015). It removes atmospheric noise and improves the fidelity of
the image. Second, geometric correction links the image to ground coordinates in order to
remove possible deviations. The procedure is crucial for mapping, mosaicking, and multitemporal comparisons.190 Finally, resampling is the process of automatically transforming
the spatial resolution of an image.
Table A2 shows that not every image was equally processed because the initial
quality of the images was not the same. Given the high quality of images taken after the
year 2000, processing those images was unnecessary. By contrast, we applied both
radiometric and geometric correction to images taken in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
Finally, every image taken in the 1970s was resampled in order to modify its spatial
resolution from 60m to 30m.191 Table A2 thus shows both the most important

190

Geometric correction requires a geo-corrected baseline, which was kindly provided by the IGAC. The
uncorrected image’s data pixels are related to the ground locations of the corrected, baseline image.
191
One of the most common resampling methods is called the nearest neighbor, which creates a new pixel
based on the characteristics of the closest pixels from the old grid.
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characteristics of each downloaded image (i.e., path and row, date, Landsat mission, and
identification number) and the executed processing procedures per image.

Table A2
Image Characteristics and Processing

Resampling

6-58

2/4/73

1

LM10060581973035AAA05

±15

6-59

2/4/73

1

LM10060591973035AAA05

±15

7-58

10/2/72

1

LM10070581972276AAA05

±15

7-59

10/2/72

1

LM10070591972276AAA05

±15

7-60

10/2/72

1

LM10070601972276AAA05

±15

8-58

1/7/77

2

LM20080581977007AAA04

±15

8-59

10/17/78

2

LM20080591978290AAA02

±15

8-60

10/17/78

2

LM20080601978290AAA02

±15

9-59

2/1/76

2

LM20090591976032AAA04

±15

9-60

2/3/79

2

LM20090601979034AAA05

±15

6-58

1/4/88

4

LT40060581988004XXX09

±0,5

6-59

1/4/88

4

LT40060591988004XXX11

±0,5

7-58

1/11/88

4

LT40070581988011XXX08

±0,5

7-59

1/11/88

4

LT40070591988011XXX04

±0,5

7-60

1/3/88

5

LT50070601988003CUB00

±0,5

8-58

1/2/88

4

LT40080581988002XXX10

±0,5

8-59

1/2/88

4

LT40080591988002XXX11

±0,5

8-60

1/23/87

5

LT50080601987023XXX01

±0,5

9-59

10/13/87

5

LT50090591987286XXX01

±0,5

9-60

8/23/86

5

LT50090601986235AAA08

±0,5

6-58

8/19/98

5

LT50060581998231XXX02

±0,5

6-59

8/19/98

5

LT50060591998231XXX02

±0,5

7-58

9/27/98

5

LT50070581998270XXX02

±0,5

7-59

9/27/98

5

LT50070591998270XXX02

±0,5

Error (m)

Landsat

ID

Geometric
Correction

Date
(mm/dd/aa)

Radiometric
Correction

Image Processing

Path / Row

1990-2000

1980-1990

1970-1980

Decade

Image Characteristics
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Resampling

7-60

9/27/98

5

LT50070601998270XXX02

±0,5

8-58

6/30/98

5

LT50080581998181XXX02

±0,5

8-59

6/30/98

5

LT50080591998181XXX02

±0,5

8-60

6/30/98

5

LT50080601998181XXX02

±0,5

9-59

7/10/99

5

LT50090591999191XXX06

±0,5

9-60

7/10/99

5

LT50090601999191XXX06

±0,5

6-58

10/4/09

5

LT50060582009277CUB00

±0,5

6-59

2/1/07

5

LT50060592007032CUB00

±0,5

7-58

9/9/09

5

LT50070582009252CHM00

±0,5

7-59

12/27/08

5

LT50070592008362CUB00

±0,5

7-60

8/21/08

5

LT50070602008234CUB00

±0,5

8-58

9/27/07

5

LT50080582007270CHM00

±0,5

8-59

8/31/09

5

LT50080592009243CHM00

±0,5

8-60

8/31/09

5

LT50080602009243CUB01

±0,5

9-59

10/4/07

5

LT50090592007277CHM01

±0,5

9-60

10/4/07

5

LT50090602007277CHM01

±0,5

6-58

2/12/17

8

LC80060582017043LGN00

NA

6-59

1/25/16

8

LC80060592016025LGN00

NA

7-58

1/16/16

8

LC80070582016016LGN00

NA

7-59

2/1/16

8

LC80070592016032LGN00

NA

7-60

2/1/16

8

LC80070602016032LGN00

NA

8-58

1/4/15

8

LC80080582015004LGN00

NA

8-59

3/11/16

8

LC80080592016071LGN00

NA

8-60

3/11/16

8

LC80080602016071LGN00

NA

9-59

1/24/14

8

LC80090592014024LGN00

NA

9-60

9/2/13

8

LC80090602013245LGN00

NA

Error (m)

Landsat

ID

Geometric
Correction

Date
(mm/dd/aa)

Radiometric
Correction

Image Processing

Path / Row

2016

2000-2010

Decade

Image Characteristics
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Image classification. After downloading and processing the images, we
proceeded to classify different types of land cover. Image classification is the manual or
automatic process by which information about land cover is extracted from raw images
(Chuvieco, 2015). Image classification could be manual or automatic. The former is the
process in which a research team draws a polygon based on the characteristics of an
image (e.g., color, texture, shadows) and assigns a particular type of land cover to it.
When the area of study is small or the research team is large enough, images can be
classified manually, which is still the best procedure. However, when the area of study is
large and resources are limited, as in my case, image classification is only possible thanks
to an automatic process in which the pixels of an image (initially stored in a raster
format) are automatically grouped into different types of land cover.
Specifically, the images for this project were analyzed through “supervised
classification,” a process that combines automatic processing with researcher supervision.
The latter involves manual determination of the values representing each type of land
cover through the collection of spectral signatures (technically defined as the variation of
reflectance). We decided to classify each pixel into three broad land cover classes:
forestland, non-forest land, and clouding. To that end, a random sample of 180 pixels per
image 60 per type of land cover was selected in order to collect the intervals of
spectral signatures.192 Based on these spectral signatures, a signature file was created for
each image. This file, which matched the spectral signatures of the sample of pixels with

192

A large number of spectral signatures contributes to the adequate classification of each type of land
cover. For example, different forests with different levels of humidity need to be identified so that they can
be classified as the same land cover.
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the three types of land cover, constituted the main input for the classification algorithm
known as Spectral Angle Mapper (SAM) implemented in ENVI image analysis
software.193
Generalization. Maps are simplifications of reality and generalization is the
process through which details are deliberately lost. Given the importance of
generalization, transparency about methodological decisions and technical procedures is
crucial (Monmonier, 1996). Every processed image was full of details at first, which
made computing and processing them difficult. Because pixels were classified according
to the 180 spectral signatures per image, each classified image initially contained
approximately three million data points on average. Different filters were applied to
reduce this complexity. Figure A2 illustrates the results of the first filter, which calculates
an average based on pixel neighbors. While the left-hand image shows the initial
classification, the right-hand image shows the result following the implementation of
neighborhood functions (filter 7x7) in the ERDAS IMAGE software.
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In theory, the association between spectral signatures and types of land cover should be checked in the
field in order to determine if the signature corresponds with the land cover on the ground. We were unable
to implement this procedure because it is costly and time consuming.
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Figure A2. Initial process of generalization
A: Initial classification, B: Classification with filter

After applying this filter, we converted the images from raster (images) to vector
data (polygons). Given that each image still contained more than one million data points
on average, additional generalization was necessary. To this end, we determined a
minimum mapping unit, that is, the smallest area that the dataset will contain, which we
set at 15 hectares.194 As a result, polygons smaller than 15 hectares were eliminated from
the database (using the Eliminate tool in ArcGIS) and merged with neighboring polygons
that had the largest area or the largest shared border. The choice of the minimal mapping
unit carried a significant implication: because coca crops are usually small

with areas

between 1 and 5 hectares—produced data was not fully capable of representing them
(Ciro, 2016; Vargas, 2003). If a small area of coca cultivation was surrounded by forests,
that area was likely generalized as forested land. Similarly, small forest patches
surrounded by farming areas were likely generalized as non-forested land.

194

This unit is smaller than the minimum unit used by the methodology of Corine Land Cover.
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Finally, in addition to applying these two generalization procedures (filters), we
dissolved adjacent polygons of the same class into a single polygon (see Figure A3).

Vector data with adjacent polygons

Vector data without adjacent polygons

Figure A3. The dissolution of adjacent polygons of the same class
Quality control. Last but not least, we conducted quality control by carefully
comparing the original image with the resulting classification and transformation into
vector data. When the classification of land cover was not accurate and the quality of the
image was high, a completely new supervised classification was performed and every
step of the aforementioned procedure, including quality control, was repeated. When the
quality of the image was low, new images were downloaded with the aim of replacing the
entire image or the specific parts that were damaged or covered by clouds. In simpler
terms, the substitution of images was total or partial depending on the overall quality of
the initial image.
Partial substitutions

patches were implemented when the overall quality of the

image and the initial classification was high, but clouding was still a problem. Clouding
was manually removed with this procedure from historically active deforestation fronts
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with altitudes below 1000 meters.195 A conscious effort was made to guarantee that
contemporary non-forested areas were cloud-free in every mosaic. Figure A4 presents an
example of the technical procedure. First, a polygon was drawn on the initial image in
order to determine the area that needed to be replaced (A), then a second image of the
same area on a different date but without clouding was downloaded and processed (B),
and finally a new image was created by spatially combining these two images (A + B).

A

B

Initial image with clouding (A)

Secondary image without clouding (B)

A

B

Final image without clouding (A+B)

Figure A4. The substitution of partial clouding

195

Clouding in the highlands was considered less problematic because deforestation literature has
demonstrated that it tends to be low there.
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Multi-temporal analysis and the identification of cumulative change. Once the
five mosaics of land cover were independently constructed, we analyzed land cover
changes. we first classified as “no data” those areas that were classified as missing data in
at least one mosaic. we then identified areas that were non-forested or forested in every
mosaic. These areas were treated as constants because they did not change over time.
Finally, the analysis compared the five decades in chronological pairs in order to identify
two broad types of multi-temporal changes: forest loss

from forest cover to a different

type of land cover and forest regrowth from non-forested land to forest cover.
Calculating deforestation, for example, required spatially correlating forested land in the
initial year with non-forest cover in the final year. The procedure was implemented by
pairing two decades at a time.
Finally, these separate multi-temporal analyses were transformed to represent
cumulative transformations over the entire five-decade period. Areas were classified as
“non-cumulative changes” when land cover changed in different directions over time
(e.g., forest loss, forest regrowth, and forest loss). By contrast, areas in which forests
were lost and never recovered were classified as “cumulative deforestation.” Similarly,
areas with forest gain and without posterior loss were classified as “cumulative forest
regrowth.” The final database included four constants (forest, non-forest, no data, and
non-cumulative change) and two variables (cumulative regrowth and cumulative
deforestation) for each of four multi-temporal changes (1970s-1980s; 1980s-1990s:
1990s-2000s; 2000s-2010s).
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As a result of the process described in this appendix, five mosaics were
constructed from at least fifty Landsat images. The technique used to produce this data,
remote sensing, is common in the deforestation literature and the earth sciences but
relatively uncommon in political science. Because remote sensing is remote, the
information gathered through satellite images should be taken as a simple starting point
for understanding complex phenomena on the ground.
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APPENDIX B. HISTORICAL ARCHIVES

Digital Archives
CGSpace. A Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs. International Center for
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT). Retrieved from
https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/35697
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). Digital
Repository. Retrieved from https://repositorio.cepal.org/
The World Bank (WB) Document & Reports (previously known as World Development
Sources). Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home.
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Web Content Archive. Retrieved from:
https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/.
Archives
Administrative Department of Intendancies and Commissariats (DAINCO). General
Archive of the Nation. Bogotá.
Corporation for Sustainable Development in the Southern Amazon
(CORPOAMAZONIA). Documentation Center. Mocoa, Putumayo.
Ecos del Maguaré (1963-1983). Caquetá´s newspaper. Access to this historical archive
was possible thanks to Andrés Eduardo Baquero. Florencia, Caquetá.
The Office of the Governor of Caquetá. Secretaries of Agriculture, Planning and
Infrastructure. Florencia, Caquetá.
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APPENDIX C. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

In-depth interviews were part of a multi-method research strategy that also included
analysis of Landsat satellite images, historical archives, and secondary sources. This
multi-pronged strategy benefited from the strengths and helped mitigate the weaknesses
of in-depth interviews (Lynch, 2013, p. 22). The latter assisted me in generating a set of
empirically-grounded hypotheses and in orienting my process of data collection. For
example, interviewees repeatedly highlighted the strong connection between
deforestation and the formal and informal conditions that regulate access to credit and
public land. On the basis of these interviews, I searched for official information about
credit and public land in the Amazon. Although Chapters 5 and 6 explain how these two
elements can help account for varied levels of cumulative deforestation, the data
employed in support of the argument did not consist of the interviews themselves.
Similarly, in constructing my analysis of regional symbolism (the moral economy of
Amazon deforestation) in Chapter 6, interviews informed my understanding of that
phenomenon but were not my most significant data source.
Because one of the main goals of this dissertation was to examine the
environmental consequences of economic and political integration over time, I focused
on the developmental epicenters of my two departments of interest. I first carried out
interviews in the two capital cities Florencia and Mocoa where the most influential
universities, state agencies, and social organizations are located. In these cities, I gained a
broad overview of the phenomenon I hoped to study and located additional interviewees
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in the other municipalities of each department. I then visited municipalities that were both
active centers of population and commerce and located near the agricultural frontier. I
carried out in-depth interviews in the municipalities of San Vicente del Caguán, Belén de
los Andaquíes, San José del Fragua, and Florencia in Caquetá and Puerto Asís, Valle del
Guamuéz, Orito, and Mocoa in Putumayo. Although I did not visit every municipality in
Caquetá and Putumayo, on the basis on my interviews I believe that my generalizations
about the two departments are not only accurate but also sensitive to internal differences.
In addition, I carried out interviews with experts and crucial informants in Bogotá, Neiva,
and Pasto: the capital of Colombia and the capitals of the two departments closest to the
Amazon piedmont.
In all of the above-mentioned municipalities, I carried out more than 90 in-depth
interviews, attended local meetings, and took detailed field notes on regional
development dynamics. Because my interviewees were not randomly selected, I
recognize that my ability to generalize about broader populations is necessarily limited.
My goal was simply to generate hypotheses about the underlying drivers of cumulative
deforestation in the Colombian Amazon that could be tested in the future using
alternative sampling techniques or sources of data.
Convenience sampling, a particular type of non-random sampling, was my only
option if I hoped to understand the complexity of Amazon deforestation in light of the
constraints of conducting interviews in a region that was deeply affected by violence
(Ciro, 2016; Cohen & Arieli, 2011). My sampling frame was comprised of bureaucrats
working for state agencies in charge of infrastructure investments, agricultural
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development, and environmental protection. Similarly, I searched for social leaders who
were directly involved in the promotion of agricultural development or environmental
protection. I also talked to experts and historians of each region. These three types of
interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling, in which new respondents are
located using the recommendations of earlier interviewees (Lynch, 2013, pp. 27–29).
Interviews lasted for an average of 90 minutes and were rarely recorded.
In addition to the above discussion of the role of in-depth interviews in my
research strategy, this Appendix provides a list of interviews. Because I promised not to
disclose the identities of my interviewees, the list omits their names and other identifying
information. Promising anonymity was necessary to ensure my respondents that their
answers would not create additional risks for them. It was a reasonable decision given the
massive violence the region has experienced, and also because I had few prior
connections in the visited municipalities (McLean, 2013).1 The following list provides
the identification number of each interview (employed throughout the text), the
occupation of the interviewee, and the date and location of the interview.

Table C1
List of interviews
ID
Occupation
1 Farmer
2 Rancher
3 Farmer
1

Date
Location
14/02/2016 Putumayo, Valle del Guamuéz
23/04/2016 Caquetá, Belén de los Andaquíes
14/02/2016 Putumayo, Valle del Guamuez

Conflict zones pose particular challenges for field research. See Wood (2006) on some of the most
important ethical dilemmas, Cohen and Arieli (2011) on the limitations of random sampling, and Ciro
(2016) on the benefits of good quality ethnographic work.
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ID
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Occupation
State official
State official
Political leader
Merchant
Merchant
Merchant
Rancher and farmer
Merchant
Merchant
Former state official of the
UAESPNN
State official
Political leader
State official
State official
Social leader
Social leader
Rancher
Social leader
Political leader
Farmer
Political leader
Social leader
Social leader
Rancher
Rancher
Rancher
Rancher
Political leader
Farmer
Rancher
Merchant
Judicial officer
Judicial officer
State official
State official
State official

Date
2/10/2015
8/10/2015
23/09/2015
16/09/2015
19/09/2015
21/09/2015
9/02/2018
22/09/2015
7/12/2015

Location
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San José del Fragua
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Putumayo, Puerto Asís

6/09/2018
26/09/2015
24/09/2015
2/10/2015
4/10/2015
25/09/2015
29/09/2015
24/09/2015
29/09/2015
24/05/2018
21/04/2016
25/09/2015
30/09/2015
9/10/2015
17/09/2015
21/09/2015
20/09/2015
22/09/2015
10/10/2015
25/04/2016
1/10/2015
15/02/2016
17/09/2015
2/10/2015
15/09/2015
17/09/2015
25/09/2015

Bogotá
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, Belén de los Andaquíes
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, Belén de los Andaquíes
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Putumayo, Valle del Guamuéz
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá, San Vicente del Caguán
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ID
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Occupation
Farmer
State official
State official
Farmer
Historian
State official
Former director of INCORA
Former state official of the
INCORA
State official of the Picachos
National Park
Social leader
State official of the INCORA
Farmer
Farmer
Political leader
Social leader
Merchant
Social leader
Farmer
State official
State official
State official
State official
State official
Judicial officer
Judicial officer
Judicial officer
Judicial officer
Former director of INCORA
Employee of a nongovernmental organization
Employee of a nongovernmental organization
Former state official at
UAESPNN
Former governor of Caquetá
Journalist

Date
16/02/2016
16/02/2016
16/02/2016
7/12/2015
20/02/2016
21/02/2016
20/02/2016

Location
Putumayo, Valle del Guamuéz
Putumayo, Valle del Guamuéz
Putumayo, Valle del Guamuéz
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Mocoa
Putumayo, Mocoa
Putumayo, Mocoa

17/06/2017 Huila, Neiva
19/06/2017
13/02/2016
19/02/2016
12/02/2016
13/02/2016
6/12/2015
10/12/2015
13/02/2016
10/02/2016
11/02/2015
8/12/2015
9/12/2015
10/12/2015
10/02/2016
12/02/2016
10/12/2015
11/12/2015
13/02/2016
12/02/2016
10/10/2015

Huila, Neiva
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Mocoa
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Putumayo, Puerto Asís
Caquetá, Florencia

15/03/2017 Bogotá
17/03/2017 Bogotá
12/06/2016 Bogotá
11/08/2017 Bogotá
23/09/2015 Caquetá, Florencia
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ID
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Occupation
Farmer
Rancher
Social leader
State official
State official
Farmer
Transporter
Historian
Social leader
Social leader
Historian
State official of the
Chiribiquete National Park
Social leader
Indigenous leader
State official of the Alto
Fragua Indiwasi National Park
State official of the Alto
Fragua Indiwasi National Park
Farmer
State official of the Alto
Fragua Indiwasi National Park

Date
22/05/2018
19/04/2016
23/05/2018
23/05/2018
23/05/2018
24/05/2018
27/07/2017
28/07/2017
25/04/2016
27/04/2016
20/04/2016

Location
Caquetá, San José del Fragua
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, Belén de los Andaquíes
Caquetá, San José del Fragua
Caquetá, Florencia
Caquetá, Belén de los Andaquíes
Nariño, Pasto
Nariño, Pasto
Caquetá, Belén de los Andaquíes
Caquetá, San José del Fragua
Caquetá, Florencia

20/04/2016 Caquetá, Florencia
6/09/2018 Bogotá
7/02/2018 Caquetá, San José del Fragua
8/02/2018 Caquetá, San José del Fragua
21/05/2018 Caquetá, San José del Fragua
12/02/2018 Caquetá, San José del Fragua
8/05/2018 Bogotá
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